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Multi-level Europeans
The Influence of Territorial Attachments on Political Trust and Welfare Attitudes
This study explores if the multi-level system in Europe can be seen as 
challenging both traditional state roles and the European integration process, 
since territorial identity by some is expected to be important for legitimacy and 
solidarity. The author argues the relevance of taking into account all levels of 
the multi-level system and shifting the focus from the level of the system to the 
individuals who live in it, and therefore investigates the influence of individuals’ 
territorial attachments on political trust and welfare attitudes.
Incorporating theoretical insights from various research disciplines, three 
challenges are put forward concerning 1) multi-level territorial attachments, 2) 
their effect on political trust, and 3) the effect on welfare attitudes. Moreover, 
these relationships may be influenced by different institutional contexts. 
Empirically, these challenges are investigated by analyzing two different types 
of data sets, combining comparative opinion data from all the EU member 
states with more detailed data from Sweden. 
The results indicate that neither the territorial attachments themselves, 
nor their impact on political trust, constitute a challenge to the role of the 
state (or to the continuation of European integration). Rather, the European 
multi-level system seems to have enhanced both attachment to and trust in 
a number of territorial levels, including the states and the EU. However, the 
relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes 
is of more concern, with possible difficulties to sustain support for the welfare 
state if the majority of people would have strong attachments to territorial 
levels other than the state. Moreover, there is no indication of a demand for a 
“social Europe”. In this regard, the European multi-level system may challenge 
the traditional role of the (welfare) state, but without offering any immediate 
alternative at the European level. Finally, the results indicate the relevance of 
taking into account the institutional context, not least regarding the variation 
of EU member states’ experience of the multi-level system. 
Linda Berg works as a researcher and teacher of political science. Multi-level 
Europeans. The Influence of Territorial Attachments on Political Trust and 
Welfare Attitudes is her doctoral dissertation.
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The political map of Europe has changed dramatically since the end of 
the 1980s, with the continuing integration and enlargement of the 
European Union and the rising importance of sub-national political 
levels. This process can be described as the development of a European 
multi-level system, which is sometimes argued to challenge traditional 
state roles, although the form and extent of such a challenge has been 
debated (Hooghe & Marks 2001; Keating 2003; McEwen & Moreno 
2005; Peters & Pierre 2004). These boundary changes at different terri-
torial levels have led to renewed interest in the theoretical system-
building tradition (Hirschman 1970; Rokkan 1974, 1987; Rokkan & 
Urwin 1983), especially concerning the possible system-building capac-
ity of the EU. Some observers are more optimistic (e.g. Scharpf 1999), 
whereas others perceive more obstacles, regarding the continuation of 
European integration (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005).  
A key to understanding such opposing outlooks is the question of ter-
ritorial identity. In the system-building tradition, territorial identity is 
seen as essential for the further development of democratic society, in 
particular, of welfare states. In the words of Maurizio Ferrera: “State-
building, nation-building, mass-democracy, and redistribution are the 
four ingredients and at the same time the four time phases of territorial 
system-building in modern Europe” (Ferrera 2005:23). If the develop-
ment of the multi-level system can be thought to correspond to the 
state-building phase, the question is whether the same three remaining 
steps are needed for the continuation of European integration. I will 
argue that such a discussion should consider all levels of the multi-level 
system and would benefit from shifting its focus from the system level 
to that of the individuals living in the system, i.e., the European citizens. 
The three remaining system-building phases can thus be explored in 
light of whether and how individuals’ territorial attachments influence 
their political trust and attitudes towards welfare – at all levels of the 
multi-level system and in different institutional settings.  
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The individual-level perspective is highly relevant, due to efforts being 
made in the EU to create specifically European institutions (more or less 
corresponding to the system-building phases); at the same time, how-
ever, European citizens remain relatively hesitant to further integration. 
This hesitation is indicated, for example, by the generally low turnouts 
for European Parliament elections (Flickinger & Studlar 2007), or by 
the 2005 French and Dutch referenda results that refused to ratify the 
new European constitution (Piris 2006). Since most of the political elite 
in Europe tend to favour European integration, the intricacy of system-
building can be thought to lie less in the actual creation of institutions, 
and more in the question of citizens’ attachments and attitudes.  
The theoretical discussions in this study will therefore concern two 
different levels of abstraction. The first is the macro level, or system 
level, at which the amalgamation of the system-building tradition and 
multi-level governance provides the overall theoretical framework of the 
study, explaining how the separate parts are linked and why they merit 
investigation. Second, at the individual level, more specific theories 
about individuals’ territorial attachments and their political impact will 
be discussed and further developed. The empirical analyses, in contrast, 
will not treat both the system and individual levels, but primarily focus-
ing on the influence of individuals’ territorial attachments.1 
 
A multi-level perspective on system building  
To explain why it is relevant to study the impact of individuals’ territo-
rial attachments, I will start the theoretical discussion at the system 
level. I argue that combining the system-building tradition with a multi-
level perspective is pertinent because of the traditional theoretical focus 
on the nation state, which can be contrasted with the reality of bound-
ary changes in Europe. The three system-building phases mentioned 
above can also be referred to using the more general concepts of iden-
tity, legitimacy, and solidarity. The theoretical understanding of the 
overall connection between these concepts in this study can be facili-
tated by considering Ferrera’s elaboration of system building as a con-
tinuous process, which he calls “bounded structuring” (Ferrera 
2005:20ff). “Bounded” refers to how the boundaries of both territory 
and citizens’ memberships, have led to greater closure and fewer exit 
options. “Structuring” concerns the internal processes of relationships 
between centre and periphery, socio−political cleavages, and institu-
tional organization, which have led to greater loyalty and more voice 
                                                 
1 The only exception is the inclusion of the institutional context in Chapter 5. 
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options. Taken together, the bounded structuring process has contrib-
uted to creating a stronger identity among people living in the same 
territory, and, according to Ferrera, made the development of mass 
democracy (legitimacy) and redistributive welfare states (solidarity) 
possible. Each system-building phase can thus be thought to constitute 
the foundation of the next.2 
The general idea of identity as a precondition for legitimacy and soli-
darity can also be found in the broader theoretical discourse, such as 
democratic theory (Dahl 1989; Held 1991), and in Marshall’s (1992) 
three internal components of citizenship: i.e., civil, political, and social 
citizenship. However, these citizenship components of a democratic 
society have almost exclusively, at least in modern European history, 
been tied to national institutions. Such institutions have contributed to 
the crystallization of national identities, and thus to the stability of 
political systems and the development of welfare state policies (Ferrera 
2005; McEwen & Moreno 2005; Rokkan 1974, 1999). Over time, the 
territorial boundaries of the states have thus come to enclose all of 
Marshall’s internal aspects of citizenship, making the external aspects, 
i.e., the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, relatively unprob-
lematic – at least in theory.  
In reality, state borders and capacities (and thus citizenship catego-
ries) have been affected by several processes, such as European integra-
tion and sub-national demands for greater political autonomy. This has 
led to the development of a multi-level political system with large inter-
nal variations among European countries (Anderson 2003; Bache & 
Flinders 2004; Hooghe & Marks 2001; Keating 2003; Marks & Niel-
sen 1996). Because of this, I believe that it is important not only to 
consider either the European or national level, but also to include the 
sub-national levels of the multi-level system in the analyses. 
In the field of multi-level governance studies, some scholars claim that 
the emergence of the multi-level system will lead to the loss of state 
authority, while others argue it is merely a question of new governance 
strategies, the state maintaining its position as the dominant political 
unit (Pierre & Peters 2000). Apart from interest in how state capacities 
are affected by a multi-level system, attention has also been paid to the 
role of the EU and whether or not it could shoulder the roles of its con-
                                                 
2 Ferrera uses these phases or concepts both to describe the historical development of 
welfare states, and as an analytical tool (described as a “ladder of abstraction”) with 
which to establish the evolutionary links between these concepts, which are considered 
parts of the “bounded structuring” process. Theoretically, each step involves greater 
voice/loyalty (internal structuring) and less exit (boundary building) (Ferrera 2005:16-28). 
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stituent nation states. The problem is that the multi-level system, due to 
its unclear distribution of competencies between levels, can also be seen 
as challenging the European integration process (Bartolini 2005). 
The development of a multi-level system thus makes it necessary to 
elaborate theories on the system-building process, to consider the possi-
ble consequences for both the states and for the ongoing European inte-
gration (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005). Since the system-building proc-
ess is supposed to need constant reinforcement and protection, the 
multi-level system has changed the very foundation, i.e., the state-
building step. This first step has been affected by the loosened state 
borders, since these boundaries are based on sovereign control over a 
territory. If the state-building aspect changes, by means of other territo-
rial levels above and beneath the state becoming more politically impor-
tant, this may influence identity (i.e., the nation-building phase). Nation 
building is seen as a further step towards more bounded structuring, 
where membership in the territory becomes bounded and territorial 
identity emerges (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005; Rokkan 1974). There-
fore, it is no surprise that political intentions to enhance new territorial 
identities (at regional or European levels) display similarities with the 
nation-building processes of the nineteenth century. Questions of con-
trol and identity in a certain territorial area are no less important today 
than they were then.3 Hence, at least the possibility of creating identities 
at other than state territorial levels has increased. If we accept Ferrera’s 
arguments about a step-wise process of bounded structuring, identity 
changes can also be expected to affect both legitimacy and solidarity.  
Against the background of the above reasoning, I will argue that the 
multi-level system poses three challenges to both the states and further 
European integration. To elaborate on and explore the consequences 
for both the states and European integration, I will shift the focus to 
include the European citizens living in this multi-level system. Each 
challenge will correspond to a system-building phase, but with Euro-
pean citizens placed at the centre of the theoretical arguments. 
 
                                                 
3 In the nineteenth century, industrialization and major social transformations caused 
people to move from small communities to the cities, changing old loyalties and attach-
ments. With the requirements of the modernization process, this process is considered one 
of the important factors giving way to the forces of nationalism (Gellner 1983; Smith 
1986).  
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Three challenges  
For simplicity, I will start by examining how the three challenges may 
challenge the states, and comment on how each may affect the Euro-
pean integration process afterwards.  
The first challenge I call the challenge of territorial attachments, 
which corresponds to identity, or the nation-building phase of system 
building. Some researchers have drawn attention to an increase in new 
territorial identities, for example, at the regional and European levels, in 
the European multi-level system (Bruter 2005; Catt & Murphy 2002; 
Keating 2003). The definition of my concept of multi-level territorial 
attachments, and how it relates to the broad, general concept of iden-
tity, will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2. For now, it is enough to 
discern that if people do have attachments to other than national levels, 
these attachments could be thought to challenge the states, but only if 
they concurrently lead to decreasing national attachments, i.e.,  if terri-
torial attachments at different territorial levels would function as a 
zero-sum game. There are disparate theoretical views on whether in-
creasing regional or European attachments imply such a decrease in 
national attachments, or whether attachments to other levels rather 
contribute to the emergence of multi-level attachments. There are sur-
prisingly few previous empirical investigations of the matter, especially 
including all levels from local to European, and including all EU mem-
ber states. 
The next challenge is the challenge of political trust, which corre-
sponds to legitimacy, or the mass-democracy phase of system building, 
of which identity is seen as a foundation. With the shift of focus to the 
citizens, I argue that this challenge could be seen as a matter of how 
individuals’ territorial attachments may influence their political trust. 
Regardless of whether or not people have attachments to more than one 
territorial level, a multi-level system can be considered to challenge the 
state in two ways: (a) if there is no empirical support at all for this ex-
pected relationship, and political trust consequently risks being subject 
to more short-term evaluations, or (b) if the expected relationship be-
tween territorial attachments and political trust exists, but there are 
many people with attachments to other territorial levels than the nation 
(regardless of whether they also have a national attachment), leading to 
increasing political trust in other territorial levels. However, it is impor-
tant to point out that even so, this can only be considered a challenge to 
the state if it also implies decreasing trust in national political institu-
tions. The theoretical expectations regarding such a zero-sum game 
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between territorial levels needs further theoretical development, as there 
is also a lack of empirical investigation of the matter.  
The challenge of welfare attitudes is the third challenge, which corre-
sponds to solidarity, or redistribution, the last phase of system-building. 
At the individual level, this challenge concerns the expected relationship 
between individuals’ territorial attachments and welfare state attitudes. 
The idea is that people are more willing to share and redistribute to 
others with whom they identify (van Oorschot 2006). Compared to 
political trust, this relationship is thought to be stronger and more ex-
clusive, due to the redistribution of resources that is essential for wel-
fare policies. This relationship can thus be considered to present a more 
pronounced challenge to the state,4 especially if people’s attachments to 
other than national levels lead to decreased support for national welfare 
policies. Whereas individuals can theoretically simultaneously trust 
political institutions at several political levels, the redistributive features 
of welfare state policies have a closer resemblance to a zero-sum game 
regarding to whom they should apply; it is easier to trust than to share.  
Finally, these challenges can vary according to the different institu-
tional contexts among the European countries, not least concerning the 
multi-level system variations, such as time of EU-membership or type of 
government structure, where these individual-level relationships might 
be more challenging in some types of states than in others. 
The same three challenges (and system-building phases) apply to the 
European integration process as well, albeit from a different angle. 
First, the challenge of territorial attachments can be described as fol-
lows. The possibility of European citizens having attachments to other 
territorial levels than the state is not challenging but favourable for the 
integration process, at least if it involves increasing European attach-
ments. Still, given the existence of the multi-level system, and not simply 
a larger state, it is preferable from a system-building perspective that 
people have multi-level territorial attachments and not only a European 
attachment. The former would correspond more closely to the multi-
level system, and hence be less challenging to the system as a whole.  
Turning to the challenge of political trust, there needs to be a connec-
tion between individuals’ European attachments and the trust they have 
in EU institutions. On the other hand, given the existence of the multi-
level system, is it not good for the future of European integration if such 
a connection between attachments and trust exists only at the European 
                                                 
4 This is mainly a challenge to welfare states. Since all EU member states are considered 
welfare states, albeit differing in scope and character, the distinction between state and 
welfare state is not made here, although it will be touched on in Chapter 5. 
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level or at the expense of national political trust, thus undermining 
system stability.  
Third, some commentators argue about the necessity of developing a 
“social Europe” (e.g. Habermas 2001). Such a development would 
correspond to the last system-building phase – i.e., redistribution, or 
solidarity – and thus to the challenge of welfare attitudes. From a sys-
tem-building perspective, it can be argued that developing a social 
Europe would need the support of people having European attach-
ments, who would be more likely to accept redistribution to other EU 
citizens. Compared to the issue of simply adding trust in another politi-
cal level, implementing welfare policies at the EU level implies at least 
some replacing of existing national welfare policies. The relationship 
between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes can therefore be 
thought to be stronger. However, depending on one’s preferred out-
come of European integration, the question of whether or not such a 
relationship exists can be seen as either a large or small challenge.  
Finally, the experience of being an EU member state and the existing 
national systems differ considerably among member states, so these 
challenges and the individual-level relationships can be expected to vary 
across different types of countries (the institutional context).  
The assumptions underlying these three challenges are more taken for 
granted than theoretically well-developed, especially when moving be-
yond the traditional nation state. Similarly, empirical analyses have 
been few, especially concerning the several relevant territorial levels, 
and there are scarcely any comparative investigations of these individ-
ual-level relationships across countries and territorial levels. The lack of 
previous knowledge in this field means that this study can make both 
theoretical and empirical contributions; it will apply a largely explor-
ative approach to the system-building capacity of a particular multi-
level system (i.e., the European Union), empirically investigating it via 
the political implications of individuals’ territorial attachments. 
Each of the three challenges, as well as the variations in institutional 
context, will be treated in a separate chapter of the study. Each chapter 
will empirically explore the expectations regarding the individual-level 
relationships, and develop them using more specific individual-level 
theories. When the results of all the chapters are combined, they should 
also contribute to our understanding of the overall problem of system 
building and how a multi-level system might challenge the European 
integration process and the role of the state. 
Empirically, studying cross-sectional opinion data is arguably a rele-
vant first step in studying these challenges at the individual level. There-
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fore, I will combine a large-scale comparative study of opinion data 
from all European Union member states with an in-depth study of opin-
ion data from one country (Sweden). The latter represents a further 
contribution of this study, as I was able to influence the selection and 
construction of some of the survey questions. The specific theoretical 
and methodological approaches used will be discussed after introducing 
the specific aim and overall model, as follows. 
 
Aim  
Corresponding to the framework of the three challenges and the institu-
tional context, the specific aim of this study is to theoretically develop, 
and empirically investigate, how individuals’ territorial attachments 
influence their political trust and welfare attitudes in various institu-
tional settings. The model in Figure 1.1 illustrates these relationships.   
 
Figure 1.1 The overall model of the study 
 






   
 
 
Each of the boxes corresponds to one of the three challenges to system-
building in a multi-level system, as well as to a specific chapter of this 
study (indicated in parentheses). Starting with the challenge of territo-
rial attachments, in the second chapter I will discuss the multi-
dimensionality of my concept of multi-level territorial attachments, and 
how it relates to various definitions of identity. In particular, I will 
elaborate on the theoretical expectations when it comes to individuals’ 
attachments to more than one territorial level, as well as how to analyse 
them empirically. In line with the second and third challenges, the pos-
sible impact of individuals’ multi-level territorial attachments on politi-
cal trust and welfare attitudes will be theoretically developed and ana-
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at different political levels (4) 
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lysed. Although not shown in the model, all the theoretical elaborations 
and empirical analyses will naturally take account of other existing 
theoretical explanations.  
Specific institutional contexts are, as mentioned previously, thought 
to have specific impacts on individual-level relationships, in the sense 
that the relationship between attachment and trust, and between at-
tachment and welfare attitudes, can vary between countries with differ-
ent institutional contexts, such as time of EU membership. In Chapter 
5, I will develop and investigate the theoretical expectations regarding 
how particular institutional contexts may impact the relationships be-
tween territorial attachments and political trust and welfare attitudes.5  
To link the separate parts of the model with the following chapters, 
this chapter will introduce a broad theoretical outline of the overall 
model, and make some general comments regarding data and methods. 
The intention is to specify how each part relates to the whole model, 
and how they will be investigated empirically. Since each part and chap-
ter will make use of different theories, and since developing specific 
theoretical expectations is part of the aim, when introducing each part 
of the model next, I will focus more on the overall system level and the 
link to the individual level, saving the details for the following chapters. 
First, however, I will highlight some more points concerning why the 
development of a multi-level system is an important general background 
to this study. 
 
States under pressure and the development of a multi-level system 
Both external and internal pressures, such as the modern international-
ized economy and technical changes in communication, have led to new 
forms of political steering and changes in the institutional design of 
states (Iversen 2005; Pierson 2001). Cross-border contacts have also 
become more important, contributing to increased interaction between 
the economic and political lives of states (Delanty 2000; Goldmann 
2001; Held 1991; Mlinar 1992). Consequently, the traditional distinc-
tion between domestic and international politics has become less mean-
ingful (Aldecoa & Keating 1999). In Europe, the deepening integration 
of the European Union limits the policy options of individual member 
states once joint decisions are taken. In the multi-level governance field, 
                                                 
5 In other words, it is not the possible direct effect of institutional context that is of inter-
est here, but rather the impact on previous relationships, which is commonly referred to 
as an interaction effect; see Chapter 5 for further discussion of this. 
Chapter 1 10 
this situation is often analysed in light of three broad developmental 
trends (Pierre & Peters 2000).  
First, there is a power shift upwards, to supra-national entities. The 
creation of the EU can be regarded as a way for states to cope with the 
challenges of globalization, by delegating certain policy areas to a su-
pra-national political level (Bulmer & Lequesne 2005). Second, power 
in certain fields has concurrently shifted downwards to regional and 
local political levels (Keating & Hughes 2003; Marks & Nielsen 1996; 
Newman 2000; Rhodes 1996). The role of sub-national political units, 
especially regions, has thus become more important in most European 
states. Regions are gaining prominence both economically, as suitable 
areas for economic development, and politically, as units of territorial 
identification, and with this heightened prominence come demands for 
increased autonomy (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Gren 1999; McEwen & 
Moreno 2005). Devolution of several policy areas, particularly in the 
field of public service, has also become common in many European 
countries (Ferrera 2005). Third, there is a shift of power outwards, 
from public to private interests, where external and internal pressures 
are seen as forcing states to retrench and find new solutions in the field 
of welfare services (Mau 2003).  
In most European states there are at least four political tiers at which 
decisions important to the citizens are made: local, regional, national, 
and supra-national − i.e., the EU (Loughlin, et al. 1999). This system of 
political tiers corresponds to what Hooghe and Marks (2003) describe 
as “type I multi-level governance”. In a type I multi-level governance 
system, the sub-central jurisdictions (e.g., regions) are multi-purpose, 
memberships in such jurisdictions do not overlap, and the number of 
political levels is fixed.6 These political levels do not constitute a federal 
system with hierarchically ordered levels. In the multi-level system, con-
tact, co-operation, and negotiation can take place vertically, horizon-
tally, and across national borders. The result is a more complex polity 
than is suggested by the traditional image of a state and how it is sup-
posed to be governed democratically. Variation in the size and auton-
omy of local and regional levels across countries also means that the 
main theoretical distinction should be made between the sub-national 
(local and regional), national, and supra-national levels when making 
comparisons across countries.  
                                                 
6 In comparison, in the type II multi-level governance system, the sub-central jurisdictions 
are functional and task specific, memberships in these jurisdictions overlap, and the num-
ber of levels is fluid. 
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Against this background of boundary changes implied by the devel-
opment of the multi-level system, the three challenges to the state and to 
European integration link together, and give cause for the separate ana-
lytical parts of the overall model. In the following section, I will intro-
duce the more specific theoretical individual-level arguments used to 
develop each part of the model and the relationships between them. 
 
Individuals’ multi-level territorial attachments  
Following Ferrera’s interpretation of the system-building phases, I sug-
gested earlier that the challenge of territorial attachments could be con-
sidered the first challenge to the traditional role of the state, but only if 
people actually form attachments to other territorial levels at the same 
time as their national attachments are decreasing. In contrast, European 
integration could be thought to benefit from increasing European at-
tachments, although correspondence to the multi-level system would be 
better with multi-level territorial attachments. 
As will become obvious in Chapter 2, there are many theoretical defi-
nitions of and research approaches to the word “identity”. One impor-
tant basic distinction is between identity seen as a system-level charac-
teristic, often referred to as collective identity, and identity seen as the 
feelings individuals have. In the introductory system level theoretical 
discussions of this study, identity is usually referred to in the collective 
sense. One example is how identity, according to the system-building 
phases, can be seen as a precondition for legitimacy and solidarity. 
However, I have also argued for the relevance of shifting the focus from 
the system to the individuals − the approach used in the following parts 
of this study. Thus from now on, individuals will be the focus of both 
the theoretical and empirical analyses, and the term “identity” will 
instead be taken to refer to how each person feels.  
I have thus chosen to use a concept I call “multi-level territorial at-
tachments”, defined as the emotional ties individuals have to several 
territorially restricted political tiers in society.7 Thus I am only inter-
ested in how individuals feel, or how individuals would describe their 
territorial attachments. The theoretical foundation I use in examining 
individuals’ attachments to different territorial levels is mainly drawn 
from psychological and sociological research, including theories of mul-
tiple identities, nested identities, and Social Identity Theory (Bourgeois 
                                                 
7 There is no consensus in the literature as to what concept of identity is better, and the 
variation is great; for example, the terms identity, identification, attachment, belonging, 
and connection are all used. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion. 
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& Bourgeois 2005; Brodsky & Marx 2001; Lawler 1992; Medrano & 
Guitérrez 2001; Müller-Peters 1998; Roccas & Brewer 2002).  
I will categorize people according to their forms of attachment, to in-
vestigate whether such attachment differences matter to their attitudes; 
this categorization will be strictly based on the territorial attachments 
respondents themselves have expressed in opinion studies. I will not 
analyse collective identities (e.g., religious or ethnic), but only attach-
ments to territories with political or administrative demarcations. Such 
demarcation corresponds to the process of bounded structuring, and to 
the challenges to a multi-level system.  
Even with such a restricted definition, the theoretical expectations are 
somewhat unclear, and previous empirical analyses are scarce. One 
issue of debate concerns whether or not individuals can be attached to 
more than one territorial level at the same time. The idea of emotional 
ties to more than one territorial level has become widespread in the 
wake of discussions of “Europe of the regions” and of the EU as a 
multi-level system. Regarding the system level, Keating argues that, 
“new and rediscovered identities are often multiple rather than singular, 
operating at two or even three levels” (Keating 2003:9). In fact, even at 
the individual level, several scholars today embrace the notion of possi-
ble multi-level attachments.  
Some commentators’ arguments instead refer to a zero-sum game. 
One example is the discussion of the powers of the state being ques-
tioned, since states are less able to protect their citizens from economic 
crises or to provide desired levels of welfare. This situation might lead 
to the disintegration of national attachment, providing a breeding 
ground for other forms of territorial attachment (Horshman & Mar-
shall 1994; Martin & Schumann 1997). In other words, people may 
become more attached to territorial units above or beneath the level of 
the nation state, and less attached to the state.  
The theoretical arguments are thus somewhat contradictory, and ex-
isting empirical analyses of multi-level territorial attachments are rare, 
especially comparative ones across European countries or including all 
territorial levels. Some existing studies do, however, demonstrate that 
there are in fact some individuals with multi-level territorial attach-
ments (Hooghe & Marks 2001; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001). Theoreti-
cally, individual variation arguably ranges from no attachment to any 
territorial level, to attachment to all territorial levels simultaneously; the 
actual distribution is an open empirical issue. 
Related to the issue of attachment to several levels, is the idea of the 
multi-dimensionality of multi-level territorial attachments; building on 
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the work of Hooghe and Marks (2001), Huici et al. (1997), and 
Medrano and Guiterrez (2001), I claim that the concept is multi-
dimensional. I emphasize that there are three important dimensions: the 
territorial level or levels to which one is attached, one’s form of attach-
ment (e.g., exclusive or multiple), and the strength of the attachment. 
These dimensions are explained and specified in more detail in Chapter 
2, along with discussion of how they can be measured and analysed.  
 
Territorial attachments and political trust 
The next system-building step, and the next challenge to the state and 
to the European integration process, is the challenge of political trust. 
At the system level, this is often referred to as the importance of identity 
to legitimacy, but for my individual-level approach, the impact of indi-
viduals’ territorial attachments on political trust is a better formulation. 
Still, support for the general idea of the importance of identity to le-
gitimacy is not only found in the system-building tradition, but in de-
mocratic theory (Dahl 1989; Held 1991) and in elaborations of 
Easton’s system support theory (Easton 1965, 1975). However, what to 
expect from this relationship in a multi-level system has been much less 
explored and developed. 
Starting with the broader issue of democracy, it has been debated in 
democratic theory whether the same principles of democracy that were 
developed parallel to the nation state and representative democracy can 
be used at all levels or are applicable to the multi-level system as a 
whole. Dahl and Tufte (1973:135) argue that democratic theorists have 
neglected the democratization of systems constituted of political units, 
from local to larger in scale: “The central theoretical problem is no 
longer to find suitable rules to apply within a sovereign unit, but to find 
rules to apply among a variety of units, none of which is sovereign”. 
The most import aspect of democratic theory for the purposes of this 
study is the notion that individuals’ sense of community, of being at-
tached to the territorially defined demos, is regarded as one foundation 
of a stable democratic society (Dahl 1989). Territorial attachment can 
be seen as an important factor making people accept majority decisions 
in territorially distinct political jurisdictions. Citizens make certain de-
mands of territorially based political institutions, including the right to 
vote and that responsibility be taken for certain functions. Moreover, 
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individuals are granted citizenship in certain states.8 For democratic 
systems, it is necessary that they be legitimate in the eyes of their mem-
bers (Dahl 1989; Offe 2000; Scharpf 1999). Inglehart and Welzel, for 
example, state that, “genuine democracy is not simply a machine that, 
once set up, will function effectively by itself. It depends on the people” 
(Inglehart & Welzel 2005:300). Regarding the importance of territorial 
attachments for political legitimacy, Easton puts it this way: “Underly-
ing the functioning of all systems, there must be some cohesive cement – 
a sense of feeling of community amongst the members. Unless such 
sentiment emerges, the political system itself may never take shape or if 
it does, it may not survive” (Easton 1965:176).  
In a multi-level system, how one demos is to be distinguished from 
another is an important matter, as well as which demos is relevant to 
which political decision. According to David Held (1999), the problem 
is that some decisions today lead to consequences not only for those 
who had the right to participate in making them, but also for people 
who had no right to influence the decision-making procedure. In the 
European multi-level system, policy decisions can be made via negotia-
tions across borders and levels, but each individual’s primary political 
citizenship is still formally tied to territorially defined levels, nested in 
one another like Russian dolls. The stability of democratic political 
institutions might thus be affected if people who live in a territorially 
defined society feel less attached to it. It is a risk that can be argued to 
increase in a multi-level system, as has been demonstrated in various 
discussions of legitimacy (for example Abromeit 1998; Agné 1999; 
Anderson 2003; Beetham & Lord 1998; Loughlin, et al. 1999).9  
There could be a challenge to the state if there is a relationship be-
tween territorial attachment and trust, and if national trust were to 
decrease as a consequence of people’s increasing attachments to and 
trust in other territorial levels. There has been considerable theoretical 
development concerning the legitimacy of the EU and of the relation-
ship between member states and the EU, but less attention has been 
paid to the full multi-level system, including the sub-national levels. 
Therefore, the theoretical expectations need to be developed in more 
                                                 
8 Despite the fact that some people have double citizenship while others live in states 
without being citizens of them, the most common situation is that people have rights in 
and obligations towards the state in which they live. 
9 Of course, other important factors contribute to state stability. The idea, is not to argue 
that territorial attachment comprises the only, or the most important, factor, but rather 
that the concept can contribute to our understanding. Not least is the basic distinction 
between diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975), and voice versus resources (Rokkan 
1987) – relevant for the theoretical elaborations in the following chapters. 
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detail, not least according to the multi-dimensionality of my concept of 
multi-level territorial attachments.  
To develop these theoretical expectations, I will use existing theoreti-
cal explanations of political trust, especially explanations that fit under 
the umbrella concept of cultural theories, in which social capital and 
identity are considered germane to political trust (Dalton 2004; Easton 
1975; Putnam 1996). It is in this broad category that I place the possi-
ble impact of multi-level territorial attachments.10 Another important 
aspect is the definition of the concept of political trust itself, which I 
define as the trust an individual has in the political institutions or politi-
cal actors at each territorial level. 
I claim that the theoretical reasoning about this relationship is rela-
tively underdeveloped, and this will become even more apparent when I 
come to the empirical analyses. Hence, I will need to investigate this 
relationship in various ways, in line with the theoretically elaborated 
expectations regarding the different dimensions of multi-level territorial 
attachments. 
There is also a lack of empirical analyses concerning the issue of cau-
sality. The theoretical literature on issues related to territorial attach-
ments and trust expresses divergent views on the direction of causality 
between these phenomena. One view emphasizes how the political insti-
tutions in a society can affect people’s attachments (McEwen & Mo-
reno 2005), whereas another view highlights the attachments individu-
als have and how they can lead to the construction of certain political 
institutions (Paasi 2003). As I will argue in more detail later, I believe 
these phenomena to be reciprocal over time, and, depending on when 
one chooses to start, the focus can shift. My choice to take individuals’ 
attachments as the starting point is justified by the steps of the system-
building process, and the fact that most of the controversy over the 
causal direction concerns the system level. Moreover, since I am not 
trying to explain why an individual has a certain attachment, but rather 
the possible effects of such attachments (in this case, on political trust), 
I argue that it is theoretically most relevant to my research aim to start 
with individuals’ territorial attachments.11 
                                                 
10 Other explanations of political trust, such as the importance of the input side (i.e., the 
formal rules and institutions of the political system) (Rothstein 1998; Scharpf 1999; Tyler 
2000), or the output side, for the system to be able to perform or produce what it is has 
set out to do (Beetham & Lord 1998; Coleman 1990; Mishler & Rose 2001), have been 
used to extract the relevant control variables for the empirical analyses. 
11 Regarding different, albeit related issues, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have tested the 
direction of causality between individuals’ values and democratic institutions, and found 
the causality to be stronger running from values to institutions rather than reversed. 
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Multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes 
The third system-building phase, and thus also the third challenge to the 
state and to the European integration process, concerns the relationship 
between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes. Peoples’ territo-
rial attachments are considered especially important in welfare states, to 
create support for redistributing resources among individuals or differ-
ent territorial units (Mau 2002; Scharpf 1999). Compared to political 
trust, which can theoretically apply equally to all levels, these relation-
ships are thought to be stronger and more exclusive. Welfare and redis-
tribution comprise the last of Ferrera’s system-building phases, and is 
closely connected to Marshall’s idea of social citizenship (Ferrera 2005; 
Marshall & Bottomore 1992; Rokkan 1999). Habermas puts it this 
way: “Belonging to the ‘nation’ made possible for the first time a rela-
tionship of solidarity between persons who had previously been strang-
ers to one another” (Habermas 1998:111). In fact, national identity 
arguably made it possible to override subgroup (e.g., class or regional) 
interests, providing a reason for building solidarity by developing the 
welfare state (Anderson 1991; Ferrera 2005; Scharpf 2000). Offe 
(2000) elaborates this idea by discussing how the development of politi-
cal communities is founded in “beliefs in communality”, which have a 
clear territorial dimension. Territorial boundaries, he argues, contribute 
to forming national identity, and to demarcating the area that encom-
passes a nation’s citizens and within which state obligations are valid. 
In this way, the territorial boundaries limit the state’s responsibility to 
care for the welfare of certain individuals, i.e., the citizens of the state. 
Territorial boundaries and identity are thus regarded as essential for 
maintaining public welfare in states. 
This view has been criticized by authors who cite the existence of 
multi-national welfare states, such as the UK or Spain. As with political 
trust, the direction of the causality has been debated. According to the 
alternative viewpoint of the causality, the development of a welfare 
system in a state contributes significantly to reinforcing national iden-
tity, through the symbolic significance of its institutions. The construc-
tion of the welfare state entails providing basic needs for a nation’s 
citizens through national welfare institutions, thus strengthening social 
solidarity and helping shape national identities. In a national political 
community that guarantees social protection, citizens are less likely to 
shift their loyalties to other communities within or beyond its bounda-
ries (McEwen & Moreno 2005). 
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The common ground between the two views of causality is the idea of 
reciprocity between identity and solidarity. As concerning trust, the 
main causality debate concerns the macro or system level. At the indi-
vidual level, it is easier to argue, theoretically, for the relevance of the 
causal direction leading from the territorial attachments of individuals 
to their welfare attitudes, especially in light of how the multi-level sys-
tem challenges the role of the welfare state.  
With the development of a multi-level political system in Europe, po-
litical tiers other than the state have become important for welfare poli-
cies; for example, some welfare policies are now being handled at re-
gional or local levels in many European countries. In some countries, 
the devolution process can be seen as a response to regional identity 
claims, a willingness to allow regional self-government as regards mat-
ters closely connected to culture and identity (such as education). Some 
observers even argue that such identity-based political claims contribute 
to undermining the welfare state, by compromising the common culture 
and sense of demos that made welfare states possible in the first place 
(Wolfe & Klausen 1997).  
On the other hand, in some European countries, the devolution proc-
ess can be viewed as a way for states to try to transfer responsibility for 
a costly public service sector to lower political levels (Pierre & Peters 
2000). Moreover, Scharpf (1997) argues that it is in fact the constraints 
of the internal market, not globalization, that obstruct the continuation 
of national welfare programs in European welfare states. According to 
that perspective, it is just as likely that the ongoing politicization of the 
territorial identities in European sub-national regions is a reaction to 
the disintegration of national solidarity, which was formerly maintained 
by such national welfare systems. Either way, there is reason to expect 
territorial attachments to matter to attitudes towards welfare. 
The possible shift of responsibility for social policy upwards to the 
EU level is a controversial issue. Some scholars argue that the construc-
tion of a European social policy is a necessity for ongoing European 
integration, whereas others argue that the lack of a common European 
identity means there is no basis on which such a joint policy could rest. 
Habermas (2001) argues that there is a need to deepen European inte-
gration to conserve the democratic achievements of the European na-
tion states beyond their own limits. The proponents of the opposite 
view argue that there is no prospect that welfare-state functions could 
be effectively federalized in Europe, due to the normative salience of the 
pre-existing social contracts between the citizens and their states, and to 
the lack of a European identity (Offe 2000; Scharpf 2000). Mau (2005), 
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for example, has found empirical evidence that people with national 
attachments tend to resist such a development. 
As I have said earlier, I believe that a shift of focus from the system to 
the individual level can facilitate the exploration of these arguments, 
especially in a multi-level setting. The arguments presented above could 
thus be interpreted, at the individual level, as signalling the expectation 
of a relationship between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes. I 
will elaborate this relationship in more detail in Chapter 4, consulting, 
among other ideas, theories on how people with whom we identify are 
seen as more deserving of social protection (van Oorschot 2006); and 
will also include the multi-level perspective. The importance of attach-
ments to territorial areas lower or higher than the state is more debated 
than is the importance of national-level attachments. Some scholars 
argue for the necessity of a connection between sub-national attach-
ments and welfare policies at these levels (McEwen & Moreno 2005); 
the corollary is that the lack of European attachments is an important 
factor explaining the resistance to a common European social policy.  
 
Institutional context interactions 
The last part of the model is the inclusion of the institutional context in 
the relationships presented in previous chapters. Institutional context is 
included because of the different ways European countries have histori-
cally evolved, leading to a range of institutional and organizational 
designs, for example, government structure, welfare regime, and time of 
joining the EU (Esping-Andersen 1990; Lipset & Rokkan 1967); all 
these differences have resulted in great variation in the preconditions for 
individual attachment to different territorial levels. According to re-
search into institutions, such institutional variation is also thought to 
matter to individual attitudes (Hall & Taylor 1996; Huckfeldt & Spra-
gue 1993; March & Olsen 1989; Peters 1999; Svallfors 2003). I will 
argue that there are important reasons to expect the impact of territo-
rial attachments on both political trust and welfare attitudes to differ 
depending on the particular institutional context in which people live. 
Hence, I am mainly interested in the aspects of institutional context that 
characterize countries, especially contextual variations that form part of 
a multi-level political system.  
I am also particularly interested in analysing how different institu-
tional contexts affect the relationship between individuals’ territorial 
attachments and political trust, or between individuals’ territorial at-
tachments and attitudes towards welfare. Hence, it is not the possible 
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direct effects on political trust or welfare attitudes that I will explore 
and analyse, but rather what are usually referred to as interaction ef-
fects.  
To deepen my theoretical understanding of the interaction effects of 
institutional context variations, starting from the multi-level territorial 
attachment perspective, I will consult theories of political trust and 
welfare attitudes, to extract the kind of institutional context variations 
that can justifiably, on theoretical grounds, be included in the analyses. 
Several studies have examined the direct effect of varying institutional 
contexts on both individuals’ territorial attachments (Bruter 2005; 
McEwen & Moreno 2005) and their attitudes regarding political trust 
and welfare attitudes (Mau 2003; Mishler & Rose 2001; Svallfors 
2003). However, fewer studies have examined the interaction effects of 
these institutional contexts, especially concerning the relationship be-
tween territorial attachments and political trust or welfare attitudes. 
Hence, I will also do some empirical analyses, including the selection of 
theoretically relevant institutional contexts as interaction variables, to 
explore the usefulness of such an approach. It should be noted, though, 
that analysing the interaction effects of various institutional contexts 
could easily be the subject of a separate study. Therefore, the analyses 
in Chapter 5 will be limited to examining a few pertinent types of insti-
tutional context that differ between EU member states. 
 
The empirical analyses and the data 
Shifting our focus, as regards the system-building process, from the 
system to the individuals, implies the possibility of statistically analysing 
survey data. Choosing such an empirical approach lets me analyse the 
theoretical relationships across countries and territorial levels. The 
available data sets permit both cross-sectional analyses across all EU 
member states, and more thorough analyses of Swedish data. The 
strength of the statistical methodological approach used in this study is 
that it allows the possibility of generalizing to all European citizens and 
of evaluating the independent impact of multi-level attachments, i.e., to 
estimate the effect when other factors are held constant. Using cross-
sectional data also makes it possible to compare attitudes in different 
institutional settings in Europe (van de Vijver & Leung 1997).  
The weakness, as always in statistical analyses, is that the analyses 
naturally have to present a simplified picture of reality. I will be unable 
to go deeper and study several other related aspects, or to explain the 
working mechanisms of the relationships. When dealing with data from 
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opinion surveys, there is also the general problem of knowing exactly 
how each respondent has interpreted the individual questions in the 
questionnaires. On the positive side, I was able to insert some questions 
of my own into the Swedish surveys, especially concerning how to 
measure degree of attachment to different territorial levels. Moreover, I 
had the chance to experiment with wording my questions in different 
ways, and to analyse the results produced by these different wordings; 
this process enhances the validity of my results, especially compared to 
those previously reported by scholars using different methods and 
wordings to analyse territorial attachments (see e.g. Bruter 2005). 
Another relevant question is whether also to do analyses over time, 
and not only over different spatial territories. The complexity and ex-
plorative nature of my model would make analyses over time an in-
volved task, and there is also a lack of longitudinal data including all 
the aspects relevant to my model. Therefore, this will be simply a cross-
sectional study of a single point in time, which I argue is a relevant first 
step in making new kind of analyses. 
For a broader comparative analysis of all EU member states, I use the 
Eurobarometer data set, EB 62.0, collected in autumn 2004, which 
includes cases from all the 25 member states at the time.12 The Swedish 
data sets offer further possibilities for more detailed analyses from a 
multi-level perspective, analyses including political trust and welfare 
attitudes at the local and regional levels. The Swedish data sets come 
from the national SOM survey13 of 2004 (Holmberg & Weibull 2005), 
and the Swedish European Parliament election study, also of 2004 
(Oscarsson, et al. 2006).14 The data will be analysed using a variety of 
statistical methods, from simple frequency tables to various regression 
analyses, and each method and the reasons for its use will be described 
in relation to the theoretical expectations presented in each chapter. 
                                                 
12 For most countries, 1000 interviews were conducted, though more were conducted in 
Germany and fewer in the smallest countries, such as Luxembourg (Eurobarometer 62. 
Public Opinion in the European Union 2005). The EB 62.0 also includes some non-EU 
countries, but my analyses focus only on the 25 member states, since they are parts of all 
levels of the EU multi-level system. 
13 The SOM institute represents collaboration between three departments at Göteborg 
University: the Institute for Journalism and Mass Communication, the Department of 
Political Science, and the School of Public Administration. SOM has carried out nation-
wide mail surveys of Swedish opinions every year since 1986. The 2004 survey was dis-
tributed to a total of 6000 representative people aged 15−85 years, 60.2 per cent of whom 
responded. 
14 The Swedish election studies are administrated by the department of Political Science at  
Göteborg University. The European Parliament election study 2004 is based on interviews 
with 2001 Swedish voters, 78 per cent of whom responded. 
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The year 2004 
The data sets used were collected in summer and autumn 2004, which 
was a special year in many ways. Among other things, it was the year of 
the greatest enlargement in EU history, with ten new member states 
joining at the same time, on 1 May. For the first time, former Eastern 
European countries become members of the EU. It was also year of the 
European Parliament election, held on 13 June, and issues concerning 
what defines Europe and what it means to be European were prominent 
in the political agendas and media of all EU countries. At the same time, 
much attention was devoted to issues of national and regional identity. 
The respondents to these survey studies therefore had ample opportu-
nity to consider the issues of interest to this study, not least concerning 
their territorial attachments.  
The European election campaign in spring 2004 helped raise aware-
ness of issues of trust in political institutions at different levels (espe-
cially the European level) to a higher level than in non-election years. 
Moreover, the EU enlargement clearly conjured up considerations of 
welfare and solidarity across country boarders, not least concerning the 
issue of free movement of workers from the newest member states. This 
contributed to more people being aware of and informed about the 
themes relevant to this study (Oscarsson, et al. 2006). The fact that the 
newest member states had only been EU members for a few months 
when the data were collected is problematic; however, this factor will 
be accounted for as an institutional context in the analyses presented in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Outline of the study 
As seen in the model in Figure 1.1, I will focus on different aspects in 
different parts of this study; accordingly, the applicable theoretical dis-
cussions also differ depending on the part of the study. Therefore, I 
have decided not to have a single chapter devoted solely to theoretical 
matters, apart from the overall system-level discussions and short intro-
ductions to the individual-level theories presented here. Instead, each of 
the following chapters will contain both a theoretical and an empirical 
section. In the former, I will develop the theoretical expectations con-
cerning individuals’ multi-level territorial attachments and the political 
implications of these attachments for different territorial levels. To 
guide the analyses, I will formulate specific research questions for each 
chapter. This structure is also suitable because theoretical development 
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is part of my research aim. The empirical section of each chapter will 
contain discussion of measurement and methodological aspects, and 
present the results of the analyses conducted. This structure provides a 
more integrated approach to both theory and empirical analysis.  
The remainder of this study can be outlined as follows. Chapter 2 will 
concentrate on the concept of multi-level territorial attachments. It will 
present a deeper theoretical discussion of similar concepts, such as iden-
tity, and elaborate the different dimensions of the concept and how they 
can be measured. In the second half of this chapter, I will present the 
results of some of the empirical analyses, including the different dimen-
sions of multi-level attachments and how they relate to one another.  
Chapter 3 will investigate the relationship between multi-level territo-
rial attachments and political trust, starting with a more thorough theo-
retical discussion of how multi-level territorial attachments can be ex-
pected to matter to political trust. Specific research questions will be 
developed, measurement issues discussed, and, finally, empirical results 
presented. 
Chapter 4 will be very similar in structure to the previous one, but in 
it the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and wel-
fare attitudes will be emphasized. The first part is devoted to my theo-
retical development of this relationship and the second part presents the 
results of the empirical analyses. 
Chapter 5 is the last substantive chapter. In it, the institutional con-
text will be included in the analyses as interaction variables, after de-
tailed examination of the theoretically relevant expectations and meth-
odological issues.  
Finally, Chapter 6 will discuss conclusions from all previous chapters. 
These will be connected to the model used in the study, relating indi-
vidual-level theoretical and empirical results to overall system-level 
theories and discussing the overall challenges to the state and to Euro-
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Multi-level Territorial Attachments 
 
The changing territorial structure of Europe can be seen as challenging 
both EU member states and the European integration process, because 
of the overall expected relationship between territorial identities, legiti-
macy, and solidarity. Such system-level expectations can be found in 
theories on system building, citizenship, and democracy (Ferrera 2005; 
Marshall & Bottomore 1992; Offe 2000; Rokkan & Urwin 1983; 
Scharpf 1999). Implicit in such discussions is an expectation that shift-
ing territorial boundaries could lead to changing territorial identities, a 
view also supported by research indicating the enhanced importance of, 
for example, regional and European identities (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; 
Bruter 2005; Catt & Murphy 2002; Keating 2001; McEwen & Moreno 
2005). However, to discuss whether or not this situation should be seen 
as a challenge, I have suggested shifting the focus to individuals, and to 
what I call the challenge of multi-level territorial attachments. I will 
elaborate the theoretical expectations of the various ways individuals 
could be attached to different territorial levels. According to the stated 
point of view, the problem is not necessarily that people have attach-
ments to other territorial levels than the state, but rather if their na-
tional attachments consequently decline. If territorial attachments are 
mutually exclusive, this is clearly what can be expected. As I will discuss 
in more detail shortly, however, there are other views on how attach-
ments to different territorial levels might relate to one another. 
Hence, it is essential for this study and the forthcoming analyses to 
elaborate here on my proposed concept of multi-level territorial at-
tachments. On one hand, I need to define the concept theoretically and 
discuss how it differs from other similar concepts, such as that of iden-
tity. This is necessary, not only to deepen our understanding of multi-
level territorial attachments per se, but also to strengthen my arguments 
about the likely consequences of an individual simultaneously having 
different sorts of territorial attachments. I will develop the analytical 
framework of the concept, including the three dimensions (i.e., level, 
form, and strength) of multi-level territorial attachments. On the other 
hand, I also need to empirically categorize and analyse the dimensions 
of multi-level territorial attachments. In the concluding part of this 
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chapter I will discuss how these results can and will be used as inde-
pendent variables in the empirical analyses presented in the remaining 
chapters.  
 
THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF  
MULTI-LEVEL TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS 
 
The concept of multi-level territorial attachments consists of three dis-
tinct parts, each of which must be scrutinized; I will discuss all three 
parts in reverse order, starting with attachment. 
 
The attachment aspect 
I have chosen to use the term attachment instead of identity for two 
reasons. First, in a variety of academic disciplines the word “identity” 
has become extremely popular, being used in discussions of diverse 
topics ranging from economic development to individuals’ life choices 
(Bruland & Horowitz 2003). The downside of such popularity is the 
tendency for the word to mean almost anything, making it less useful as 
an analytical concept. Brubaker and Cooper (2000:114) state that, es-
pecially in the social sciences, the word “identity” is too ambiguous: it 
is either being used in a strong sense, or in a sense that is too weak to 
capture the essence of the researcher’s theoretical interest. A conse-
quence of the popularity of the word is the need to specify exactly what 
form of identity one is studying, or, as in my case, to develop new and 
more precise terms.  
Second, and in line with the previous consideration, the word “at-
tachment” has the advantage of directly indicating my emphasis on the 
feelings of individuals. I am thus indicating my alignment with one of 
the two broad main strategies of identity studies, namely, how indi-
viduals identify themselves. The division between collective and indi-
vidual identity has been highlighted by several scholars, not least in the 
study of European identity (Smith 1992).15 Collective identities are seen 
as encompassing all, or almost all, the individuals in a certain commu-
nity, and can be found in symbols and specific cultural features. In con-
trast, territorial attachments can vary between individuals and situa-
                                                 
15 Bruter (2005) discusses this division as two different ways to study identities, a 
“top−down” or a “bottom−up” way. A top−down study would concentrate on questions 
such as who should be considered European and where Europe ends. A bottom−up study, 
in contrast, would focus on questions such as who feels European and why some people 
tend to identify with a certain territorial area while others do not.  
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tions, even in the same community. The objects, or community, to 
which a person is attached can vary, as can the intensity of the attach-
ment. The theoretical development of the concept of multi-level territo-
rial attachments will thus be based on psychological and sociological 
research, on theories of multiple or nested identities, for example, and 
on social identity theory (Bourgeois & Bourgeois 2005; Brodsky & 
Marx 2001; Lawler 1992; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001; Roccas & 
Brewer 2002).16 Research into territorial attachments tends to focus on 
why individuals develop certain attachments, what these mean to the 
individual, and what effects they might have on individual attitudes and 
behaviour (Some examples are: Bruter 2005; Carl 2003; Duschesne & 
Frognier 1995; Haesly 2001; Hjerm 1998, 2000;  Hooghe & Marks 
2004; Müller-Peters 1998).17  
Another related concept is pride, which is usually part of discussions 
of national or European pride (Citrin & Sides 2004; Müller-Peters 
1998). There are theoretical reasons to believe that pride, although 
clearly related to territorial attachment, has a slightly different connota-
tion. My interpretation is that pride is both stronger and more narrowly 
defined than territorial attachments. People with national pride will 
most likely have national attachments, but people with national at-
tachments could say that they were not so proud of their country. Pride 
is often associated with the distinction between thick or thin identity 
(Cederman 2001) most commonly found in discussions of whether or 
not the EU needs a European identity, and, if so, what kind of identity 
(Beetham & Lord 1998; Follesdal 2001, 2002; Scharpf 1999). Føllesdal 
discusses the concept of “thick identity” as corresponding to a broad 
cultural basis, national pride, and empathy, stating that citizenship 
based on these values would tend to be exclusive and incompatible with 
concurrent commitments and loyalties. Both he and Scharpf agree that 
such a “thick identity” is not necessary for state legitimacy, and that 
there are states lacking such “thick” shared values but which nonethe-
                                                 
16 The distinction between collective and individual identity is not always clear, and the 
two are obviously related. If a large group of individuals is attached to a certain territorial 
area, this can be seen as signaling the existence of a collective identity. However, there 
might still be some individuals living in the area who do not feel the same attachment. 
Such individual variations are not normally considered when studying collective identities. 
The relationship between the collective and individual levels thus explains the use of both 
individual- and system-level theories when examining expectations regarding multi-level 
territorial attachments and their implications. 
17 In comparison, common approaches to examining collective identities include inquiring 
into what the identity consists of, how it has developed, whether it can change, and what 
effects it might have on individuals and society (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 1992; Calhoun 
1995; Delanty 1995; Gellner 1983; Harris 2003; Smith 1986).  
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less possess a strong sense of community. This distinction gives reason 
to argue that there is a strength dimension to multi-level territorial at-
tachments, i.e., people can feel more or less strongly attached.  
 
The territorial aspect 
After discussing the attachment part of the concept of multi-level terri-
torial attachments, we will now consider the territorial aspect. The 
important issue is whether or not the attachments individuals have are 
directed towards a territory, since obviously a full range of other possi-
ble identifications is available to individuals (e.g., gender, class, ethnic-
ity, and religion). The territorial aspect may seem easy to identify at 
first glance, but the situation can at times be more complex, for exam-
ple, when several national identities are possible in the same state, eth-
nic identities exist with or without a territorial homeland (Keating 
2001), or the territory sometimes functions merely as a symbol of na-
tionality.18  
In this study, the emphasis is on European, national, regional, and lo-
cal attachments. These are all clearly territorial, even if the territorial 
boundaries are sometimes relatively unclear, as in the case of Europe 
itself. The question of where Europe ends could have as many answers 
as there are respondents (Delanty & Rumford 2005). The important 
point here is that I am investigating attachments to territorially defined 
levels of society, at which some forms of political institutions exist.19  
It should be noted that in the case of attachments to Europe, it is not 
crucial to this study whether a person who has such an attachment only 
thinks of EU countries or also includes a geographically wider area. The 
EU has undergone several phases of enlargement, and European self-
definition and possible future enlargements could include even more 
countries in Europe’s immediate surroundings. Moreover, I am only 
investigating the attachments of people in current EU countries, who all 
have one common European political decision level.20  
Instead of territorial attachments, some scholars use other concepts to 
capture the same phenomenon. One example is Bruter (2005), who uses 
                                                 
18 Bourgeois and Bourgeois (2005), for example, cite the dialectic between territory and 
identity, saying that both “are in constant (re)construction, one as a function of the 
other” (Bourgeois & Bourgeois 2005:1128).  
19 The territorial levels referred to are politically institutionalized, administrative levels of 
decision-making (e.g., local communities, regions, countries, and Europe). 
20 For safety’s sake, I will also include measures of both the EU and Europe. 
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the concept of political identity.21 The advantage of the political identity 
concept, in his view, is the clear connection it makes to the political 
importance of attachments, as well as its focus on politically defined 
territories. In my opinion, however, the concept presents several disad-
vantages, for example, disunity arising from different interpretations of 
the identity concept, and the fact that attachment to a region, for ex-
ample, is for many people not necessarily thought of as “political”, 
regardless of the political structure in the region and the possible politi-
cal implications of their attachment. As well, in political science, the 
term “political identity” is more commonly linked to matters of party 
alignment and ideological self-placement, which could contribute to 
increased confusion; hence, I prefer the term territorial attachment.  
In this study, I will pay less attention to the different qualitative 
meanings of territorial attachment, for example, the distinction between 
a more cultural or ethnic form, and a more civic or civil form of at-
tachment, common in the literature on nationalism (Hjerm 2000; Smith 
1991). One reason for this limitation is that like the concept of pride, 
discussed earlier, I believe the concept of territorial attachment to be 
broad enough to incorporate both civic and cultural aspects. Hence, I 
will not investigate this distinction empirically, but refer to some of the 
theoretical arguments when interpreting my results. According to my 
three dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments, some of the 
categorizations of individuals can be partly justified by this line of rea-
soning, for example, the “form” dimension, that distinguishes between 
exclusive and multiple attachments. According to Føllesdal, a strong 
cultural basis for citizenship would tend to be exclusive, so an exclusive 
form of attachment can thus be considered to capture this more cultural 
aspect. 
Moreover, most empirical studies of this distinction tend to empha-
size the degree to which these components are part of, for example, 
national identity.22 Fewer studies have investigated the possible effects 
of such differences; some results even indicate a need to move beyond 
this division, since many individuals tend to harbour a mixture of these 
forms of feelings (Hjerm 2000). Still, Bruter (2005) suggests the same 
                                                 
21 In his definition, political identity cannot be reduced to merely a social or personal 
component of identity. Instead, it involves both reference to a pre-existing group (the 
status aspect of social identity) and an affective component (more similar to personal 
identity). The affective part is evident in the sorrow experienced when “our” soldiers or 
citizens die, as well as in the happiness and pride when “our” team wins in international 
sports competitions such as the Olympics (Bruter 2005).   
22 Some researchers have studied the various components of attachment to at least three 
levels, i.e., regional, national, and European; see, for example, Grad and Garcia (2003). 
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distinction regarding European attachments – or European identity, as 
he puts it. In his opinion, cultural identities are associated with phe-
nomena such as language, history, religion, and myths, whereas civic 
identities are more related to political aspects, i.e., the rights and obliga-
tions of individuals. He has also found the civic aspect to be most pro-
nounced in general European attachment:23 “When people answer non-
specific questions about their European identity in general, it is of their 
civic identity that they think primarily” (Bruter 2005:114). I regard this 
as favourable, since it is the political effects of territorial attachments 
that interest me; moreover, Bruter’s findings suggest that it is more 
likely that people think of those politically defined territorial levels that 
are theoretically relevant. 
There has also been a tendency in some studies of European attach-
ment to treat it as the same thing as support for European integration 
(Duschesne & Frognier 1995; Gabel 1998a; Inglehart, et al. 1991). 
However, I argue that these are two theoretically distinct issues and 
should thus be treated as such in analyses.24 Conceptually, values and 
identities (such as territorial attachments) are supposed to precede and 
influence attitudes (e.g., support for European integration) (Jacoby 
1991; Jolly 2005). A person can have a general European attachment 
without wanting either deeper or wider European integration; as well, it 
is theoretically plausible that a person might not feel European, but still 
support European integration for purely functional or self-interested 
reasons. There are also empirical results supporting the notion that 
these two are separate, though obviously connected, factors.25 The ques-
tion of general European attachment brings me to the final part of the 
concept of multi-level territorial attachments, namely, the multi-level 
aspect. 
 
                                                 
23 Bruter combines several different methods, in this case experimental surveys to volun-
tary respondents from the UK, France, and the Netherlands, to explore this division. The 
correlation between general European identity and civic identity was .68, whereas the 
cultural identity had a correlation of .48 (Bruter 2005:119). 
24 One reason for this confusion might be Easton’s (1965) incorporation of diffuse support 
for the community (which I argue, in Chapter 3, is the same thing as territorial attach-
ment) as the highest object in his model of system support. However, although support 
for the community was part of the system support model, Easton stated that it could vary 
independently of support for the rules of the system and its actors and institutions.  
25 Support for European integration correlates with both the existence of a general Euro-
pean identity and with both civic and cultural forms of attachment, though the correla-
tion with the former is slightly stronger (Bruter 2005:119). 
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The multi-level aspect 
Most research into individuals’ territorial attachment has dealt with 
issues of national attachment, and in recent years, has increasingly dealt 
with European attachment. One of the contributions of this study is its 
consideration of attachments to several territorial levels, from the local 
to the European. As discussed in Chapter 1, the development of Europe 
into a multi-level system accentuates the need for greater knowledge of 
how strongly attached people can simultaneously feel to several territo-
rial levels, and whether this matters for political trust and welfare atti-
tudes. Hence, the multi-level part of the concept emphasizes this impor-
tant aspect. Choosing to direct research interest towards multi-level 
territorial attachments also follows the call of Bourgeois and Bourgeois 
(2005) to better incorporate different territorial scales into studies of 
territorial attachment, and not simply to focus on the nation state level 
and its political institutions.  
The idea that people can simultaneously feel attached to more than 
one political level has become widespread in the wake of discussion of 
“Europe of the regions” and of the EU as a multi-level system (Keating 
& Hughes 2003; Painter 2002). However, empirical studies in this field 
are still rather rare, and there is a tendency to focus on aggregated 
comparisons between countries and not so much on individual varia-
tion. At the individual level, studies comparing attachments to one’s 
nation and to Europe are most prevalent (e.g. Bruter 2003, 2005; Kohli 
2000; McManus-Czubinska, et al. 2003). Studies of individuals’ identi-
fication with lower (i.e., sub-national) levels are more unusual, mostly 
focusing on EU countries with strong regions, such as Spain, or on 
strong historical regions, such as Scotland (Haesly 2001; Huici, et al. 
1997; Martínez-Herrera 2002; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001). 
There are only a few empirical studies of multi-level territorial at-
tachments, at least studies that include sub-national levels and most EU 
member states (Duschesne & Frognier 1995; Hooghe & Marks 2001). 
Existing empirical studies tend to support the idea that at least some 
people have multi-level territorial attachments, although the definitions 
and measures of these attachments vary. 
There are no clearly developed theories regarding in what ways and 
how strongly individuals are thought to be simultaneously attached to 
several different territorial levels, from local to supra-national. Thus, I 
need to formulate plausible theoretical expectations regarding the con-
cept of multi-level territorial attachments and the three dimensions (i.e., 
level, form, and strength). 
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From discussions of its attachment, territory, and multi-level aspects, 
it is apparent that the concept of multi-level territorial attachments, as I 
define it, only captures part of the much broader concept of identity. 
On the other hand, the concept is individual and territorial, including 
several territorial levels considered to have at least some political impor-
tance (ranging from the local community to Europe). Moreover, the 
concept of multi-level territorial attachments is broader than the term 
pride, encompassing both thick and thin emotional attachment, and 
both the cultural and civic components.  
As is to be expected, given that it includes so many aspects, the con-
cept is not unidimensional. On the contrary, I will argue that it has 
three important dimensions, and that one can measure these empirically 
with the help of survey data. To support my reasoning, I will first de-
scribe how territorial attachments are being measured with the help of 
survey studies. 
 
Measuring attachments to different territorial levels 
To capture multi-level territorial attachments, one must be able to 
measure respondents’ attachments to territorial levels, ranging from the 
local to the supra-national. The Eurobarometer survey contains items 
asking respondents how attached they are to their town, region, coun-
try, and Europe. In the Swedish survey studies, I had the chance to try 
out my own survey questions about multi-level territorial attachments, 
using wordings and response options in line with my theoretical reason-
ing. 
The territorial levels referred to in all data sets are the politically de-
fined territorial units that form part of the multi-level political system in 
Europe. National level attachment is measured in both the Swedish 
surveys and the Eurobarometer via questions about the degree of at-
tachment to the country of residence (mentioned by name), regardless 
as to whether the respondent might actually have a stronger attachment 
to another country (e.g., whether he or she was born in another coun-
try). This is in line with my theoretical reasoning: I am interested in the 
implications of territorial attachments to the territories of residence.  
As for regional level, the questionnaires do not specify the names of 
the administrative regional levels in which the respondents live, al-
though it is the administrative region in which one lives that is theoreti-
cally relevant, since they are parts of the multi-level political system and 
correspond to Hooghe and Marks’ “type I” form of multi-level govern-
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ance (2003).26 Therefore, there is no certainty as to what type of region 
people are thinking of when responding to questions, especially in the 
Eurobarometer where the wording is “your region”. Still, how the re-
gional level is incorporated into the other administrative/political levels 
referred to in the various items does imply that it is the administrative 
level that is being referred to, and I argue that this is the most plausible 
interpretation of the results. The Swedish SOM survey is clearer, since 
the wording specifies the regional level as the administrative region in 
which individual respondents live.  
The same reasoning is applicable to the local level. In the Euro-
barometer, the local level is referred to as “one’s town”, supposedly to 
capture the town where one lives. In the Swedish SOM survey the local 
level is measured in two different ways, due to the unusually large size 
of municipalities in Sweden. In it, I ask both about attachment to the 
village or part of municipality in which the respondent lives, and about 
attachment to the municipality as a whole. The Swedish EUP election 
study only asks about the degree of attachment to one local level – i.e., 
the town or municipality – where respondents live. 
Regarding supra-national level, Eurobarometer 62.0, asks about at-
tachment to Europe (other Eurobarometers, however, have sometimes 
replaced the term “Europe” with “the EU”). The Swedish SOM survey 
includes both Europe and the EU, to facilitate separate analyses of at-
tachment to the territory per se, and to the territory as a political entity; 
the EUP study, in contrast, only asks about attachment to the EU. 
The usefulness of using survey data in analysing attachments is de-
bated (Bruter 2005; Smith 1992); this debate is especially to the point 
when the discussants use the word identity, but interpret the word dif-
ferently. Another reason for the scepticism is the variety of indicators 
used to measure particularly European attachments. One Eurobarome-
ter question has been especially criticized, because it asks people 
whether in the near future they will see themselves as mainly [national-
ity] or mainly European (Bruter 2005), the response options thus pre-
supposing that all respondents have a hierarchy of feelings. This is a 
matter that McManus-Czubinska et al. (2003) rightly point out should 
be explored by an open empirical question. However, this most criti-
cized indicator is still being used in research, even being cited in recently 
published articles in well-known journals (e.g., Lutz, et al. 2006).   
                                                 
26 The concept of a region can be interpreted in several different ways, administrative, 
functional, and cultural being the most common theoretical classifications (Jönsson, et al. 
2000). Administrative regions have politically defined boundaries and institutionalized 
political control, whether via a regional parliament or a county governor. 
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The questions I use in all data sets ask respondents to indicate their 
degrees of attachment to the local, regional, national, and supra-
national levels, separately. As Bruter (2005) notes, this set of questions 
has fewer validity limitations than do other more criticized questions, 
but there are still objections to comparing such items across countries, 
levels, and individuals, since the respondents might not be referring to 
the same interpretations or definitions of attachment (Burgess 2000; 
Smith 1992). To some extent, this is a general problem, especially with 
cross-country comparative opinion studies. I believe it is essential not to 
treat any aspect of attachment or identity as beyond possible empirical 
investigation, especially given the important role identity has been as-
cribed in modern European politics. Moreover, some of the objections 
to such investigation will be met through the particular theoretical and 
empirical construction of the dimensions of the multi-level territorial 
attachment concept. To that end, I will present the original survey ques-
tions in some detail before justifying the theoretical dimensions, empiri-
cal transformations, and categorizations of individuals. 
In all data sets, the questions are fairly similarly formulated (if not 
identical), but there are some noticeable differences in the response 
options, as can be seen in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. In the national SOM 
study and the Swedish European Parliament election study, the degree 
of attachment is measured using a scale from 0 (not at all attached) to 
10 (very strongly attached), whereas in the Eurobarometer there are 
four response options for degree of attachment. These different data 
sets will be analysed separately throughout the chapters, but the general 
congruencies and tendencies will be discussed and compared between 
the data sets. 
In Sweden, with a long history as a unitary state, it is understandable 
that people feel most attached to their country (mean 8.27 in the SOM, 
or 8.54 in the EUP). In fact, a full 43 per cent of the Swedes surveyed 
indicated the strongest degree (10) on the scale in the SOM survey. The 
finding that most people are strongly attached to the national level is 
also supported by another Swedish data set, the investigation of the 
referendum about the adoption of the Euro in 2003 (see Berg 2004). 
Despite using different wordings about attachments, and slightly differ-
ent response alternatives, the overall patterns are the same in all three 
data sets. It seems that some emotional connection to the territorial 
level is captured regardless of variations in wording, which can be ar-
gued as also supporting the possibility of comparisons across countries. 
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Table 2.1  Degrees of attachment to different territorial levels in 
Sweden, 2004 (means) 
 
Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, and the Swedish European Parliament election study, 
2004. The question in the SOM survey is: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to different areas. How 
attached do you feel to [the above alternatives]?” The scale ranges from 0 (not at all attached) to 10 (very attached). 
The question in the EUP study is: “How allied do you feel with [the above alternatives]?” The total number of individu-
als responding to each item was between 1651–1696 for the SOM study, and 1283–1310 for the EUP study. 
The village, town, or part of municipality in which one lives is the 
second most common level to which Swedes feel attached to (6.83 and 
7.04). Sweden has comparatively large and independent municipalities, 
and earlier investigations have found a primary attachment to one’s 
town (over 50 per cent), when respondents were asked to select a single 
level from a list ranging from “one’s town” to “the world as a whole” 
(Johansson 2002:199).27 The present results thus indicate a contrast 
between responses indicating where one primarily feels at home, and 
responses indicating how strongly attached one concurrently feels to 
several different levels (when given the opportunity to grade them inde-
pendently of one another); I will return to this point later, when discuss-
ing the measurement of the three dimensions of multi-level territorial 
attachments. 
The lowest degrees of attachment found are to the European Union 
(mean 3.92 and 4.08), quite as expected, given Sweden’s brief EU mem-
bership and renowned EU scepticism. Interestingly, however, the mean 
is significantly higher concerning attachment to Europe (5.88), when 
respondents are asked about it separately from attachment to the EU. 
The degree of attachment to Europe is thus not far from the degree of 
attachment felt to the weak regional level in Sweden.  
The distribution of degrees of attachment to Sweden’s different terri-
torial levels could be expected to be different from a European perspec-
tive, given Sweden’s long history as a unitary state. However, the pat-
tern is in fact relatively similar to the feelings of attachment to different 
                                                 
27 These results indicate a need to ask about the degree of attachment to all levels inde-
pendently. In the above example, respondents were asked to pick the one level in which 
they felt most at home, which, apart from focusing on just one level, also has bearing on 
the proximal principle to be discussed later. 
 Swedish SOM study Swedish EUP study 
 Mean Mean 
The village/town/part of municipality where you live 6.83  
The municipality you live in 6.71 7.04 
The region/county you live in 6.45 6.69 
Sweden 8.27 8.53 
The European Union 3.92 4.08 
Europe 5.88  
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levels in all 25 EU member states. Most Europeans feel fairly or very 
attached to all levels, although they feel less attached to Europe. 
The overall patterns for citizens in all 25 EU countries conceal the 
fact that there is variation in the degree of attachment to one’s country 
between different countries. In some federal states, and in countries 
where the regional level is strong, people tend feel somewhat more at-
tached to their region than to their country. Inversely, in traditionally 
unitary states, such as Finland and Denmark, a higher proportion of 
people feel strongly attached to their country. In the ten newest EU 
member states, the average degree of attachment to one’s country is 
somewhat higher than in the 15 older member states; however, the 
degrees of attachment in the older member states have remained stable 
over time. 
 
Table 2.2  Degrees of attachment to one’s town, region, and country 
and to Europe, in EU25, 2004 (weighted per cent) 
 
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The question is: “People may feel different degrees of 
attachment to their town or village, their region, their country, and to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to 
[each alternative]”. There are four possible answers for each level: very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, 
and not at all attached. The numbers are weighted according to the national populations of the 25 EU member states. 
Questions corresponding to that presented in Table 2.2 have occasion-
ally been part of the Eurobarometer surveys for at least ten years; over 
this time, the proportion of people who feel very attached to their own 
country has remained at just over 50 per cent, and the proportion of 
those fairly attached has remained slightly beneath 40 per cent, with no 
declining tendency from 1995 to 2004.28 This has two implications for 
the analyses of the Eurobarometer data presented in the ensuing chap-
ters. First, all analyses must be weighted according to national popula-
tions, and a dummy variable for each country must be included when 
analysing the effect of multi-level territorial attachments on political 
trust and welfare attitudes. Second, I need to include institutional con-
texts, in the form of country differences, as interaction effects in Chap-
ter 5. All these analyses will use measures of the different dimensions of 
                                                 
28 The percentages of very and fairly attached people are (weighted for then 15 EU mem-
bers): 53 and 37 (1995), 52 and 38 (1999), 50 and 39 (2002), 51 and 40 (2003), and 54 
and 37 (2004). 
How attached do you feel to your town your region your country Europe 
Very attached 61 57 65 23 
Fairly attached 29 33 29 43 
Not very attached 8 8 5 25 
Not at all attached 2 2 1 9 
Sum, per cent 100 100 100 100 
Total N 33 726 33 622 33 688 32 699 
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multi-level territorial attachments as independent variables. Before pre-
senting these dimensions, let us first investigate the covariance between 
the degree of attachment to different levels, and how territorial attach-
ments relate to some other indicators. 
 
Exploring the internal and external correspondence  
In all the data sets, the items concerning simultaneous attachments to 
several territorial levels let us investigate how these attachments corre-
late with each other. This gives a preliminary view of the correspon-
dence between the levels and an empirical basis for my construction of 
measures of the three dimensions.  
As can be seen in the correlation matrix (Table 2.3), the attachment 
to each level is significantly positively correlated, to some degree, to 
attachment to all the other levels, in both Sweden and the 25 EU mem-
ber states (“EU25”). This indicates both that there is no internal oppo-
sition to simultaneous attachments to more than one level, and that 
most people are attached to more than one level. Both these results are 
preconditions for the constructions I will make to capture the various 
dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments. For example, the 
strongest correlation is found between the sub-national levels, making it 
possible to combine them to one measure of sub-national attachment.  
 
Table 2.3  Correlations between attachment to different levels in 
Sweden and in EU25 (Pearson’s r) 
 
Comment: The data in the table are from the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004, and the Swedish national SOM survey, 
2004. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2. for more information on the questions. The EB data are weighted according to the 
national populations of the 25 EU member states. All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed). 
The size of the correlation coefficients also suggests the same sort of 
local−international polarization as has been demonstrated by Duschesne 
Sweden Town/part of 
municipality 
Municipality Region Sweden EU Europe 
Town/part of municipality 1      
Municipality .83 1     
Region .70 .78 1    
Sweden .46 .47 .52 1   
EU .11 .15 .18 .16 1  
Europe .19 .20 .25 .35 .59 1 
      
EU25  Town Region Country Europe 
Town  1    
Region   .70 1   
Nation  .42 .49 1  
Europe  .16 .19 .30 1 
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and Frognier (1995).29 To explore this polarization in greater depth, I 
did a factor analysis of the SOM data, which confirmed the division 
into two factors, one domestic and one European. The attachment to 
Sweden item loaded high on both factors, but stronger on the domestic 
factor, indicating bipolarity in the attachment to the national level, and 
further grounds for exploring different dimensions of attachments.  
This pattern was one of the reasons why Hooghe and Marks (2004) 
chose to distinguish between people who feel exclusively national and 
those who feel both national and European when analysing opinions 
regarding European integration, to highlight the difference in opinions. 
The same pattern of country attachment loading on both the sub-
national and supra-national factors is also found in the Eurobarometer 
data of 2004. Other explorative analyses also confirm the theoretical 
expectation of multi-dimensionality − hence, my continuous develop-
ment of three different dimensions.30  
Earlier, I discussed the concept of pride in relation to multi-level terri-
torial attachments, arguing that the latter are broader than pride, and 
not just a proxy for it. This is also supported empirically by correlating 
the attachments to different levels with the two available variables 
measuring pride, i.e., national and European pride. Attachments to 
country and to Europe do not display correlation levels contradicting 
my view that pride is a narrower concept than that of multi-level terri-
torial attachments.31  
At the other end of the wide−narrow scale, there have been some con-
cerns that attachment to Europe is just another proxy for favourable 
attitudes towards European integration. Correlation analyses indicate a 
relationship between the variables, but not one close enough to indicate 
that they are the same thing.32 
                                                 
29 Using a Eurobarometer question from the 1970s about the places to which respondents 
felt the strongest and second-strongest senses of belonging (ranging from one’s town to 
“the world”), they found feelings of belonging to be structured around the local and 
international poles, with “country” being intermediate (Duschesne & Frognier 1995). 
30 A cluster analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield 1984) with a three-cluster solution for the 
Swedish SOM data, resulted in one cluster capturing an exclusive form of attachment 
(mainly to Sweden). The other two clusters were both multiple, one capturing only the 
four domestic levels, and the other being multiple across all the levels.  
31 National pride and country attachment have correlation coefficients of .363 (SOM) and 
.521 (EB), while European pride and European attachment have correlation coefficients of 
.666 (SOM) and .609 (EB). Deeper analysis indicates that most people who claim to be 
very proud to be Swedish also tend to indicate high degrees of national attachment. At the 
same time, however, there are people who do not feel very proud to be Swedish but who 
still indicate high degrees of national attachment. 
32 In the Swedish SOM data, the question of whether one supports Swedish membership in 
the EU correlates by a coefficient of .272 with European attachment; the correlation with 
 Multi-level Territorial Attachments  37 
The presentation of the variables and the preliminary analyses of in-
ternal and external correspondence support my argument about the 
independence of my concept from other related aspects; they also indi-
cate the multi-dimensionality of the concept, where not only each level 
by itself, but also the relationship between levels, and attachment 
strength are important. In other words, it is time to theoretically justify 
and empirically scrutinize the three dimensions of multi-level territorial 
attachments. 
 
DIMENSIONS OF INDIVIDUALS’  
MULTI-LEVEL TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS  
 
All scholars acknowledge that there are undoubtedly several political 
levels in any political system to which people at least theoretically may 
feel attached. These levels are considered to be organizationally 
“nested”, i.e., a smaller unit is part of a larger unit, which in turn is 
included in an even larger unit, like nesting Russian Matryoshka dolls, 
and in line with what Hooghe and Marks (2003) call “type I multi-level 
governance”. The theoretical assumptions as to how individuals are 
supposed to connect emotionally to these multiple territorial levels are 
not very clearly developed, tending to vary between different groups of 
researchers. (Bourgeois & Bourgeois 2005; Brodsky & Marx 2001; 
Lawler 1992; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001; Müller-Peters 1998; Roccas 
& Brewer 2002).  
One reason for the range of views on how individuals are supposed to 
be attached to such multiple territorial levels could be the very multi-
dimensionality of the concept. I argue that there are three dimensions of 
multi-level territorial attachments, territorial level, form, and strength, 
each of which can vary from one individual to another. One person 
may, for example, be strongly attached to only one territorial level, 
whereas another may be fairly attached to several levels, and a third 
might not be attached to any territorial level at all. An overview of the 
three theoretical dimensions and their possible variations is presented in 
Table 2.4. 
 
                                                                                                         
attachment to the EU is higher, correlating by a coefficient of .560, but is still not consid-
ered exactly the same concept. In the Eurobarometer, the correlation between attachment 
to Europe and believing one’s country’s membership in the EU to be a good thing is .355. 
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Table 2.4 Theoretical dimensions of multi-level territorial attach-
ments 
 
The first dimension is the territorial level (or levels) to which a person 
feels attached. Given that this study is limited to considering territorial 
levels of some political importance, this dimension mainly varies be-
tween the sub-national (local and regional), national, and the supra-
national levels (Europe and the EU). It is also possible not to be at-
tached to any level, a possibility captured by the “unattached” category. 
The second dimension is the form of territorial attachment. Apart from 
the group of unattached, the variation here starts with individuals who 
are exclusively attached to only one territorial level (no matter which). 
A person can also feel attached to two levels, and is then considered to 
have a multiple form of attachment, whereas individuals who feel at-
tached to all territorial levels are regarded as having nested forms of 
attachment. The strength of territorial attachment can range from non-
existent for the unattached group, via fairly strong and mixed strength 
(i.e., a mixture of fairly and very strong attachments), to very strongly 
attached.  
Each of these dimensions will be further theoretically developed be-
low, and then empirically scrutinized later in this chapter. Explaining 
why individuals have the attachments they do is not an aim of this 
study; nevertheless, to explore the robustness of my concept, I will also 
touch on some of the social background variation that has been identi-
fied by previous research (e.g., Citrin & Sides 2004). As well as investi-
gating the three dimensions separately, they will also be analyzed in 
combination, via the construction of a new variable. This variable is a 
measure of the strongest attachments, and I will discuss and argue for 
its variations after scrutinizing each of the three dimensions. 
 
First dimension: territorial level of attachment 
The first dimension concerns the territorial level(s) to which a person 
feels attached, since they differ in size, importance, and interdepend-
ence. Although the territorial levels are organizationally nested in the 
EU, they still interact and function differently. The highest decision-
making level is relatively new and weak compared to most national 
governments (even in federal states), and the contacts and negotiations 
Dimensions Level Form Strength 
Unattached Unattached Unattached 
Sub-national Exclusive Fairly 
National Multiple Mixed 
 
Variations 
Supra-national Nested Very 
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between the levels are not necessarily hierarchically ordered, as de-
scribed by the multi-level governance perspective in Chapter 1 (Hooghe 
& Marks 2003; Peters & Pierre 2004; Pierre & Peters 2000).  
Lawler (1992) has developed a theory to explain the circumstances in 
which individuals will identify with lower- or higher-order nested 
groups. He argues that individuals tend to identify with those units that 
provide them a greater sense of control, and are thus likely to generate 
more positive emotions. He discusses two contradictory rules. First, 
there is the “proximal” rule, stating that because of the greater salience 
of smaller groups or units, individuals tend to identify more with them. 
Second, there is also a “distal” rule, which applies when larger groups 
or units have acquired functions that allow them better to provide for 
their members’ well-being; this rule accounts for the higher probability 
of individuals identifying with these larger groups or levels in certain 
circumstances. 
Similar reasoning is found in Calhoun’s observation that in any iden-
tity claim, two different purposes are sought: differentiation, and 
equivalence or inclusion (Calhoun 1994). Some identities may help 
differentiate between individuals within interaction groups, while others 
help make people feel that they belong to a community of equals. Dif-
ferent people can be expected to have varying perceptions of the degree 
and extent to which each of these territorial levels fulfils these purposes, 
due to their personal experiences and backgrounds. 
The personal experiences of individuals and the historical develop-
ment of the diverse territorial units both vary, thus affecting the ex-
pected attachment of each individual. This also means that everyone 
cannot automatically be assumed to be attached to all the levels beneath 
the highest level to which he or she is attached − which is otherwise 
known as a “spill-over effect”. Individuals have widely differing life 
experiences − some perhaps living in the same place all their lives, while 
others move across borders, living in EU member states for various 
lengths of time − all of which might affect the levels to which they feel 
attached. 
Another current view held by most researchers is that even if territo-
rial attachments are considered as some sort of “imagined communi-
ties” (Anderson 1991) that can be politically constructed or taken ad-
vantage of (Bucken-Knapp 2003; Hall 1998; Hansen 2000), emotional 
attachments to territorial units are still thought to take time to develop 
(Archibugi, et al. 1998; Smith 1991). Most people are thus expected to 
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have weaker attachments to new territorial levels, such as new regions 
or the EU (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Bruter 2003, 2005).33  
Empirically, the territorial level of attachment dimension will be ex-
plored by analysing whether or not a person feels attached to a certain 
territorial level. I choose to differentiate between three theoretical cate-
gories of levels, namely, the sub-national, national, and supra-national 
levels. There are several reasons for this categorization, one being that 
these are the three broad levels that are theoretically mostly distinct. 
Another reason is the variation in form of sub-national levels in Europe, 
which makes the comparison of, for example, different local attach-
ments more difficult. 
Previous analyses of the internal correspondence between different 
territorial levels also support the combination of local and regional 
attachments into the sub-national attachment category. Thus, in the 
Swedish SOM data, data regarding attachment to one’s town, munici-
pality, and region will be combined into the sub-national attachment 
category. Attachment to Europe and the EU can similarly be combined 
to form the supra-national level.  
How the question is designed in both the Swedish SOM survey and 
the Swedish EUP study, both of which use a 0–10 scale, yields useful 
information for analysing the three dimensions of multi-level territorial 
attachments. The downside of this 0−10 scale is the problem of cut-off 
points, i.e., the difficulty knowing at exactly what point a person would 
say he or she definitely has an attachment to the territorial level in ques-
tion. Bear in mind that it is only the level dimension that is under scru-
tiny at the moment, and finding a cut-off point indicating when a per-
son does or does not have an attachment to a certain level is relevant to 
distinguishing this dimension from the later dimension of strength.  
There are obviously many different and justifiable ways one can 
stipulate a cut-off point. Zero is easy, as it clearly means absolutely no 
attachment at all; one suggestion would thus be to consider any re-
sponse of one or higher to indicate at least extremely weak attachment. 
However, there is a two-fold problem with this approach. One is the 
almost complete lack of variation between those who are attached and 
non-attached, since in practice very few people actually choose “zero”. 
The other is the theoretical question of how weak an attachment to a 
territorial level can be and still be considered meaningful. Would a per-
                                                 
33 I will return to this matter in Chapter 5, where I will examine how the effects of multi-
ple territorial levels on trust and welfare attitudes vary in different institutional settings. 
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son who indicates the degree of attachment to her town to be “one” 
really say she has a town attachment at all?  
A completely different approach to finding the relevant cut-off point 
would be to consider people who have a stronger degree of attachment 
than the average of the population to be attached, while those with 
below average attachment would be considered unattached. If this aver-
age degree of attachment were measured for each territorial level, there 
would be no variation in degree of attachment between levels, basically 
indicating as many people feeling attached to the nation as to the EU − 
which clearly misrepresents the data in Table 2.1. Using the average 
total degree of attachment to all territorial levels as a cut-off point 
would represent the data slightly better, but there is no theoretical ar-
gument as to why the aggregated average should be the distinguishing 
factor between the attached and non-attached. Why should we expect 
there to be, on average, as many attached as non-attached people? 
Moreover, depending on the territorial levels included in the survey 
items, the cut-off point could shift; thus, a person’s answer could at one 
time be regarded as indicating attachment, and at another time as indi-
cating non-attachment, which is clearly not theoretically acceptable. In 
addition, considering the bias towards a majority of people being 
strongly attached to most levels, the aggregated average is very high 
(6.32), even higher than five, which experimental studies find that most 
people consider the mid point of a 0–10 scale. To claim that a person 
who chooses the mid point (5) has no attachment is thus not rational. 
For the overall concept of multi-level territorial attachments, I argue 
that one must go beyond the dichotomous idea of focusing only on 
whether or not people have an attachment. However, in order to distin-
guish the dimension of the territorial level to which a person is attached 
from the other dimensions, I must make such a distinction. I argue that 
it is reasonable to consider responses from five to ten on 10-point scales 
as indicating attachment to the territorial level in question; I will pro-
pose two main arguments supporting this position (apart from the rejec-
tion of the above alternatives).  
The first argument is empirical, using the comparison of answers, pre-
sented in Figure 2.1, to the original questions from the three different 
Swedish data sets. What is so apt about this comparison is that in the 
study of the 2003 Swedish referendum about Euro adoption (the thick 
grey line), each respondent was first asked to answer whether or not he 
or she was attached to a certain territorial level (a town, in Figure 2.1), 
and only people answering “yes” were then asked to indicate their de-
gree of attachment, using a 0–10 scale. No one who said he or she had 
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a town attachment selected zero on the scale. For comparison, however, 
I have included the 18 per cent that answered that they were not at-
tached to any specific town, by coding them as zero in Figure 2.1. Of 
those who said that they had an attachment to a town, only a few se-
lected one to four on the scale, the overwhelming majority selecting five 
and above.  
Moreover, from five to ten on the scale, the proportions of people in-
dicating a certain degree of attachment are also strikingly similar be-
tween all the data sets, which I believe indicates that these responses 
accurately capture those who have attachments. Further support comes 
from the fact that in the two other survey questions, the number of 
people choosing values between zero and four totals approximately 18 
per cent – the same as the proportion of people claiming to have no 
attachment at all in the referendum study.  
 
Figure 2.1 Degrees of attachment to town, part of municipality, and 
municipality in three different opinion studies (per cent) 
Comment: The three opinion studies used in the figure are as follows: the Swedish SOM study, 2004 (“SOM 04”), the 
European Parliament election study in Sweden, 2004 (“EUP 04”), and the study of the Euro referendum in 2003 
(“REF 03”). In REF 03 the question was divided into three parts, starting with “Is there any specific town to which you 
feel related?” This was followed by an open question to respondents who answered “yes” to the first question, asking 
the name of the town of which they were thinking. Finally, these same respondents were asked to rate the degree to 
which they felt connected to the town mentioned, on a scale of 0–10. Those answering “no” to the first question have 
been coded as zero in Figure 2.2, explaining the higher proportion of zeros here than in the other studies.  
 
Similar patterns are also found regarding comparisons of the degrees of 
attachment to the regional and national levels between these different 
data sets.34 Moreover, the general trends evident from these three differ-
ent studies also validate the stability of the patterns of attachments, 
despite some variation in the wording of the questions and the response 
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options. From Figure 2.1 it is obvious that the choice of wording is not 
decisive, as long as the wording can be argued to capture the same un-
derlying phenomenon. The similarities in response patterns in these 
three separate studies clearly indicate that there exist some sorts of emo-
tional attachments to the local level, and that we can capture such at-
tachment even using slightly different wordings.35 These results also 
support the claim that questions translated into different languages can 
indeed capture the same phenomenon. This is important knowledge for 
the interpretation of Eurobarometer data. If different, but related, 
words can capture the same underlying phenomenon, then there is a 
good chance of measuring the phenomenon of interest in the Euro-
barometer studies too, regardless of slight differences interpreting and 
translating the word “attachment” in different countries.  
The second argument as to why I believe the cut-off point between 
those who are or are not attached to a certain territorial level should be 
five, is the comparability to a previous analysis using Eurobarometer 
data (Hooghe & Marks 2001:56). Of the four response options to the 
Eurobarometer question, “very attached” and “fairly attached” were 
considered to indicate that a person had an attachment, whereas “not 
very attached” and “not at all attached” were considered to indicate no 
attachment. I intend to apply the same criteria in analysing the Euro-
barometer data. Hence, there is a balance in the number of possible 
response options with which to capture whether or not a person has a 
territorial attachment, in both the Swedish and the European data. As 
can be seen in Table 2.5, the proportion of people considered to be 
attached to the different levels is relatively similar in all three data sets, 
despite the differences in wordings and measures.  
The disadvantage is that, since people can indicate strong attachments 
to all levels, the variation turned out to be low, especially regarding 
national attachment, over 90 per cent having such an attachment. 
Naturally, this distribution would change in the Swedish data if the cut-
off point were raised to six or seven, or even higher; then, however, it 
would no longer be a measure of only the territorial level of attachment, 
but would also capture the strength of attachment dimension, which I 
will define in more detail shortly. Analogously, it would then be neces-
sary to consider only those who answered “very attached” in the Euro-
                                                 
35 There is debate as to what words or concepts best capture territorial attachment. In the 
SOM study and in the Eurobarometer the word of choice is “attachment” (In Swedish: 
“hur fäst är du vid …”), while in the two other Swedish surveys the word is “sam-
hörighet”, which can be translated as feeling related, allied, or akin to something.  
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barometer to be attached, not those who claimed to be “fairly at-
tached” (which seems more obviously illogical). 
The empirical categorization according to the territorial level dimen-
sion in the Swedish data sets will thus take account of whether a person 
has indicated 5–10 on the attachment scales regarding the sub-national, 
national, and supra-national levels. In the Eurobarometer, attachments 
to the local and regional levels are combined into sub-national attach-
ment, whereas attachment to the national and supra-national levels is 
based on one question each. All in all, there are four possible categories 
in the territorial level of attachment dimension. The distributions for 
both the Swedish and the Eurobarometer data sets can be seen in Table 
2.5.36  
 
Table 2.5  Territorial level of attachment in Sweden and EU25 (per 
cent, weighted per cent) 
 
Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, the Swedish European Parliament election study, 
2004, and the Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information regarding the questions, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. 
The figures represent the proportions of people attached to particular categories (or to any of the levels forming parts 
of these categories). In the SOM survey this means response indications from five to 10 on the scale; in the Euro-
barometer it means the response options “fairly attached” or “very attached”. The Eurobarometer numbers are 
weighted according to the national populations of the 25 member states. 
A very high percentage of the respondents do feel attached to all three 
categories of territorial levels (i.e., sub-national, national, and supra-
national). I am stressing the fact that these categories are not mutually 
exclusive (apart from the unattached group), in line with the theoretical 
reasoning that a person can feel simultaneously attached to more than 
one level. Only a small fraction of all respondents comprise the unat-
tached. Analyzing some of the common background variables indicates 
that there is a tendency for being unattached to be somewhat more 
common among men, younger people, and people not born in the coun-
try. 
                                                 
36 If six is used as the breakpoint instead of five, the distribution of the SOM data is unat-
tached (8), sub-national (74), national (87), and supra-national (52). For the forthcoming 
analyses, this does not change the overall patterns or the results, and the coefficients 
change only marginally, as will be commented on in later chapters; hence, all results are 
robust to the choice of cut-off points. 
 
Level of attachment  
Sweden 2004 
National SOM survey 
Sweden 2004 
EUP election study 
EU25 2004 
Eurobarometer 
Unattached 4 1 2 
Sub-national 84 90 93 
National 94 97 94 
Supra-national 68 49 66 
Total N 1689 1283 29 334 
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The first category of the level dimension is the sub-national level. The 
Swedish data indicate that 84 (SOM) or 90 (EUP) per cent of the re-
spondents feel attached to at least one of the sub-national levels. Exam-
ining the distribution of sub-national attachments among different so-
cial groups, I find almost no differences between men and women, dif-
ferent age groups, or different levels of education. The high percentage 
of people having at least some degree of attachment is also found in the 
European data. The results for all 25 member states indicate that almost 
93 per cent of respondents have a sub-national attachment. There are 
basically no important differences between social groups, just an almost 
negligible tendency for older generations and people of lower education 
to be over-represented in this category. 
At the national level in both the Swedish and the European data sets, 
94 and 97 per cent, respectively, feel at least somewhat attached to their 
country, and thus it is not surprising to find no variation between social 
groups.37 Attachment to the supra-national level is found in 68 (or 49)38 
per cent of the Swedish and 66 per cent of the European respondents. 
The variation between different groups is still small, but there is a ten-
dency for supra-national attachment to be more common among men, 
younger people, and people with a higher than basic educational level.  
The number of people feeling attached to Europe is, perhaps surpris-
ingly, higher in the ten newest than in the older member states, 78  
compared to 65 per cent. However, the highest European attachment of 
all is found in the six founding countries, indicating the need to include 
the time of joining the European Union as an institutional context in 
Chapter 5. Also, the generally high degrees of attachment clearly indi-
cate the need to further explore the variation between individuals re-
garding the other two dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments.  
 
Second dimension: form of attachment 
The second dimension has to do with the form of territorial attachment, 
i.e., how an individual combines his or her attachments to different 
levels. Two opposing ideal types can be found in the literature − exclu-
sive and nested forms of attachment − although different terms have 
been used to refer to nested attachment, such as multiple or dual identi-
fication (Herrmann, et al. 2004; Hooghe & Marks 2001; Huici, et al. 
1997; McManus-Czubinska, et al. 2003).  
                                                 
37 Apart from the expected higher attachment to Sweden among Swedish citizens. 
38 In the EUP study, where the attachment only concerns the EU, not Europe. 
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The exclusive form of territorial attachment is based on the view that 
no matter how many territorial levels there are in society, only one of 
these levels matters to each individual, regardless of which level it is; the 
individual is supposed to “make a choice” between different levels. 
According to this idea, emotional attachments to different levels are 
regarded as incompatible with each other. In other words, feeling at-
tached to one level excludes the possibility of also feeling attached to 
others. This line of reasoning is partly based on the essentialist view of 
how identities are formed (Cederman 2001). According to Smith 
(1986), national identity is arguably the only important territorial iden-
tity for individuals. On the other hand, following Inglehart (1977), 
arguments have been put forward that the national level could teach 
citizens about abstract feelings of community and thus more easily be 
linked to a European identity compared to the regional level (Duschesne 
& Frognier 1995).  
In its ideal form, nested territorial attachments are perceived as com-
pletely vertically compatible (and even mutually amplifying) from one 
level to the next. A nested form of attachment thus lies at the other end 
of this theoretical axis. As long as different levels are organizationally 
nested within each other, identification with those levels can be nested 
too (Huici, et al. 1997). This is sometimes described as the “Russian 
doll” model (Risse 2004) or the concentric circle model (Bruter 2005). 
An interesting example of a study of nested identification is Medrano 
and Guiterrez’s (2001) study of the relationship between identifications 
with different levels in Spain. The authors say, “In Spain, people who 
identify strongly with Spain or/and with their region also identify 
strongly with Europe. Spaniards have thus developed a sort of hyphen-
ated identity with respect to Europe” (Medrano & Guitérrez 
2001:772). It is less common for such studies also to include the local 
level. An exception is that of Hooghe and Marks (2001), who include 
local, regional, national, and European levels, and call this form of 
territorial attachment multiple identities. In their model, a person with 
multiple identifications can feel strongly attached to all, or nearly all, 
levels.  
The idea of a nested form of attachment is often cited in studies of the 
interplay between national and European identifications. Some re-
searchers also describe the nested identification as a form of cosmopoli-
tan identity, at least if they are only comparing national and European 
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identities.39 In their study of exclusive and dual identities in Poland, 
McManus-Czubinska et al. (2003) found the pattern that the poor, the 
elderly, the less educated, and the rural dwellers were more exclusively 
Polish, whereas the more affluent, the young, the highly educated, and 
people in big cities more often felt equally European and Polish 
(McManus-Czubinska, et al. 2003).  
Theoretically, the distinction between exclusive and nested forms of 
attachment is clear. In practical terms, however, there are more than 
two territorial levels in a multi-level system, making it possible for peo-
ple to be attached to two or three levels before having a nested attach-
ment to all territorial levels. My solution is that if respondents feel at-
tached to both their municipality and their region, they will still be 
regarded as having an exclusive form of attachment, since these two 
territorial levels both belong to the sub-national level. The nested form 
of attachment will thus be ascribed to respondents who feel attached to 
all three categories of territorial levels. Between the exclusive and nested 
forms of attachment we find those who feel attached to two levels; I call 
this a multiple form of attachment. 
As can be seen in Table 2.4, the unattached group is theoretically part 
of all three dimensions. This category is a group of people that is often 
neglected in the theoretical literature on identity (Hooghe & Marks 
2001). For such people, territorial levels are not relevant to self-
categorization, at least not those levels in which these people currently 
live.40 This is of course an important category for my following analy-
ses, since such people can be expected to have different political atti-
tudes from those of more attached people. 
The form of attachment is the dimension that most directly concerns 
the relationships between attachments to different territorial levels. The 
previous section demonstrated that high percentages of people are at-
tached to the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels, indicat-
ing that some individuals are attached to at least two levels. The actual 
percentage distribution of respondents categorized as having unat-
                                                 
39 According to Delanty (2000), however, the cosmopolitan identity is not territorially 
based, so this is a debated statement. 
40 Such people likely have other identifications of greater importance to them; gender, age, 
life-style, or ideology may be more salient for their everyday life and political opinions. 
Another aspect here is the number of people who have moved across borders and still feel 
a strong attachment to territorial areas where they formerly lived, but less attachment to 
some or all of the territorial levels where they currently live. 
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tached, exclusive, multiple, and nested forms of attachment in Sweden 
and in all EU member states can be found in Table 2.6.41  
The results indicate yet again similar overall patterns between the 
Swedish and the EU25 data sets. Regarding both the form dimension 
and the next dimension, strength, the categories are mutually exclusive 
and the percentages add up to 100. Five per cent of respondents are 
attached to only one level (either the sub-national, national, or supra-
national level), and are hence categorized as having an exclusive form of 
attachment. 
 
Table 2.6  Form of attachment in Sweden and EU25, 2004 (per cent, 
weighted per cent) 
 
Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, the Swedish European Parliament election study, 
2004, and the Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information regarding the questions, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. 
The unattached are coded as not being attached to any level, the exclusive are people attached to only one level, the 
multiple are attached to two levels, and the nested feel attached to all levels. The Eurobarometer numbers are 
weighted according to the national populations of the 25 member states. 
More than one quarter of the Swedish SOM respondents, almost half of 
the EUP respondents, and one third of the EB respondents have a mul-
tiple form of attachment, i.e., feel attached to two levels. There are few 
social group variations behind these patterns. Most of the SOM and EB 
respondents, 64 and 60 per cent, respectively, have a nested form of 
attachment, whereas the percentage is slightly lower for the Swedish 
EUP respondents (45 per cent). People with higher incomes and ideo-
logically leaning more to the right are somewhat overrepresented in this 
group, as are men. Education does not, however, seem to matter for 
belonging to this group in the Swedish data, and only to a certain extent 
in the Eurobarometer data. 
The exclusive form of attachment can in theory be directed towards 
any one of the three categories of levels discussed above. Most common 
in Sweden is exclusive attachment to the national level (2/3 of respon-
                                                 
41 The categorization has been done according to the levels to which a person feels at-
tached. Since the proportion of people attached to each level was large, most people are 
categorized as having either multiple or nested forms of attachment. If the breakpoint is 
changed to six, the size of each category changes somewhat, but the overall results of the 
ensuing analyses remain the same. 
 
Form of attachment  
Sweden 2004 
National SOM survey 
Sweden 2004 
EUP election study 
EU25 2004 
Eurobarometer 
Unattached 4 1 2 
Exclusive 5 6 5 
Multiple 27 48 33 
Nested 64 45 60 
Sum, per cent 100 100 100 
Total N 1689 1281 29 334 
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dents), followed by exclusive sub-national attachment (1/5 of respon-
dents). In all EU countries, exclusive attachment is most frequently di-
rected towards the sub-national level. Only very few people have an 
exclusive form of attachment to the supra-national level. 
People with a multiple form of attachment can also vary in terms of 
the territorial levels to which they feel attached. Most multiply attached 
Swedes (3/4 of respondents) have a combination of sub-national and 
national attachments. In EU25, almost nine out of ten respondents with 
a multiple form of attachment feel attached to both the sub-national 
and national levels.42  
 
Third dimension: strength of attachment 
The third dimension is strength of attachment. This is an important 
theoretical dimension, since it is the one that captures the possibility of 
people having various degrees of attachment (Hooghe & Marks 2001). 
The theoretical possibility that people can be attached to several levels 
emphasizes the question of how strongly attached they feel to those 
levels. Moreover, the issue of strength of attachment clearly relates to 
the earlier discussion of thick and thin versions of identity (Cederman 
2001; Scharpf 1999). It is reasonable that someone with a thick iden-
tity, who feels proud to be of a certain nationality, for example, would 
indicate a strong degree of attachment when answering the questions 
about national territorial attachment; the empirical correlations also 
support this interpretation. 
From the two theoretically opposing views (essentialist versus con-
structivist) of how people supposedly can feel simultaneously attached 
to several territorial levels (Cederman 2001), I can extract two views 
regarding strength. The first view, that a person can only feel attached 
to one level (Lawler 1992; Smith 1991), implies an underlying assump-
tion of “limited strength”. In my view, this implies that if a person ac-
tually felt attached to more than one level, this would lead to generally 
lower degrees of attachment to each level. Hence, the attachment 
strength could be considered limited in total supply, being distributed in 
zero-sum fashion between different levels.  
                                                 
42 A combination of national and supra-national attachment is apparent in one fifth of the 
sampled Swedes with a multiple form of attachment, but only among 8 per cent of the 
EU25 respondents. Only a handful of respondents feel both sub-nationally and supra-
nationally attached, but without having national attachment. Hence, the combination of 
feeling both nationally and supra-nationally attached is somewhat more common in 
Sweden than in EU member states taken as a whole. 
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The opposing theoretical position regarding possible nested and mul-
tiple attachments (Hooghe & Marks 2001; Medrano & Guitérrez 
2001) leads to an expectation of a more expandable view of strength, 
where attachments to new (or additional) levels do not necessarily de-
crease the strength of attachment to former levels. The average total 
degree of strength could thus stay the same or even increase. 
In the Swedish SOM and EUP data sets, it is clearly possible to meas-
ure the strength of attachment due to the use of the 0–10 scale. When 
analysing strength of attachment, simply summing the total degree of 
attachment to every level is not a good measure. It will obscure the 
variation between, for example, those respondents who have overall 
average degrees of attachment to all levels, and those who feel strongly 
attached to one or a few levels but only weakly or not at all attached to 
others. A first step will thus be to measure the strength of attachment 
only to those territorial levels to which a person is attached. In the 
Swedish data, this means the levels to which a respondent has indicated 
that the strength of attachment is five or higher.  
By dividing the total strength by the number of levels to which a per-
son feels attached, I can create an index of the average degree of at-
tachment strength, and thus compare the strength regardless of which 
form of attachment a person has or to which levels he or she feels at-
tached.43 My analyses indicate, for example, that it is almost as common 
for someone with an exclusive attachment to answer five (or ten) on the 
index, as it is for someone who has a multiple or nested form of at-
tachment. The results thus support the idea of expandable rather than 
limited attachment strength. Any one individual can thus not only have 
attachments to several levels (as demonstrated earlier), but also have 
equally strong degrees of attachment to more than one level.  
In the Eurobarometer data, attachment strength can be determined by 
comparing answers indicating fairly attached to those indicating very 
attached, and by only including in the strength calculation those levels 
to which respondents are considered to feel attached. This is justified by 
the same arguments as above. Altogether, there are four possible de-
grees of strength, ranging from “not at all attached” to “very strongly 
attached”, which can be coded from 1 to 4. By coding “fairly attached” 
as three, and “very strongly attached” as four, I can compute an index. 
                                                 
43 Such a strength index ranges between five and ten; the overall average I found was 7.47. 
Fortunately, the variation between groups with different forms of attachment is low, 
suggesting an empirically rather high independence of the strength dimension from the 
form dimension. In the group of people having an exclusive form of attachment the mean 
strength is 7.17, in the multiple group the mean is 7.76, and in the nested group it is 7.79. 
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By dividing the total strength by the number of levels to which a person 
feels attached, I can create an index of the average degree of attach-
ment, as with the Swedish data. To make the comparisons between the 
European and Swedish data sets more comparable in the ensuing analy-
ses, the Swedish data will be categorized in a similar fashion: “fairly 
attached” (corresponding to 5–7) and “very attached” (8–10).44 
Hence, in both data sets I can categorize respondents into three 
groups based on strength of attachment. The first group contains people 
who have indicated fairly strong attachments, no matter whether they 
are to one or several territorial levels. The second group includes people 
with a mixture of both fairly and very strong degrees of attachments. 
Third, there is the group of very strongly attached people, also regard-
less of how many territorial levels the attachment concerns. 
 
Table 2.7  Strength of attachment in Sweden and EU25, 2004 
(per cent, weighted per cent) 
 
Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, the Swedish European Parliament election study, 
2004, and the Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information regarding these questions, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. 
To enable comparisons between the data sets, the answers are recoded thus: 3 = fairly attached (= 5–7 in SOM) and 
4 = very attached (= 8–10 in SOM). Strength of attachment is an index, representing total strength of attachment to 
all levels divided by the number of levels to which a person feels attached.  
Most people have a mixture of fairly and very strong degrees of at-
tachment in all three data sets. The distribution of attachment strength 
across different levels and forms of attachment is rather even. For ex-
ample, there are people with different degrees of attachment strength in 
all three form categories, although there is a tendency towards slightly 
stronger average degrees of strength among the respondents with multi-
ple rather than nested attachments.45  
                                                 
44 Comparison of the data sets indicates roughly similar percentages of people selecting 
5−7 (“fairly attached”) and 8−10 (“very attached”). 
45 Theoretically, an exclusively attached person can only have fairly strong or very strong 
attachments, since only one level would be considered. However, since a person might feel 
attached, for example, to both her town and her region, and still be considered to have an 
exclusive attachment (i.e., to the sub-national level), a few exclusively attached people 
have mixed fairly and very strong attachments.  
Strength of attachment  Sweden 2004 
National SOM survey 
Sweden 2004 
EUP election study 
EU25 2004 
Eurobarometer 
Unattached 4 1 2 
Fairly attached  15 13 22 
Mix of fairly and very attached  55 60 43 
Very attached  26 26 35 
Sum, per cent 100 100 100 
Total N 1625 1271 29 334 
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There are only small differences between groups of people concerning 
their degrees of strength of attachment, but there are still some discern-
able tendencies. Men and younger people are somewhat more likely to 
be fairly attached than others are. More highly educated, more right-
leaning, and middle-aged people are slightly overrepresented in the 
mixed category, whereas women, less-educated people, and older age 
groups are somewhat overrepresented among the very attached. The 
differences are small, but these background factors must obviously be 
controlled for in the ensuing analyses. 
Territorial level, attachment form, and attachment strength thus each 
provide necessary input to forming an understanding of the concept of 
multi-level territorial attachments. Apart from analysing these elements 
separately, I also need to include all three dimensions in the ensuing 
analyses.46  
 
Combination of all three dimensions of attachment  
Investigating each of the dimensions − i.e., level, form, and strength − 
separately is essential for the ensuing analyses, to explore the impact 
each might have on political trust and welfare attitudes. However, the 
three dimensions are also parts of the same broad concept of multi-level 
territorial attachments, so I must be able to combine the dimensions in 
a theoretically (and empirically) valid manner.  
Returning to Lawler’s idea of two different rules concerning which 
level a person can be expected to feel attached to, the proximal rule 
leads to the expectation that attachment will be strongest to the lowest 
level, for example, one’s home town, becoming gradually weaker the 
further away the level (Lawler 1992). This is also described by Bruter 
(2005) as the concentric theory of political identities.  
On the other hand, the distal rule would lead us to expect stronger 
attachment to the political level(s) that have the resources and power to 
provide for a citizen’s well-being. Hence, individuals can generally be 
expected to feel most strongly attached to the national level. This corre-
sponds to the argument that the construction of national welfare insti-
tutions contributes to the development of national identity, even in such 
divided countries as the United Kingdom (McEwen & Moreno 2005).47 
There are also the two different purposes of any identity claim: differen-
                                                 
46 The most immediate solution that springs to mind is to include all three dimensions at 
the same time in the regression analyses, but that is not possible for statistical reasons.  
47 The importance of different levels in this respect varies among countries according to 
their type of welfare system and whether they are federal or unitary states, an important 
aspect I will address in Chapter 5. 
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tiation and inclusion (Calhoun 1994). Depending on whether attach-
ment to the level in question helps people differentiate themselves from 
others, or contributes to a sense of belonging to a community of equals, 
the strength of attachment can vary.  
Therefore, I argue that evaluating the territorial level or levels to 
which a person feels most strongly attached is a satisfactory approach 
to simultaneously capturing important features of all three dimensions 
of attachment. It clearly includes the first theoretical dimension, level, 
since I will take into account exactly which territorial level(s) the 
strongest attachment is directed towards, for each individual.  
Measuring the strongest attachment obviously also concerns strength 
of attachment, since the categorization is determined by the attachment 
strength each person has indicated for each level. Finally, the form of 
attachment dimension is also included, since the original survey ques-
tions allow people to indicate the same strength of attachment to more 
than one level. I can thus distinguish between people whose strongest 
attachment concerns one, two, or three levels, capturing the main es-
sence of the concept of form, i.e., an exclusive, multiple, or nested form 
of attachment. The difference from the original form dimension is that 
according to this classification, form only concerns the strongest degree 
of attachment an individual has indicated, not whether a person feels 
attached to more than one level. 
To investigate this combined measure empirically, I must first classify 
individuals according to the level or levels to which they have the 
strongest attachment. I use the coding of the different categories earlier 
devised for each of the three dimensions, analysing the data to deter-
mine who belongs in each category of theoretically possible combina-
tions of levels (regardless of the attachment strength).48  
Hence, I have arrived at the following categories of the strongest level 
or levels of attachment (see table 2.8): unattached, primarily sub-
national, all domestic (equally strongly attached to the sub-national and 
national levels), primarily national, supra-national etc. (strongest at-
tachment to the supra-national level, and occasionally to one other level 
as well), and finally all levels equal (the same strong degree of attach-
ment to all levels).  
 
                                                 
48 For both theoretical and practical reasons (i.e., insufficient number of respondents), 
some of these categories are merged, in accordance with the results of the earlier factor 
analyses. These analyses indicated that there were two main factors structuring the an-
swers to these questions, namely, domestic and supra-national factors, with national 
attachment loading on both of them. 
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Table 2.8  Combined dimensions of attachment in Sweden and EU25, 
2004 (per cent, weighted per cent) 
 
Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, and the Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For 
information regarding these questions, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The numbers indicate the proportions of people with 
the highest degree of attachment to each level or levels (or whether the degree of attachment is equally strong to 
more than one level). The Eurobarometer numbers are weighted according to the populations of the 25 EU member 
states. 
In all three data sets, it is most common for people to belong to either 
the all domestic (in the Swedish EUP and the Eurobarometer) or pri-
marily national (the Swedish SOM) categories. This clearly signals that 
the possibility of people having attachments to territorial levels below 
and above the national level has not contributed to the dominance of 
the strongest attachment to any other level than the national.49 This 
finding is clearer in the Swedish data, which is reasonable given Swe-
den’s unitary status and recent membership in the EU. 
In the Eurobarometer data, in comparison, it is noticeable that those 
having equally strong attachments to all levels comprise the second 
largest group. More people are on average strongly attached to Europe. 
Still, this situation does not challenge the states in any major way, since 
it is the all levels equal group that dominates, not the supra-national 
etc. group (in which attachment to any domestic level is rare). 
A glance at the background variation reveals no large overall differ-
ences between various social groups. However, a few small tendencies 
are worth mentioning, for example, that people whose sub-national 
attachment is the strongest tend to be younger than other respondents. 
A combination of sub-national and national attachment is slightly more 
common among women and people with less education. Having na-
tional attachment as the strongest attachment is somewhat more com-
mon among the more highly educated and the middle aged. Men and 
younger people are slightly overrepresented among those who have 
their strongest attachment to the supra-national level (and sometimes 
                                                 
49 This is partly a consequence of using five as the breakpoint on the attachment scales; 
however, if six were instead used as the breakpoint, the main pattern would stay the same 




National SOM survey 
Sweden 2004 
EUP election study 
EU25 2004 
Eurobarometer 
Unattached 4 1 2 
Primarily sub-national  7 6 10 
All domestic 29 46 34 
Primarily national 37 32 17 
Supra-national etc. 11 7 10 
All levels equal 12 8 29 
Sum, per cent 100 100 100 
Total N 1689 1329 29 344 
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one other level). In contrast, the only significant pattern among those 
who feel equally strongly attached to all levels seems to be a minor 
overrepresentation of men, apart from people born or raised in another 
European country. None of these variations is large enough to prompt 
worries that my categories may actually be capturing other background 
phenomena, but I will nevertheless control for such factors in the ensu-
ing analyses. 
 
Summing up and concluding discussion 
I started this chapter by raising the concern that increasing attachments 
to other territorial levels than the state could be seen as a challenge to 
the role and position of the state and to European integration. I called 
this factor the challenge of territorial attachments, but I also pointed 
out that for it to be a real challenge to the state or to European integra-
tion, increased attachments to other territorial levels would have to lead 
to a decrease in national attachments. The theoretical views on this 
matter have been diverse, which I argue is a consequence of the variety 
of definitions of the term “identity” and of the multi-dimensionality of 
the concept of multi-level territorial attachments. The lack of developed 
theoretical assumptions and empirical analyses concerning individuals’ 
attachments to all the levels in society has called for a partly explorative 
approach. I have built on related social and psychological theories to 
elaborate my concept of multi-level territorial attachments with its three 
dimensions (level, form, and strength of attachment). Moreover, I have 
conducted some empirical analyses of Swedish and European data to 
investigate the relevance and usefulness of this concept and its dimen-
sions. 
In my definition, the overall concept of multi-level territorial attach-
ments is more specific than the term “identity”, but at the same time 
broader than national or European pride, and distinct from support for 
European integration. The concept is also individual and territorial, 
including a range of territorial levels from local to supra-national.  
I have argued that the concept has three relevant dimensions. The first 
dimension is the territorial level or levels to which a person is attached, 
i.e., the sub-national (local and regional), national, and supra-national 
levels (Europe/EU). There are various theoretical views as to whether 
people can feel attached to more than one level, but according to my 
analyses of the Swedish and the Eurobarometer data, most people do 
have attachments to more than one level. People are most commonly 
attached to the national level, a level to which over 90 per cent of re-
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spondents were attached. Therefore, there did not seem to be any lack 
of national attachment stemming from the other territorial attachments, 
as had been feared. At least this was the case when merely the presence 
or absence of the attachment was measured without considering the 
strength of the attachment. The figures have remained stable over at 
least the last ten years.  
The second dimension is the form of territorial attachment. Com-
pared to the dimension level, this dimension can be divided into catego-
ries that are mutually exclusive. Apart from the group of completely 
unattached people, these categories are: individuals with exclusive at-
tachment to only one territorial level (no matter what level), individuals 
considered to have a multiple form of attachment, and individuals with 
nested attachments (i.e., they feel attached to all territorial levels). The 
empirical analyses demonstrate that few people are either completely 
unattached or have an exclusive form of attachment and that the largest 
group of people have nested attachments. Since people with both multi-
ple and nested attachments are attached to more than one level, an 
overwhelming majority of people can be said to have multi-level territo-
rial attachments. Before making any statements about any possible 
challenge to the state, however, there is the third dimension to consider. 
The third dimension, the strength of territorial attachment, can be de-
scribed as fairly strong, mixed, or very strong. This division into mutu-
ally exclusive categories allows us to compare the data sets and to cre-
ate a measure of strength that is independent of the other two dimen-
sions. The group of people having a mixture of fairly and very strong 
attachments is the largest, and the different degrees of strength are rela-
tively evenly distributed between the forms and levels of attachment. 
These results indicate that there is no overall tendency for the strength 
of attachment to be stronger for people with an exclusive form of at-
tachment, for example, or for attachment to a certain level; the varia-
tion between individuals, moreover, is large.  
Each of these dimensions considered separately contributes to a better 
understanding of multi-level territorial attachments, but the ensuing 
analyses will also benefit from analysing their combined influence as 
well. I argued that categorizing individuals according to the level or 
levels to which they have the strongest attachment was able to capture 
important features of all three dimensions. The following mutually 
exclusive categories of the strongest level of attachment were con-
structed for both theoretical and empirical reasons: unattached, primar-
ily sub-national, all domestic, primarily national, supra-national etc., 
and all levels equal. The largest groups are the all domestic, primarily 
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national, and, in the European data, all levels equal. Moreover, these 
are the categories that include people for whom the national level is 
among the levels to which they feel the strongest attachment. Hence, I 
conclude that although these analyses demonstrate that most people 
have some form of multi-level territorial attachment, this is not neces-
sarily a threat to the state or to the continuation of European integra-
tion, since national attachments remain very strong for most people.   
On the other hand, the challenge to the state or to European integra-
tion might not lie so much in the strength of the attachment as such, but 
rather in the possible impact multi-level territorial attachments may 
have on political trust and welfare attitudes, which will be the focus of 
the following chapters. 
 
 Chapter 3 
 
 Multi-level Territorial Attachments 
and Political Trust 
 
One of the main themes of this study is how the preconditions for po-
litical stability might be affected by ongoing social change in Europe. In 
line with the system-building tradition (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005; 
Rokkan 1999), this can be described as an interest in how European 
integration and the whole of Europe as a multi-level system can handle 
the developmental shift from a “nation-building process” to a stable 
“mass democracy”. Shifting the focus from the system level to individu-
als, I have chosen to investigate this matter as how people’s multi-level 
territorial attachments influence their trust in political institutions and 
politicians at various territorial levels. This will help me to explore what 
I call the challenge of political trust. 
I argue that there are three ways in which individuals’ territorial at-
tachments could theoretically challenge the state, by giving rise to de-
clining political trust. The first would be if national attachments influ-
enced trust in national institutions and politicians, and the number of 
people with such national attachments were to diminish. However, the 
previous chapter demonstrated that a huge majority (over 90 per cent) 
of respondents had a national attachment, so this situation is of less 
concern. The second would be if national attachments had no effect on 
national political trust. In this scenario, any challenges to the state 
would have other sources than territorial attachments. The third would 
be, if national attachments indeed had an impact on national political 
trust, how the combinations of people’s different territorial attachments 
would lead to greater trust in other political levels; the challenge to the 
state would thus be in the form of lower political trust in national insti-
tutions and actors. For the European integration process, it could also 
be seen as a challenge if European attachments had no influence on 
trust in European institutions; however, it could also challenge the 
European multi-level system if such a relationship existed, but at the 
expense of national political trust. These challenges capture the essence 
of this chapter: the question of whether there is a relationship between 
Chapter 3 60 
multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, and if so, how 
different aspects of attachment and trust are related. 
That individuals’ territorial attachments are important for a political 
system to be perceived as legitimate, or even to survive, is a common 
idea not only in the system-building tradition, but also in democratic 
theory and political support research (See e.g. Dahl 1989; Easton 1965; 
Offe 2000; Rokkan 1999; Scharpf 1999, 2000). Among the political 
elite at the regional and European levels, there also seems to be a strong 
belief in this relationship, i.e., that territorial attachments can have a 
positive effect on political legitimacy. There are several examples of 
leading politicians attempting to raise the level of citizen attachment to 
a sub-national region or to the EU, with the admitted purpose of trying 
to enhance political legitimacy (Batt & Wolczuk 2002).  
This notion needs further theoretical development and empirical test-
ing, for a number of reasons. First, there is an objection concerning the 
nature, or rather direction, of this relationship. There are disparate 
theoretical viewpoints concerning the direction of causality, whether it 
is territorial attachments that affect the degree of trust in political insti-
tutions, or whether it is trustworthy political institutions and politicians 
that give rise to the territorial attachments. Second, the theoretical ap-
proaches that do argue for a causal relationship in line with my expec-
tations (i.e., that the direction of causality runs from territorial attach-
ments to trust) still need to consider and develop the multi-level aspects 
of the relationship, i.e., how the different dimensions of multi-level 
territorial attachments may impact political trust. Third, more research 
is needed to explore empirically whether, and if so, how, multi-level 
territorial attachments are related to political trust at different levels. 
After the following section about causality, this chapter will follow 
the same structure as that of the other substantive chapters: there will 
be a theoretical section discussing theoretical arguments relevant to the 
analyses, followed by an empirical section presenting and discussing the 
results of the analyses. 
 
The question of causality 
Many social phenomena are reciprocal over time (Hall 1997), and so, I 
argue, is the connection between territorial attachments and political 
trust. The fact that there are disparate theoretical views on the direction 
of causality in this case could well reflect the existence of such reciproc-
ity over time. Paasi (1986) describes how the territorial demarcation of, 
for example, a region is followed by the creation of regional conscious-
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ness among its inhabitants via common symbols, which entails the de-
velopment of common institutions, which in turn crystallize regional 
identity. Once the identity exists, it is thought to continue to support 
the political system and its institutions (Easton 1975). Depending on 
where along this reciprocal causal chain a researcher chooses to start, 
she or he can focus on the impact either of individuals’ attachments or 
of political institutions. Not surprisingly, in this field of study there are 
many differing theoretical approaches to the causality operative in this 
case, most of them elaborating on various aspects of Rokkan’s work 
(Rokkan 1974, 1987, 1999). In one approach, the emphasis is on the 
political institutions in a society and how they affect social norms, such 
as territorial attachments (McEwen & Moreno 2005); these norms can 
in turn affect the degrees of trust people have in these political institu-
tions, and thus their territorial attachments. According to another ap-
proach, it is the territorial attachments that lead to the creation of cer-
tain political institutions; once these institutions are established, they in 
turn continue to reinforce the feelings of attachment (Ferrera 2005; 
Paasi 1986), and thereby the trust, and so on. Admittedly, these are 
simplistic descriptions of theoretically reciprocal causal chains, ignoring 
other known explanatory factors. However, the point is that, regardless 
of the theoretical approach or causal view, there is a common denomi-
nator in the expectation of a relationship between territorial attachment 
and political trust.  
These contrasting views on the direction of causality can also be illus-
trated by the various interpretations of Marshall’s (1992) three compo-
nents of citizenship (i.e., civil, political, and social). Some believe them 
to represent developmental stages (Ferrera 2005; Offe 2000). Others see 
them merely as three separate dimensions of the concept of citizenship 
that might evolve in different sequences depending on the country or 
system, with no causality between them (Bulmer & Rees 1996).  
Why then would I argue that analysing the impact of territorial at-
tachments on political trust is the approach most relevant to this study? 
There are two reasons. First, debate about causality tends to focus on 
the aggregated, or macro, levels, i.e., how institutions may affect the 
population at large, or how the aggregated or dominant feelings in a 
society may affect the construction of certain political institutions. 
There is also a tendency for the main debate to concern itself with ori-
gins (e.g., why a certain institutional setting exists or why a certain 
identity dominates an area), rather than with current relationships. 
However, neither of these aspects is relevant to my study; it is not the 
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influence on the creation of institutions that matters per se, but rather 
how much individuals tend to trust existing institutions.  
Second, since my aim is not to explain why individuals have certain 
territorial attachments, but to investigate the effects of those attach-
ments, it is logical for me to begin with the attachments people have, 
regardless of why these attachments exist. Moreover, some theories of 
individual political trust highlight the impact of emotional factors, 
which I will discuss shortly. The completely reversed causality, i.e., that 
individuals’ degree of trust in institutions or politicians affects their 
territorial attachments, is much less plausible (cf. Easton 1965).  
Apart from these two arguments, a practical consideration concerns 
the explanatory approach of this study, which involves the theoretical 
elaboration of plausible expectations, new ways of measuring multi-
level territorial attachments, and analysing the possible consequences of 
these attachments. The analyses are cross-sectional, being conducted on 
data from one point in time; the analysis can be more detailed in the 
case of Sweden, and be done cross-nationally in the other EU countries, 
but the data do not allow me properly to test for the direction of causal-
ity.50  
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TERRITORIAL 
ATTACHMENTS AND POLITICAL TRUST 
 
The theoretical arguments as to why it is relevant to investigate whether 
there is a connection between individuals’ multi-level territorial attach-
ments and political trust can, I believe, be found in one of the three 
main groups of theoretical explanations of political trust. I call it the 
group of cultural theories. This group includes a variety of cultural or 
affective explanations of political trust, invoking concepts such as social 
capital, group identification, and attachment to the community 
(Almond & Verba 1963; Dalton 2004; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Offe 
2000; Putnam, et al. 1993; Scharpf 1999). The other two main groups 
of explanations of political trust are institutional performance theories 
                                                 
50 A proper test for causality would need data over time, preferably from panel studies. 
Instead, the first step in the present study was to determine whether the expected relation-
ships could be found at the individual level at all, and when controlling for other relevant 
control variables. The more detailed analysis of how much of an existing relationship can 
be explained by either causal direction is a possible task for future research. 
 Multi-level Territorial Attachments and Political Trust  63 
and procedural fairness or input theories,51 to which I will return later 
when selecting control variables.  
In these three categories of explanations of political trust, important 
distinctions can be made between macro and micro variants. Macro 
theories emphasize that political trust is a collective or group property, 
shared by most members of a society, and thus focus on macro explana-
tions. Micro theories hold that political trust varies according to indi-
vidual beliefs, backgrounds, and experiences. Since I am interested in 
the effect of individuals’ multi-level territorial attachments, it is the 
micro versions of these theories that are most relevant to this chapter. 
However, I will return to the macro versions of all three groups of ex-
planations in Chapter 5, where I discuss and analyse institutional con-
texts as mediating factors.  
 
How multi-level territorial attachments matter to political trust 
The micro variants of cultural theories provide some arguments as to 
how multi-level territorial attachments are supposed to matter to indi-
viduals’ political trust. These theories highlight the difference between 
individuals’ feelings: not everyone in a society is expected to feel the 
same cultural bond, or territorial attachment, due to variations in indi-
vidual socialization and life experiences. The lack of theoretical devel-
opment regarding the importance of multi-level territorial attachments 
makes it valuable to use arguments from closely related theories to 
elaborate how multi-level territorial attachments matter to political 
trust. 
One such closely related theory is Robert Putnam’s theory of the im-
portance of social capital, which has been much criticized.52 Neverthe-
less, there are some interesting conceptual connections, as well as differ-
ences, between the social capital theory and the concept of multi-level 
territorial attachments, useful for developing my arguments. Although 
investigations of social capital tend to focus on the amount of interper-
sonal trust, instead of on territorial attachments, the similarities lie in 
the emphasis on what tends to “glue” people together in a society. 
Trust in one’s fellow citizens is supposed to help make political institu-
                                                 
51 In the literature on European legitimacy, three similar broad categories are sometimes 
referred to as three different strategies for remedying the so-called legitimacy deficit of the 
EU (Eriksen & Fossum 2002), or as a legitimacy “trilemma” (Höreth 2002; Scharpf 
2000). 
52 The theory about social capital has been criticized and empirical tests outside Italy of 
both the macro and micro versions tend to not support its premises (see e.g. Mishler & 
Rose 2001; Norén Bretzer 2005).  
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tions work, because such interpersonal trust “spills over” into political 
trust (Putnam, et al. 1993). 
Unlike social capital, the notion of territorial attachments as a basis 
for political trust does not rely on interpersonal trust per se, but rather 
on an attachment that is territorially defined, and connected to the 
boundaries of the political system. In this respect, territorial attachment 
is a more abstract concept than interpersonal trust is, as it is “stripped 
of personal life experiences” (Duschesne & Frognier 1995). In compari-
son, interpersonal trust risks being both too narrow (in the sense of a 
person thinking about his or her closest friends and neighbours) or too 
wide (encompassing people in general regardless of country) to be able 
to capture the essence of what Offe (2000) describes as a “horizontal” 
phenomenon linking citizens to one another. Offe also discusses the 
importance of mutual trust and solidarity, but within a clear territorial 
frame, as a “we feeling” that includes more than just interpersonal 
trust. According to his view, set territorial borders function as reference 
points for the formation of a people. For the purposes of my study, one 
of Offe’s arguments is particularly important, namely, that these hori-
zontal phenomena, the territorially restricted “we feelings”, are seen as 
“preconditions for the ‘vertical’ phenomenon of the establishment and 
continued existence of state authority” (Offe 2000:5). The theory of 
social capital focuses less attention on the importance of territorial 
boundaries than on the concept of multi-level territorial attachments. 
Moreover, I argue that the possibility of distinguishing between differ-
ent levels in society helps my model better represent the theoretical 
thoughts of, for example, Offe, Ferrera, and Rokkan, than does social 
capital theory, especially in the case of the European multi-level system. 
The idea that individuals’ territorial attachments can affect trust in 
political institutions and politicians has yet another theoretical basis in 
Easton’s concept of political support. He argued that, for any political 
system to be stable, its members needed a feeling of community (Easton 
1965). One of his main contributions relevant to this study is the dis-
tinction between diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). Diffuse 
support is emotional or affective, whereas specific support is more ra-
tional or utility based. Although both are parts of Easton’s full model of 
system support, this distinction roughly corresponds to the distinction 
between the cultural theories explaining political trust and the output 
theories I will discuss later in connection with the selection of control 
variables.  
The Eastonian division between diffuse and specific support has been 
investigated empirically in several studies (Borre & Goul Andersen 
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1997; Dalton 2004; Norris 1999a), especially regarding individuals’ 
support for European integration (Carey 2002; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; 
Hooghe & Marks 2004; McLaren 2004). The results vary. Sometimes 
the diffuse aspects (e.g., exclusive national identity) seem to be more 
important, whereas in other studies the specific aspects (e.g., self-
interest) are found to dominate. The differences in research results often 
depend on the particular definitions or measures chosen. These studies 
differ from the analyses I will conduct in two ways. First and foremost, 
I define and measure multi-level territorial attachments in a particular 
manner. As presented in Chapter 2, the territorial attachments indi-
viduals have are emotional, can concern different territorial levels, and 
their form and strength can vary from one individual to another. In this 
chapter, it is also important to remember that attachment to Europe, 
for example, is not the same thing as supporting European integration 
or “liking the EU”. Second, my study is unlike previous ones in that I 
use different dependent variables. The emphasis of previous studies has 
been on explaining support for European integration rather than trust 
in political institutions and politicians at different territorial levels.  
Since the concept of multi-level territorial attachments differs some-
what from most other frames used in investigating individuals’ identifi-
cation, no previous empirical analyses measure the effects on trust in 
institutions and politicians in the same way as I do. However, there are 
studies of the impact of other measures of territorial identification, such 
as nationality, on political trust. Silver and Titma (1998), for example, 
have compared the importance of nationality, citizenship, and material 
well-being in explaining trust in new political institutions in Estonia, 
finding that nationality was the most important factor.  
The conclusions of this overview are that, despite competing theoreti-
cal views of the causal relationship between territorial attachments and 
political trust, and despite some contradictory empirical results, there 
still is a sufficient theoretical foundation to justify a study exploring the 
effects of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust.53 It should 
be stressed that this effort is seen as complementing other known ex-
planations of political trust, rather than claiming that multi-level terri-
torial attachments comprise the most important factor.  
Following Offe (2000), I claim that what I call the horizontal princi-
ple leads to the expectation of finding the strongest connections be-
tween attachments and political trust at the same territorial levels. Ex-
                                                 
53 Theoretically, I will presuppose such a causal link, use statistical techniques where such 
a relationship is a prerequisite, and interpret the results in this manner; despite this proc-
ess, I will not empirically test the causal order. 
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pressed differently, I argue that the dimension territorial level of at-
tachment (sub-national, national, and supra-national) can be expected 
to have a positive influence on political trust at the corresponding level. 
The next dimension, form of attachment (exclusive, multiple, and 
nested), is also important. An exclusive form applies to a person who 
feels attached to only one level, regardless of which level it is, in which 
case the overall degree of trust can be expected to be on average lower 
than for people with multiple or nested forms of attachment. With a 
nested form, there is attachment to all levels, so the presence of trust in 
all levels is a logical expectation; the multiple form, in contrast, can be 
thought to be intermediate. Regarding the third dimension, strength 
(fairly, mixed, and very strongly attached), the strongest attachment 
could be expected to be connected to the most political trust. 
What complicates these arguments is that each of the three dimen-
sions is “pure”, i.e., uninfluenced by the other two. The benefits of this 
approach include the more thorough investigation of the impact of each 
of the dimensions, while the downside is the loss of possible combined 
effects. However, I am incorporating this combined-effect aspect by 
constructing the fourth multi-level territorial attachment variable, called 
the strongest attachment, which combines all three dimensions of at-
tachment (see Chapter 2 for greater detail). The expected effects dis-
cussed above will be more noticeable using this independent variable. 
Four specific questions will be presented to guide the empirical analy-
ses; first, however, how the political trust concept is to be defined 
should be discussed, for the specific questions to make sense.  
 
Political trust – in theory 
Several concepts are used in theories and studies of what I here call 
political trust. Legitimacy, political support, and trust, for example, are 
common concepts in the field of political science. Some scholars use 
these concepts interchangeably, whereas others define trust, for exam-
ple, as either something more specific (Mishler & Rose 2001) or some-
thing broader than political support (Hetherington 1998). 
In the present study I use the concept of political trust; more specifi-
cally, I am interested in trust in political institutions and trust in politi-
cal actors. They are theoretically the most interesting for this study, 
because they are the kinds of trust that can be expected to vary among 
people with different feelings of multi-level attachment. Earlier, I 
pointed out that political institutions have changed dramatically over 
recent decades in Europe, raising new questions about political trust.  
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Moreover, in comparison with definitions of the concept of political 
support (Almond & Verba 1963; Easton 1965, 1975; Norris 1999a), 
trust in institutions and actors can be considered merely one sort of 
object, towards which the political support could be directed.54 Easton 
argued about the multi-dimensionality of the concept of political sup-
port, citing the difference between phenomena such as support for the 
values of a system and support for current political actors. He distin-
guished between support for three fundamental objects in the political 
system, namely, the political community, political regime, and political 
authorities (Easton 1965:165).55 Combining these three objects into one 
broad concept of system support is probably one reason underlying the 
theoretical debate as to whether territorial attachment and political 
trust might be the same thing. Easton himself, however, despite merging 
these concepts to form a complete model of system support, pointed out 
that the different objects of support could vary independently of each 
other.56  
It is important for me to make sure that my dependent variable is as 
distinct as possible from multi-level territorial attachments, which fur-
ther accounts for the focus on trust in political institutions and actors. 
Hence, my definition of political trust corresponds to the last of 
Easton’s three objects, i.e., “support for the political authorities”, be-
cause in his definition support for this object includes trust in both po-
litical institutions and political actors.57 Norris et al. (1999a) and Dal-
ton (2004), on the other hand, treat trust in institutions and in political 
actors as two distinct phenomena. They identify the possibility of a 
person distrusting members of parliament, while trusting parliament as 
such – or the other way around. Trust in institutions is seen by some as 
a more generalized form of support (Listhaug & Wiberg 1995), whereas 
trust in political actors could more easily be subject to short-term 
evaluation (Citrin 1974; Norris 1999a). On the other hand, political 
                                                 
54 Objects of political support have been defined in different ways. Almond and Verba 
(1963), for example, distinguish between the system as a general object, input objects, 
output objects, and the self as object.  
55 This trisection has been further developed by several scholars (e.g. Dalton 2004; Norris 
1999a, 1999b) into five different objects, or levels, of political support.  
56 These concerns can be compared to the earlier aspect of whether European attachment 
and support for EU integration were the same thing, which proved not to be the case.  
57 The other two objects, political support for the regime and for the community, are not 
parts of my definition of political trust. Support for the regime is usually measured as 
support for democracy, something that is not considered in this study. Support for the 
community is regarded as identical to my independent variable, i.e., multi-level territorial 
attachments. The similarity is both theoretical and indicated by the choices of measure-
ments used in empirical research (Dalton 2004; Scheuer 1999).  
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actors could be considered more “human” or easier to relate to than 
fairly anonymous institutions (e.g., the European Commission). The 
trends in empirical research indicate a decline in trust in institutions, 
whereas the patterns are mixed concerning trust in political actors 
(Norris 1999a).  
The third important aspect when defining political trust is to distin-
guish between different modes, or forms, of trust.58 As mentioned previ-
ously, individuals can have both emotional and rational (or evaluative) 
feelings towards political objects, which Easton calls diffuse and specific 
support (Easton 1975). Several other researchers have drawn on 
Easton’s distinction when studying various aspects of political trust (e.g. 
Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Gabel 1998a; Hetherington 1998; Kumlin 
2004). I argue that the focus on trust in political institutions and actors 
bears more resemblance to diffuse trust.59 Diffuse trust refers to evalua-
tions of what an object is, not what it does, and it concerns trust in 
institutions and positions as such, not the evaluation of incumbents. 
Specific trust, in contrast, is related to the evaluation of what political 
authorities do, how they do it, and the results achieved. The evaluation 
of institutional performance is not part of my dependent variable, but 
will be included in the analyses via control variables.  
Finally, corresponding to the multi-level aspect of territorial attach-
ments, a special feature of this chapter is that I am interested in “multi-
level” political trust, or put differently, trust in institutions and political 
actors at several political levels. The increased importance of regional 
and EU institutions, makes it important to investigate whether all these 
institutions (and politicians) are trusted by the people they represent. In 
many countries there is an official, or elite, notion of at least three le-
gitimate levels of government, i.e., regional, state, and supra-national 
(Carl 2003). From the previous chapter it is clear that most people have 
multi-level territorial attachments. Whether or not these territorial at-
tachments correspond to trust in institutions and politicians at different 
political levels will be the focus of the empirical analyses presented in 
this chapter.  
This aspect of the relationship between trust in different political lev-
els in the same society also needs to be further developed. Easton ac-
                                                 
58 Almond and Verba (1963:16) distinguished between cognition, affect, and evaluation, 
whereas Easton (1975:436f) distinguished between specific and diffuse support. 
59 Norris et al. (1999) have chosen to define trust in institutions and political actors as 
being more specific forms of trust; however, I agree with Dalton (2004) concerning the 
interpretation that Easton’s distinction between specific and diffuse forms of trust can be 
extended to all objects of support. 
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knowledged that the society, or the “regime”, might constitute anything 
from a local community to the UN. His theoretical arguments can thus 
be applied to any political system, regardless of size; however, he left it 
open as to how to consider simultaneous trust in institutions and politi-
cal actors at different political levels. In a system of multi-level govern-
ance, like the EU, all political levels interact, albeit not necessarily hier-
archically (Hooghe & Marks 2001). Given the known range of atti-
tudes towards the EU and given the varying degrees of legitimacy of 
new regions, it is likely that trust in institutions and politicians at differ-
ent levels will vary from one individual to another. According to the 
horizontal principle, I extend the anticipated relationship between 
multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, and also expect to 
find higher degrees of trust in all levels among people with attachments 
to several levels. Another argument supporting this expectation is the 
earlier notion of there being no internal contradiction between trusted 
institutions and trusted politicians at each different level. 
In sum, my definition of political trust refers to trust in political insti-
tutions and political actors, at all political levels in Europe, and I believe 
it is closer to the diffuse rather than the evaluative aspect of trust. Ac-
cording to the horizontal principle, the relationship between attachment 
and trust at a single political level can be expected to be positive, and 
stronger than relationships between non-corresponding levels. Hence, 
attachment to several levels can be expected to be related to trust in 
several levels. The notion that trust in political actors can be more easily 
affected by short-term evaluations also leads to the expectation that 
multi-level territorial attachments will have a generally lower impact on 
trust in political actors.   
In the next section, I will present the variables used to measure politi-
cal trust, and empirically describe the degrees of political trust found in 
both Sweden and the European Union.  
 
Political trust – in Sweden and the EU 
Trust in political institutions and political actors is usually empirically 
measured using straightforward questions in opinion surveys, concern-
ing, for example, how much trust people have in certain institutions, or 
whether or not they tend to trust them. These questions are supposed to 
capture the more diffuse form of trust, rather than support for current 
incumbents or evaluations of current events. 
In the Swedish SOM survey, 2004, several different questions meas-
ured trust in both institutions and political actors, at all political levels. 
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This provides the unique possibility of studying and comparing trust 
across political levels, as well as between institutions and actors. All the 
relevant questions are presented in Table 3.1. 
When initially examining the frequencies from the Swedish sample, it 
is noticeable that the degrees of trust seem to distributed relatively simi-
larly among the different institutions and politicians; in other words, 
most people (approximately 40 per cent) choose the middle alternative: 
they have neither much nor little trust in the institution or actors in 
question.60 Apart from this, the overall pattern is that the number of 
non-trusting people generally exceeds the number of trusting people, 
although the degree of this difference varies. There is no systematic 
overall difference between the degree of trust in institutions and in po-
litical actors either. The similarities make it easier to compare the possi-
ble impacts of multi-level territorial attachments on these two groups.  
 
Table 3.1  Trust in political institutions and political actors at dif-
ferent political levels in Sweden (per cent) 
Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM survey, 2004. The degree of trust in all institutions and politicians above is 
measured using the five alternatives presented in the table, apart from trust in Swedish politicians where there were 
only four alternatives (no middle alternative).  
Further scrutiny does reveal some smaller differences, though, concern-
ing the different levels of the political system. The national political 
institutions (parliament and government) and national politicians are 
the most trusted; or, more correctly expressed, the least mistrusted. 
                                                 
60 This is not merely a response effect of people giving the same responses, since the ques-

























       
Municipal executive boards in general 1 17 45 27 10 100 1665 
Your municipal executive board  2 18 43 21 16 100 1600 
Your regional executive board 2 10 45 24 19 100 1548 
The national government 3 21 40 25 11 100 1683 
The national parliament 3 22 44 22 9 100 1682 
The European Commission 1 10 39 30 20 100 1671 
The European Parliament 1 9 39 29 22 100 1670 
 
Political actors: 
       
The political parties 1 11 45 29 14 100 1670 
Swedish politicians in general 1 29 - 54 16 100 1714 
Municipal politicians 1 18 40 26 15 100 1604 
Regional/county politicians 1 10 39 27 23 100 1562 
National politicians 2 22 43 21 12 100 1617 
Members of parliament representing your 
constituency 2 15 52 21 10 100 1688 
Swedish members of the European Parliament 1 15 45 24 15 100 1678 
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Least trusted are, not surprisingly, the European Parliament and the 
European Commission, although Swedish members of the European 
Parliament are slightly less mistrusted than EU institutions are. I said 
not surprisingly, since Table 3.1 only refers to Sweden (with its well-
known EU scepticism). In a Europe-wide setting, trust in EU institutions 
tends to exceed trust in national institutions, as can be seen in the 
Eurobarometer data in Table 3.2.61 The differences in trust in different 
levels could then be expected to be influenced by the varying territorial 
attachments, which will be analysed later in this chapter. 
The fourteen available questions in the Swedish SOM data provide 
the opportunity to do separate analyses, as well as to divide the ques-
tions into different groups by constructing indices. Constructing trust 
indices is justified by the theoretical expectation of a relationship be-
tween territorial attachments and different forms of trust, such as: gen-
eral trust in institutions, general trust in politicians, and trust in both 
institutions and politicians at the sub-national, national, and supra-
national levels. Empirically, these items are also closely correlated, and 
indices have the advantage of improving the reliability of the measure-
ment. These indices are thus useful in measuring trust in different ways, 
according to political level and type of object (i.e., institutions or ac-
tors).  
The questions included in the institutional trust index are the ones 
under the heading “Institutions” in Table 3.1, and the index of trust in 
political actors includes the items in the lower half of the table.62 Com-
bined in another way, according to political level, these items also con-
stitute three level-specific indices, which measure trust in both institu-
tions and actors at the sub-national, national, and supra-national lev-
els.63 These indices will be used as dependent variables in subsequent 
analyses. 
                                                 
61 Another interesting result from the Swedish frequency table is the lack of trust in one’s 
regional or county executive board, and in politicians. In Sweden, the counties are weak 
administrative regions mainly managing healthcare, and less powerful than most regions 
in Europe. The few newly created regions with more competences, which exist in some 
parts of the country, do not appear to have been able to enhance trust in institutions or 
politicians at the regional level. 
62 The correlations between the variables included in the institutional trust index range 
between .34 and .73, and Chronbachs’s alpha is .87; while the correlations between the 
variables in the political trust index range between .40 and .66 (Chronbach’s alpha = .89). 
63 All variables correlate enough to allow the construction of different indices, which is 
also supported by factor analyses indicating a one- or two-factor solution where there is a 
European dimension; however, these variables still load more strongly on the first factor 
(factor loadings between .65 and .78). Two items, the general trust in political parties and 
in politicians in general, are not included in the level-specific trust indices since they are 
not level specific. 
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In the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004, the choice of items measuring trust 
in institutions and political actors is more limited than in the SOM 
survey, especially concerning trust in political actors.64 Regarding differ-
ent political levels, only questions about trust in institutions at the na-
tional or European levels are available in the questionnaire; no sub-
national institutions are included, limiting the indices to the national 
and European levels.  
The two data sets also differ in the response options available for the 
questions. In the Eurobarometer these options are “tend to trust”, 
“tend not to trust”, and “don’t know” for all questions. Thus, there is 
no middle alternative and there is no possibility of capturing variations 
in strength of trust, apart from the number of institutions trusted. One 
consequence of the lack of a middle alternative is the obvious high per-
centage of respondents answering “don’t know” when asked whether 
or not they tend to trust EU institutions (the "don't know" responses 
are not included in the later analyses).  
 
Table 3.2 Trust in national and European political institutions, in 
EU25, 2004 (weighted per cent) 
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The questions about trust in European institutions are all part 
of a battery of items starting with the question, “Have you ever heard of [each institution]?”, followed by questions 
about how important each institution is in the life of the European Union, and finally by the question, “And for each of 
them, please tell me whether you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?” Response options are “tend to trust”, “tend not 
to trust”, and “don’t know”. The questions about trust in national institutions are part of a battery of questions examin-
ing 16 other institutions (e.g., church, police, and media), which runs as follows: “Now, I would like to ask you about 
how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me whether you tend 
to trust it, or tend not to trust it?” 
Most people tend not to trust national political institutions. The overall 
tendency across the whole European Union is for there to be higher 
levels of trust in European than in national institutions, which, as noted 
above, is completely opposite to the trend in the Swedish data.  
These figures represent the opinions and feelings of all citizens in all 
25 EU countries. Thus, the degrees of trust in European and national 
institutions can be expected to vary significantly across countries, not 
                                                 
64 Trust in political actors can only be measured as a matter of trust in political parties; 
hence, there is no general “trust in political actors” index, and this item cannot be in-
cluded in the level-specific indices either, since it is not a level-specific kind of trust. 
Trust in: 
Tend to trust Tend not to trust Don’t know 
Total 
per cent N 
Institutions: 
     
The national government 40 53 7 100 33 877 
The national parliament 41 51 8 100 33 877 
The Council of Ministers 46 24 30 100 33 877 
The European Commission 54 22 24 100 33 877 
The European Parliament 58 22 20 100 33 877 
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least according to paths of historical development, government struc-
ture, and time of joining the EU, matters to which I will return in Chap-
ter 5. It is known that in countries with low levels of trust in national 
political institutions, trust in EU institutions is usually stronger (Schmitt 
& Thomassen 1999). 
Due to the limitations of the relevant questions about trust in the 
Eurobarometer data, I have chosen to construct only three indices: one 
for general trust in all included institutions (both national and Euro-
pean), and two level-specific indices, one for trust in national level insti-
tutions and another for trust in supra-national level institutions.65  
 
Questions about multi-level territorial attachments and political trust 
The general expectation arising from democratic theory and from theo-
ries of political trust is that territorial attachments should have a posi-
tive effect on political trust, an expectation that will shortly be explored 
empirically. This overall expectation has been discussed in terms of 
both the dimensions of attachment and the different definitions of po-
litical trust. Hence, it is time to summarize and connect these expecta-
tions in the form of specific questions. The explorative nature of this 
study means that rather than formally testing hypotheses, the analyses 
will be guided by four questions about the nature of the relationship 
between the dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments and trust 
in political institutions and actors.  
1. The first question concerns the level dimension. I want to investi-
gate whether particular territorial levels of attachment (sub-national, 
national, and supra-national) are related to trust in political institutions 
or politicians in general, as well as related to combined trust in various 
institutions and politicians at the sub-national, national, and supra-
national levels. In addition, I want to analyse whether the relationships 
hold when controlling for other factors known to influence political 
trust (to be discussed below). The theoretical expectation arising from 
the horizontal principle is that attachment to a certain level should be 
positively, and more strongly, related to trust in institutions and politi-
cians at the same level.  
                                                 
65 The item measuring trust in political parties was excluded because it was not level 
specific, and because it was the least correlated with the remaining items. The correlation 
coefficients of the other items ranged from .27 to .76, with a Chronbach’s alpha of .80. 
Factor analysis indicated a two-factor solution with both a national and a European 
dimension; however, the European trust items loaded slightly more strongly on the na-
tional factor (.66−.80). 
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2. The second question is whether the form of attachment dimension 
(exclusive, multiple, or nested) matters for political trust. Does the trust 
a person has in institutions and politicians in general differ between the 
sub-national, national, and supra-national levels, depending on the 
particular form of attachment? If so, will the difference prevail when 
controlling for control factors? I expect the exclusive group to be the 
least trusting, since they only feel attached to one level (and this could 
be any level), whereas the nested group is expected to be most trusting 
of institutions and politicians at all levels. 
3. The third question is about the strength dimension. Are stronger 
territorial attachments connected with more trust in institutions and 
politicians in general or only at specific political levels, when controlling 
for other known factors? One expectation is that the stronger the at-
tachment, the greater the political trust. On the other hand, since the 
strength of attachment is independent of form and level, very strong 
attachment could also be expected to be more common among people 
with exclusive forms of attachment, thus leading to less positive rela-
tionships with some of the trust indices. The uncertainty about what to 
expect also implies the need for the fourth question. 
4. The final question is about the combination of all three dimen-
sions, measured as the fourth independent variable, strongest prefer-
ence. This variable represents the level or levels to which the respon-
dents have the strongest attachment, thus capturing level, form, and 
strength at the same time. One expectation is that the group that feels 
most strongly attached to all levels will have on average more political 
trust. I also expect the horizontal principle to be more noticeable in the 
results when I combine the dimensions. To determine whether these 
explanations hold under control, I will include relevant control vari-




Both political trust and welfare attitudes (the latter to be treated in the 
next chapter) are well-established concepts in social science research, 
and knowledge of the factors influencing them is vast. My purpose is 
thus not to claim a dominant position for the concept of multi-level 
territorial attachments, but rather to emphasize that it can contribute to 
further knowledge, and explain how it fits with already established 
theoretical explanations. I will therefore discuss the main groups of 
theoretical explanations, as well as select control variables in accor-
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dance with these explanations in the following analyses. The most im-
portant explanations of political trust are those theories related to insti-
tutional performance or utility, corresponding to Easton’s notion of 
specific (or evaluative) support mentioned above (Easton 1975). Borre 
and Andersen (1997) state that when demands (normative beliefs con-
cerning what governments should do) are met by policy output, politi-
cal trust is supposed to increase. In the macro version, the institutional 
theories of political trust emphasize the importance of the aggregated 
output or institutional performance, such as economic development, 
avoiding corruption, and providing public service (Anderson & Tver-
dova 2003). Delivering what the public wants is supposed to increase 
the political trust in the government and other responsible political 
institutions (Miller 1974; Mishler & Rose 2001). 
The micro variants of these performance or economic utility theories 
emphasize individuals’ evaluations of institutional performance, and 
how these evaluations are conditioned by individual experiences. This is 
based on the idea of a relationship between a system fulfilling the de-
mands of its citizens and reciprocal citizen support of the system 
(Easton 1965). Attention has mostly been paid to individuals’ evalua-
tions of economic performance. Huseby (2000), for example, has stud-
ied how individuals’ evaluations of government economic performance 
in a variety of policy areas affect trust in political institutions. Personal 
welfare state experiences are also found to be important (Kumlin 2004). 
Individuals’ utilitarian evaluations are also considered to be important 
to support for the European integration process (Gabel 1998a, 1998b; 
McLaren 2004). Given these theories and previous research findings, 
evaluations of institutional performance need to be controlled for when 
analysing how multi-level territorial attachments are related to political 
trust and socio−economic status. In the SOM study there are questions 
asking respondents to evaluate whether or not economic conditions 
have improved in their municipality of residence and in Sweden over the 
past year, and another two questions asking respondents to evaluate the 
public service offered in their municipality and region over the past 
year.66  
                                                 
66 Unfortunately, there is no good measure of EU institutional performance in the SOM 
study. One option is the indicator of how well one thinks the EU commission is perform-
ing, but it is theoretically and empirically too close to measuring trust in the EU commis-
sion. The only other option would be whether or not one supports Swedish EU member-
ship, which is not regarded as capturing trust in EU institutions, since there are several 
reasons why a person may or may not favour EU membership. 
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The Eurobarometer contains fewer relevant control variables, but 
some indicators do capture some of the evaluative aspects, namely, 
whether or not one’s country has benefited from being a member of the 
EU, whether the EU is perceived to play a positive or negative role 
regarding economic conditions in one’s country, and whether it is per-
ceived as a generally good or bad thing that one’s country is a member 
of the EU. Socio−economic background questions will also be included 
in the analyses as control factors, especially gender, age, and education. 
The third broad group of explanations of political trust emphasize the 
procedures, i.e., the formal rules and fair political institutions, and how 
these procedures and institutions affect human behaviour or attitudes 
(Hall & Taylor 1996; March & Olsen 1989). If the decision-making 
structure of a political institution is open and fair, people are supposed 
to trust it (Rothstein 1998).  
The micro versions of these theories focus on how different individu-
als perceive the institutions and their rules and norms. Individuals who 
perceive the institutions and decision-making procedures as fair are 
assumed to be supportive of them (Tyler 2000). Another micro theory 
concerns the extent to which people feel their opinions are represented 
by the political elite. This is not a purely ideological explanation, but 
rather one that applies when the “policy issue distance” is great. Ac-
cording to it, people who hold opinions opposed to those of the elite 
tend to be more distrusting of political institutions and actors (Borre & 
Goul Andersen 1997; Holmberg 1999; Miller 1974). People supporting 
the party currently in power are assumed to have a higher degree of 
political trust than others. Hence, individuals’ perceptions of their influ-
ence on the political system, or their issue representation, need to be 
included in the analyses as control variables.  
In the Swedish SOM data, policy issue distance can be measured indi-
rectly, using the question of whether one is a partisan of the incumbent 
government party as a proxy.67 The Eurobarometer 62.0 contains no 
party preference question, but instead a question about one’s perceived 
influence, i.e., whether one’s voice counts in the EU. These variables 
will all be included as controls in the empirical analyses of the expected 
relationships between different dimensions of multi-level territorial 
attachments and political trust, to be presented next. Finally, social 
background variables, such as age, gender, and education will be in-
                                                 
67 Borre and Goul Andersen (1997) argue that especially in Scandinavian settings, with 
their long traditions of Social Democratic government, whether or not one is a Social 
Democrat partisan is a good proxy for policy distance. 
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cluded, since degrees of both trust and territorial attachment may vary 
between these groups. 
 
ANALYSES OF MULTI-LEVEL TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS 
AND POLITICAL TRUST 
 
Of the three challenges to multi-level systems, this chapter addresses the 
second, i.e., the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments 
and trust. I have argued that the challenge could be either that there is 
no such relationship, or − more likely given theory and previous re-
search − that the overall relationship exists, but that the large number 
of people feeling attached to other territorial levels would lead to less 
trust in national institutions and politicians. The latter will be explored 
in the later analyses of the dimensions of multi-level territorial attach-
ments, in accordance with the four chapter-specific questions. 
As an introduction to the empirical results, it would be enlightening 
to consider whether the expected pattern exists at all, even before un-
dertaking the dimensional or index categorizations, and before includ-
ing any control variables. Hence, I will present correlation analyses of 
all the original Swedish items regarding territorial attachment to each 
political level, and all the original items of trust in institutions and poli-
ticians at all political levels. The results in Table 3.3 exhibit the clear 
pattern, indicated by the shaded figures, that attachment to a certain 
level tends to correlate positively, and most strongly, with trust in insti-
tutions and politicians at the same level. The only small exception is 
attachment to the regional or county level, which tends to correlate 
somewhat more highly with trust in municipal institutions and politi-
cians. Since this is still a sub-national level, it does not change the over-
all expected pattern.68 Attachment to the municipality correlates slightly 
more highly with trust in political institutions and politicians than does 
attachment to one’s village, town, or part of municipality. This is logi-
cal, given that the organization of political institutions in Sweden fol-
lows municipal boundaries, i.e., larger geographical areas than towns or 
villages.  
Another noticeable result is that people who feel more strongly at-
tached to the EU and to Europe also tend to have stronger, or equally 
strong, trust in institutions and politicians at all levels than do other 
people − though the correlation with trust in European institutions is 
                                                 
68 This is also reasonable in the Swedish context, due to the historically weak regional 
level described above and to the strong municipalities. 
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strongest. Not surprisingly, the correlation with trust in EU institutions 
is absolutely the strongest among those who feel attached to the EU. At 
first sight, this might indicate some support for the idea that attachment 
to a larger territorial area could “spill over” to lower levels. However, 
this theoretical notion was developed with respect to national levels, 
and as can be seen, attachment to the national level is only weakly cor-
related with trust in several other lower-level domestic institutions and 
in politicians.  
 
Table 3.3  Correlations between attachments to different levels, and 
trust in political institutions and politicians, in Sweden 
(Pearson’s r) 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed). 
Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The question about attachment is: “People may feel different 
degrees of attachment to different areas. How attached do you feel to [the above alternatives]?” The scale goes from 
0 (not at all attached) to 10 (very attached). The trust items have response categories coded to range from 1 = very 
little trust to 5 = very much trust. Entries in the table are correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r). 
This pattern is not merely a Swedish phenomenon, because the Euro-
barometer data display the same overall correlation patterns for all 
Europeans. A more probable explanation, to be further tested in the 
following sections, is that those people who feel attached to both the 
EU and to Europe might have multiple forms of attachments, and thus 
feel attached to several lower political levels as well. The horizontal 
principle is at least initially supported in both data sets, but with some 
interesting exceptions to be investigated in more detail in the following 
analyses, not least to determine whether the results hold when control-





















Institutions       
Municipal executive boards in general .14* .18* .14* .11* .17* .14* 
Your municipal executive board  .16* .21* .16* .06 .19* .15* 
Your regional/county executive board .09* .14* .12* .05 .16* .14* 
The national government 10* .13* .11* .12* .18* .14* 
The national parliament .10* .14* .11* .11* .25* .19* 
The European Commission .04 .07* .05 .03 .44* .26* 
The European Parliament .03 .06 .05 .01 .45* .25* 
       
Political actors       
The political parties .09* .13* .09* .09* .25* .18* 
Swedish politicians in general .09* .13* .10* .10* .29* .21* 
Municipal politicians .16* .22* .17* .12* .22* .16* 
Regional/county politicians .11* .14* .15* .09* .22* .16* 
National politicians .11* .14* .12* .14* .27* .19* 
MPs representing your constituency .11* .17* .13* .13* .23* .19* 
Swedish MEPs .09* .12* .10* .11* .33* .22* 
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Level of attachment and political trust  
Above, I introduced four specific questions to guide the empirical analy-
ses presented in this chapter. The first one focuses on the territorial level 
of attachment dimension (sub-national, national, and supra-national), 
and whether it has an impact on trust in political institutions or politi-
cians in general, and on trust in institutions and politicians both at the 
same level (sub-national, national, and supra-national).  
Five different trust indices were constructed from the Swedish SOM 
data (see earlier this chapter). The first measures trust in all political 
institutions regardless of level and the second trust in all political actors 
regardless of level. These two indices let us explore whether multi-level 
territorial attachments might have a different impact on trust in institu-
tions than on trust in politicians. Such different impacts can be expected 
from the reasoning of, among others, Norris (1999a) and Dalton 
(2004), about political institutions and actors being different objects of 
support; in contrast, Easton (1965) considered institutions and political 
actors to be comparable. 
The other three trust indices are level specific, consisting of all vari-
ables measuring trust in both institutions and politicians at the sub-
national, national, and supra-national levels. They provide good pre-
requisite information with which to analyse the horizontal principle. 
Table 3.4 presents different OLS regression analyses of the Swedish 
data, one column for each index.69 Since my independent variables are 
categorical, all values are transformed into separate variables with a 
value of one if a person has the attachment, and zero if not. Concerning 
this dimension, however, the dummy variables are not mutually exclu-
sive, because a person can have attachments to more than one level at 
the same time. The first group of rows displays the bivariate coefficients 
for each of the three attachment levels. Below are the estimates for the 
basic model when the effects of three different attachment levels are 
only controlled for each other, without using any control variables.  
In the bivariate analyses, all attachment levels are positively related to 
all trust indices, apart from the sub-national attachment level; however, 
even when controlling for all attachment levels in the basic model, the 
results change. The most striking result is the significant effect of supra-
                                                 
69 Although regression analysis presupposes a casual relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables, I will not empirically be able to prove this causality. Instead, I 
argue that the theoretical arguments for this direction of causality are strong enough to 
justify such analyses.  
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national attachment; this effect is noticeable in all trust indices, regard-
less of object or level, although it is most apparent in the case of trust in 
supra-national politicians and institutions. 
 
Table 3.4 Effect of level of attachment on trust in political institu-
tions and politicians in Sweden, 2004 (unstandardized 
multivariate OLS estimates) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p<.01 
Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The trust indices are coded 1–5, where 5 is the highest degree of 
trust (further described in the measurement section). The attachment variables are each coded 0–1, 1 indicating the 
existence of attachment. These are not dummy variables since a person can feel attached to more than one level.  
Also noticeable is that the effect of national attachment disappears 
when controlling for the other attachment levels, and that national 
attachment has only a weak significant effect on the national trust in-

















     
Sub-national attachment (1–0) .13** .23*** .23*** .22*** .08 
National attachment (1–0) .16** .35*** .17* .38*** .18** 
Supra-national attachment (1–0) .29*** .30*** .24*** .29*** .41*** 
      
Basic model 
     
Sub-national attachment (1–0) .14** .14** .24*** .13** .03 
National attachment (1–0) -.11 .12 -.12 .16* -.08 
Supra-national attachment (1–0) .33*** .28*** .24*** .27*** .46*** 
      
Full model including control variables 
     
Sub-national attachment (1–0) .13** .11* .23*** .10 .00 
National attachment (1–0) -.13 .14 -.07 .15* -.02 
Supra-national attachment (1–0) .31*** .27*** .22*** .26*** .46*** 
      
Support government party (1–0) .35*** .31*** .32*** .48*** .17*** 
Economy & service evaluation of last year  
(base = got worse)      
Municipality economy same  19*** .10** .29*** .06 .10 
Municipality economy improved .25** -.00 .20 .00 .19 
Swedish economy same .08* .15*** .00 .21*** .18*** 
Swedish economy improved .22*** .23*** .14* .31*** .27*** 
Municipality service same  .17*** .16** .25*** .13** .15** 
Municipality service improved .07 .15 .16 .04 .28 
Swedish public service same .06 .05 .04 .08 .04 
Swedish public service improved .45*** .37** .29 .41** .46** 
Male (female = 0) -.06* -.03 -.07* -.02 -10** 
Age (in years, year 2004) .00** .00** .00 .00** .00** 
Education (base = low)      
Medium low education -.00 .04 -.08 .09 .05 
Medium high education .00 .04 -.11* .05 .15** 
High education .14** .17*** -.03 .27** .24*** 
      
Constant 1.94*** 1.63*** 1.88*** 1.75*** 1.67*** 
Adjusted R2 for large model .22 .17 .18 .21 .13 
N 1258 1278 1201 1339 1431 
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dex.70 One has to remember that over 90 per cent of respondents have a 
national attachment, and that a person can feel attached to all levels at 
the same time. Hence, the additional attachments become more impor-
tant. In comparison, sub-national attachment has a somewhat higher 
effect, especially regarding trust in sub-national institutions and politi-
cians (.24), in line with the horizontal principle.  
When controlling for the other known explanatory factors, the effects 
of supra-national attachment clearly remain significant. This partly 
supports the horizontal principle, concerning the effect on the supra-
national trust index, but it is interesting that supra-national attachment 
also remains the most important attachment for all other trust indices.71 
Returning to the initial question of whether or not attachments to other 
territorial levels would contribute to diminishing state legitimacy, these 
results point in the opposite direction. It would seem that supra-
national attachment is the most important factor, even for trust in na-
tional institutions and political actors. One must consider, however, 
that the level of attachment in this case is measured separately from the 
strength and form dimensions. Hence, I will return to this result further 
on.  
Sub-national attachment has its strongest impact on the sub-national 
index, even under control, as expected from the horizontal principle 
and also to some extent from the institutional and the political actor 
indices. National attachments remain, having only a weak impact on 
the national trust index. These results indicate that there is more to the 
effect of multi-level territorial attachments, or more specifically, their 
territorial level dimension, than merely the horizontal principle. This 
justifies my ongoing scrutiny of the impact of the other attachment 
dimensions. It is not enough only to consider the importance of having 
or not having an attachment to a certain level; one must also simultane-
ously consider both the strength of such an attachment, and attachment 
to other territorial levels.  
Another result is that the effects on the institutional and the political 
actor indices are almost identical, even when controlling for factors 
                                                 
70 The same pattern emerges if the breakpoint for having or not having an attachment is 
shifted from five to six; doing so only marginally lowers the estimates of national attach-
ment and marginally raises the estimates of sub-national attachment. 
71 If a good measure of evaluation of EU institutional performance were available, it is 
possible that these effects could be found to be lower. As substitutes, I have included both 
evaluation of the EU commission (which is too close to trust) and general support for EU 
membership (which has too many different explanations) in the analyses. Both correlate 
strongly with the supra-national index, but the effect the of supra-national attachments 
still remains significant, although decreases (to .25 and .31 respectively 
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believed to be more influential on trust in political actors. So far, the 
results lend more support to Easton’s idea that both institutions and 
actors belong to the same category, namely, that of political authorities. 
The fact that there are no relevant trust items regarding political actors 
in the Eurobarometer thus seems to pose less of a problem. 
I should also comment on the fact that the coefficients are generally 
rather low. For example, concerning trust in all institutions, the differ-
ence between having or not having a supra-national attachment results 
in only a .31 increase on a 1–5 scale, when controlling for all other 
variables. For my purposes, however, it is mainly relevant that signifi-
cant effects can be found at all, since I believe that the effects of multi-
level territorial attachments complement other factors known to influ-
ence the degree of trust people have in political institutions and politi-
cians. My contribution is thus to demonstrate that multi-level territorial 
attachments can also contribute to our understanding and hence should 
not be neglected, and to show how they can matter. Among the other 
factors, supporting the government party has a marked significant effect 
on most indices, as do the relevant evaluations of public service and 
economy. All in all, the results thus also lend support to the main alter-
native traditional explanations of political trust, especially the expected 
influence of the evaluations and perceived fairness of the institutions.  
What can be concluded from the Swedish data thus far is that the 
level of attachment dimension affects both the general trust indices and 
specific levels. The results partly support the idea of a horizontal rela-
tionship, but most striking are the effects of having a supra-national 
attachment on all the trust indices. It is time to turn to the Eurobarome-
ter results to see whether the same patterns will emerge. 
The Eurobarometer data contain trust indices for only the national 
and supra-national levels, and for trusting all the institutions. The val-
ues of these three indices correspond to the number of institutions a 
person trusts, ranging from zero to five (the institutional index), two 
(the national index), and three (the supra-national index). Because of 
this, the regression analyses used for the Eurobarometer data are not 
the same as in the Swedish SOM data, but rather are ordered logistic 
regression analyses. This regression technique is used when the depend-
ent variable is categorical, but has more than two values, values that 
can be ordered in relation to one another (Long 1997).  
In an ordered logistic regression, the coefficients cannot be interpreted 
in the same direct way as in an OLS regression, so a common option is 
to calculate predicted probabilities (ranging from 0 to 1) (Hoffmann 
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2004; Long & Freese 2003).72 In this case it is the predicted probability 
of the highest value, i.e., of trusting all institutions included in each 
trust index, that is reported in the lower part of the table. In this way it 
is possible to compare the probabilities of trusting all the institutions, 
between respondents who do and do not have a certain attachment 
(e.g., sub-national attachment). 
In Table 3.5 the same general pattern of supra-national attachment 
having the strongest significant effect appears in the European data as 
well. For example, the predicted probability of trusting all three supra-
national institutions is .46 for a person without a supra-national at-
tachment and .66 for a person with such an attachment, when the con-
trol variables are at their means.73 The exception to the pattern is the 
national trust index, where national attachment seems to be more 
strongly influential, and thus more in line with the horizontal principle. 
This is supported by the fact that the predicted probability  of having 
the highest value of the national trust index, i.e., trusting both national 
institutions, rises from .20 for people not attached to the national level, 
to .33 for people attached to the national level. This is a slightly larger 
change than that predicted for people without (.29) and with a supra-
national attachment (.34). The sub-national attachment could not be 
analysed in the same manner, since the Eurobarometer contains no 
questions concerning trust in regional and local institutions. 
The Eurobarometer results support the horizontal principle, at least 
concerning national and supra-national attachments. I also find the 
same pattern of supra-national attachments influencing all indices as in 
the Swedish data, although it is less obvious.74  
 
                                                 
72 Due to the problems of interpreting the coefficients, the bivariate ones are not displayed 
in the table, and only the estimates of the basic model, made under controlled conditions, 
are shown. 
73 The predicted probabilities are dependent on the values of all other variables included in 
the analyses: if any single variable changes, the probabilities will change too. It is thus 
possible to calculate predicted probabilities for any type of person, for example, a less-
educated man who is negative towards the EU, or a young woman of high education. 
Notably, the same tendencies remain even when we change some of the other variables.  
74 National attachment appears more important for national trust according to the Euro-
barometer than the Swedish data, a difference that cannot be caused by more variation in 
the independent variable, since the Eurobarometer also indicates a 94 per cent national 
attachment; according to the Eurobarometer, however, fewer people, trust national politi-
cal institutions, and more people trust EU institutions. 
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Table 3.5 Effect of level of attachment on trust in political institu-
tions and politicians in EU25, 2004 (ordered logistic re-
gression coefficients and predicted probabilities) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The trust indexes are formed by adding together trust vari-
ables (tend not to trust = 0 and tend to trust = 1). The institutional index ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 5 
(tend to trust all institutions in the index). The national index ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 2 (tend to 
trust both institutions in the index). The supra-national index ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 3 (tend to 
trust all three institutions in the index). The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have 
such attachment) and are not mutually independent, since people can be attached to more than one level. All 
coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25. Dummies for all countries but one (Slovenia) 
have been included in the analyses, but are not presented in the table. The predicted probabilities are calculated 
when all other variables are at their means (including the control variables). Only the extreme values of the predicted 
probabilities (of trusting all included institutions) are presented in the table. 
The general answer to question one is that the level of attachment 
dimension has significant effects in both the Swedish and the European 
data, even when controlling for other known explanations. I find sup-
port for the anticipated horizontal principle at all levels. Moreover, 
people with supra-national attachments tend to trust both institutions 
and politicians at all levels as much as or more than other respondents. 
Trust indices: The institutional 
trust index 
 





Model Basic Control  Basic Control  Basic Control 






Sub-national attachment (0–1) 
.15** .26***  .11** .18***  .18** .28*** 
National attachment (0–1) 
.34*** .50***  .48*** .70***  .12** .24*** 
Supra-national attachment (0–1) 1.47*** .72***  .63*** .25***  1.62*** .81*** 
         
Country benefits from EU membership (0–1)
 .77***   .44***   .72*** 
Country’s EU membership (base = a bad thing) 
       
Membership is neither a good or bad thing 
 .74***   .30***   .83*** 
Membership in the EU is a good thing 
 1.36***   .72***   1.49*** 
EU effect on country’s economy (base = negative) 
       
EU neither pos. nor neg. for my country’s economy 
.28***   .09*   .35*** 
EU is positive for my country’s economy 
 .68***   .38***   .80*** 
My voice counts in the EU (0–1) 
 .95***   .63***   1.02*** 
Male (female = 0) 
 -.04   .03   -.13*** 
Age (in years) 
 .00***   .00***   .00** 
Education (base = stopped before 16 yrs) 
        
Education stopped at 16–19 years 
 .01   -.10**   .09* 
Education stopped at 20+ years  
 .19***   .10**   .13** 
Still studying 
 .27***   .31**   .13 
 





N 16176 13611  22213 17205  17319 14358 
         
    
Probability of trusting all institutions in the indices, 







 No Yes No Yes No Yes 
P(trusting all the institutions) .17 .22 .14 .22 .14 .25 
P(trusting the two national institutions) .29 .33 .20 .33 .29 .34 
P(trusting the three supra-national institutions) .54 .60 .54 .60 .46 .66 
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As well, so far there is no evidence that the effects on trust in institu-
tions differ from the effects on trust in political actors. 
 
Form of attachment and political trust 
The dimension form of attachment (exclusive, multiple, and nested) is 
the focal point of the second chapter-specific question. It is the dimen-
sion that most clearly captures the variety of combinations of attach-
ments to different political levels among the individuals in the sample. 
Theoretically, the variation in this dimension consists of the unattached 
(i.e., not attached to any level), people with exclusive attachments (i.e., 
attached to any single level), people with multiple attachments (i.e., 
attached to two levels), and finally people with nested attachments (i.e., 
attached to all levels in the polity).  
In Table 3.6, the results are structured as previously. The top group 
of rows displays the bivariate effects of each of the dummy variables, 
followed by the basic model in which these variables are analysed con-
trolling for each other. The results of analyses including control vari-
ables are presented at the bottom of the table (although the control 
variables are suppressed). One difference from the level dimension is 
that here all the categories are mutually exclusive, i.e., a person can be 
attached to only one of the categories. The unattached group is the base 
category, excluded from the multiple regressions, and all effects should 
be interpreted in relation to people who are unattached. 
All forms of attachment have a bivariate effect on all trust indices, 
apart from the unattached group; however, when the different forms of 
attachment are controlled for each other, the pattern changes dramati-
cally. The obvious finding from a multi-level territorial attachment per-
spective is that having a nested form of attachment has a significant 
impact on all the trust indices, which also holds when controlling for 
the other variables in the analyses (however, the control variables are 
suppressed in the full model, because their values are almost identical to 
those in Table 3.4). This explains why those described as having a su-
pra-national attachment in the previous section tended to trust institu-
tions and politicians at all levels. Since the level dimension is not mutu-
ally exclusive between the categories, anyone with a supra-national 
attachment could also be attached to both of the other two levels. Many 
of the people with a supra-national attachment have a nested form of 
attachment; this result is clearly in line with the theoretical expectation 
that people with nested attachment trust all levels and objects. 
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Table 3.6 Effect of form of attachment on trust in political institu-
tions and politicians in Sweden, 2004 (unstandardized 
multivariate OLS estimates) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01 
Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The trust indexes are coded 1–5, where 5 is the highest degree 
of trust (further described in the measurement section). The attachment variables are dummies, coded 0–1. Unat-
tached people make up the base category, coded as not attached to any level; the exclusive form comprises people 
attached to only one level, the multiple form people attached to two levels, and the nested form people attached to all 
levels (sub-national, national, and supra-national). The control variables are the same as in Table 3.4, but not shown 
in this table due to their almost identical estimated values.  
The results for the exclusive and multiple forms of attachment are not 
significant under control, and to some extent they even indicate a nega-
tive relationship with the trust indices (e.g., in the case of supra-national 
trust). The estimates for the control variables are almost the same as in 
Table 3.4, with support for government party and public service evalua-
tions having the strongest effect. These insignificant results are not so 
surprising in the case of the exclusively attached people, since they were 
expected to be the least trusting. In fact, since the horizontal principle 
would lead us to expect that exclusively attached people would only 
trust one level, and that it could be any level for each individual, insig-
nificant overall results are just what we would expect. The lack of effect 
of the multiple form of attachment is more surprising, since these peo-
ple were thought to trust at least two levels. However, most multiply 
attached respondents tend to feel attached to the national and sub-
national levels. We could thus have expected to find a connection be-

















     
Unattached .16 -.34*** -.20* -.33*** -.20* 
Exclusive form of attachment (1–0) .35*** -.27*** -.28*** -.30*** -.33*** 
Multiple form of attachment (1–0) .24*** -.27*** -.23*** -.25*** -.32*** 
Nested form of attachment (1–0) .30*** .34*** .28*** .33*** .38*** 
      
Basic Model 
     
Form (base = unattached)      
Exclusive form of attachment (1–0) .14 .08 -.05 .06 -.09 
Multiple form of attachment (1–0) .02 .14 .04 .16 -.01 
Nested form of attachment (1–0) .30** .45*** .31*** .46*** .35*** 
      
Full model including control variables 
     
Form (base = unattached)      
Exclusive form of attachment (1–0) .17 .01 -.07 .04 -.22 
Multiple form of attachment (1–0) .03 .10 .07 .15 -.05 
Nested form of attachment (1–0) .23** .39*** .31** .42*** .31** 
[control variables suppressed]      
Constant 2.01*** 1.77*** 1.95*** 1.85*** 1.80*** 
Adjusted R2 .21 .18 .18 .21 .12 
N 1258 1278 1201 1339 1413 
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tween multiple attachment and, for example, the sub-national or na-
tional trust indices, though this is not the case in the Swedish data.  
Let us turn to the Eurobarometer data and see whether the patterns 
are the same as in the Swedish data. After all, the overall trust levels 
were different between the data sets, the Swedes tending to trust na-
tional institutions more than EU institutions, and the opposite being 
true in all 25 EU member states. As in Table 3.5, the analyses were 
done using ordered logistic regression, so I present predicted probabili-
ties, this time in the columns furthest to the right. The mutually exclu-
sive nature of the form of attachment variables leads to the same prob-
abilities of trusting all the institutions in each trust index for those who 
do not have the exclusive, multiple, or nested form of attachment. Since 
the variables are dummies, they all have the same base category (the 
unattached group). I have also chosen not to present the estimated con-
trol variables, since they are almost identical to those presented in Table 
3.5. 
 
Table 3.7 Effect of form of attachment on trust in political institu-
tions and politicians in EU25, 2004 (ordered logistic re-
gression coefficients and predicted probabilities) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information on the trust indices, see Table 3.5. The form 
of attachment items are dummies (0–1), and the unattached group is the base category. The control variables are the 
same as in Table 3.5, but are not displayed because their estimated values are similar. All coefficients are weighted 
according to the national populations in EU25. The predicted probabilities reported in the right-hand columns are 
calculated with the other form of attachment variables set to zero and the control variables at their means. Only the 
extreme values of the predicted probabilities are presented. P(I) = the probability of trusting all five institutions, P(N) = 
the probability of trusting the two national institutions, and P(S) = the probability of trusting the three supra-national 
institutions. 
The exclusive form of attachment is in general as insignificant as it is in 
the Swedish data. This can be seen in the very small (or non-existent) 
differences in the predicted probabilities, for example, the probability of 
trusting all institutions, P(I), is .09 for the unattached group (the base 
category) and .10 for the group with an exclusive form of attachment.  
Trust indices: The institutional 
trust index 




P(I) P(N) P(S) 
Model Basic Control  Basic Control  Basic Control  
            
Form (base = unattached)         .09 .16 .41 
Exclusive attachment .02 .10  .20 .21  -.00 -.02 .10 .20 .41 
Multiple form of attachment .36*** .59***  .57*** .74***  .15 .33** .16 .29 .49 
Nested form of attachment 1.61*** 1.24***  1.13*** 1.04***  1.55*** 1.05*** .26 .36 .67 
            
Pseudo R2 .04 .15  .01 .11  .06 .21    
N 16176 13611  22213 17205  17319 14358    
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The findings regarding those with a multiple form of attachment dif-
fer from the comparable findings from the Swedish data. Having a mul-
tiple attachment instead of being unattached raises the predicted prob-
ability of trust, especially in national institutions, P(N), from .16 to .29. 
The multiple form of attachment also has a small effect on trust in all 
institutions, and as it turns out, on supra-national trust when control-
ling for the other factors. In this sense, the European data support the 
theoretical expectations. 
The most impressive change in predicted probabilities concerns those 
with unattached versus nested attachments. In the case of trusting all 
three supra-national institutions, the predicted probabilities, P(S), are 
.41 and .67 for the unattached and nested groups, respectively, which 
represents a substantial rise and is in line with the horizontal principle. 
As in the Swedish data, however, the effects of the nested form of at-
tachment are the strongest, regardless of the level or object trusted; this 
could be expected, since a nested person is attached to all levels. 
In answering the second question, I conclude that nested attachment 
has a significant effect on all the trust indices in both the Swedish and 
the European data sets, whereas multiple attachment only has a signifi-
cant impact on trust in the Eurobarometer data, and exclusive attach-
ment has no significant effect at all. It is thus important for trust in all 
levels of institutions and politicians whether the form of attachment is 
nested, or perhaps multiple.  
 
Strength of territorial attachment and political trust 
The results corresponding to the third question concern the last dimen-
sion, strength of attachment. The strength of territorial attachment is 
only measured among those considered to be attached to at least one 
level, making the group of unattached people the reference category 
once more. The average degree of strength is calculated without taking 
account of the levels to which a person is attached or of the form of 
attachment. For simplicity, this average degree of strength is then di-
vided into three groups: those on average fairly attached (to one or 
more levels), those very attached (to one or more levels), and those with 
a combination of fairly and very strong attachments. This procedure 
has the advantage of making some sort of comparison between the 
Swedish and the Eurobarometer data possible, despite the original 
variation in response options, especially regarding the strength. 
What I want to find out here is to what extent stronger territorial at-
tachments are connected with more trust in institutions and politicians, 
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in general or at specific political levels. The theoretical expectations in 
this regard are unclear, pointing in different directions. 
 
Table 3.8 Effect of strength of attachment on trust in political 
institutions and politicians in Sweden, 2004 (unstan-
dardized multivariate OLS estimates) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The trust indexes are coded 1–5, where 5 is the highest degree 
of trust (further described in the measurement section). The attachment variables are dummies, coded 0–1 (see 
Chapter 2 and the accompanying text for more information about the categorization). The control variables are the 
same as in Table 3.4, but are suppressed.  
In Table 3.8 the pattern is different from those of the previous two 
dimensions. Even the bivariate estimates are very low and only a few 
are clearly significant, and moreover indicate negative effects (fairly 
attached). When controlling for each other (the basic model), both the 
very attached and those with a combination of very and fairly strong 
attachments have positive effects on almost all trust indices.  
However, neither the institutional trust index nor the supra-national 
trust index is affected by any degree of strength of attachment once the 
control variables are included in the analyses. The impact is clear re-
garding effect on trust in political actors at the sub-national and na-
tional levels. It is people with mixed fairly and very strong attachments, 
or solely very strong attachments, who indicate trust in these indices. 
The theoretical expectation was unclear, and I do not find a pattern of 
stronger attachments leading to more trust. Instead, and in trying to 

















     
Fairly attached (1–0) .17*** -.17*** -18*** -.17*** -.11* 
Fairly and very attached (1–0) .06 .07* .05 .06 .11** 
Very attached (1–0) .06 .08* .09* .09** -.03 
      
Basic model 
     
Strength (base = unattached)      
Fairly attached (1–0) .01 .19* .04 .18 .10 
Fairly and very attached (1–0) .18* .36*** .22* .35** .24** 
Very attached (1–0) .20** .39*** .26** .39*** .17 
      
Full model including control variables 
     
Strength (base = unattached)      
Fairly attached (1–0) .00 .18 .11 .20* .07 
Fairly and very attached (1–0) .11 .30*** .23* .32*** .18 
Very attached (1–0) .13 .32*** .27** .34*** .13 
      
Constant 2.03*** 1.76*** 1.95*** 1.86*** 1.80*** 
Adjusted R2 .18 .14 .16 .18 .07 
N 1234 1251 1177 1311 1384 
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answer question three regarding the Swedish data, there seems to be 
some kind of domestic and personal trust pattern regarding the strength 
of attachment, since there were no significant connections with the 
institutional and supra-national indexes.  
This could somewhat support the idea that indicating the highest de-
grees of attachment when answering such questions is connected to a 
more cultural (or ethnic) mode of attachment, and thus more to be ex-
pected among attachments to national and sub-national levels. For the 
first time, I also note an obvious difference between the effect on trust 
in institutions and on trust in political actors. This is not, however, a 
result corresponding to the expectations of Norris et al. (1999a), that 
political actors should be more easily affected by short-term evalua-
tions; on the contrary, it seems to be closer to domestic trust. In the 
context of my study this is logical, considering the single variables in-
cluded in the indices. Concerning political actors at the supra-national 
level, the political actor index only asks about trust in Swedish members 
of the European Parliament, not MEPs in general. The two indices that 
displayed no significant effects of strength of attachment are in fact the 
only two that contain questions about trust in EU institutions. 
Let us turn now to the Eurobarometer data, and see how the effects 
of strength of attachment on trust in political institutions appear in the 
Europe-wide setting, where the general image of the EU tends overall to 
be more positive than in Sweden. 
The results of the analyses of the strength of attachment dimension 
differ the most between the Swedish and European data sets. In the 
Eurobarometer data, changing from unattached to being fairly, mixed, 
or very attached has almost no effect on the results, the predicted prob-
abilities increasing between ten and twenty points, regardless of the 
strength of attachment. Hence, there is a small effect, but it does not 
vary between the different degrees of strength.   
Since the measure of strength is independent of level and form, one is 
as likely to find a person with a nested form of attachment in any of the 
strength categories, as a person attached to a certain level. The degree 
of strength in itself does not seem to matter; rather, the general effect of 
multi-level territorial attachments is captured by the more significant 
estimators and greater increase in predicted probabilities than those of 
the unattached group.  
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Table 3.9 Effect of strength of attachment on trust in political 
institutions and politicians in EU25, 2004 (ordered lo-
gistic regression coefficients and predicted probabilities) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01 
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information regarding the trust indices, see Table 3.5. 
The form of attachment items are dummies (0–1), and the unattached group is the base category. The control 
variables are the same as in Table 3.5, but not displayed due to similar estimates. All coefficients are weighted 
according to the national populations in EU25. The predicted probabilities reported in the right-hand columns are 
calculated with the other attachment variables set to zero and the control variables at their means. Only the extreme 
values of the predicted probabilities are presented. P(I) = the probability of trusting all five institutions, P(N) = the 
probability of trusting the two national institutions, and P(S) = the probability of trusting the three supra-national 
institutions. 
From the European data I can conclude that having an attachment at all 
is what makes the difference, not whether the attachment is fairly or 
very strong. The different patterns in the Swedish and the European 
data are largely explained by the different response options, but they 
also indicate the need to combine all three dimensions to explore which 
combinations of attachments matter the most for different types of po-
litical trust.  
 
Combined dimensions of attachment and political trust 
In accordance with the fourth chapter-specific question, I am investigat-
ing the impact of the combination of the three dimensions of multi-level 
territorial attachments. As developed both theoretically and empirically 
in Chapter 2, this combination is constructed as a new measure, where 
people are categorized according to the level or levels to which they 
have the strongest attachment. It is not important how strong the at-
tachment is in absolute terms, as long as it is the strongest one held by 
each individual.  
Since the survey questions enable people to indicate the same degree 
of attachment to more than one level, they do not properly rank all 
levels. Such a ranking, or list, can only be made in those cases where a 
respondent has indicated different degrees of attachment to the different 
levels. On the other hand, there is no theoretical reason to expect that 
Trust indices: The institutional 
trust index 




P(I) P(N) P(S) 
Model Basic Control  Basic Control  Basic Control  
Strength of attachment            
(base = unattached)         .10 .17 .43 
Fairly attached 1.01*** .84***  .78*** .78***  .78*** .66*** .20 .30 .59 
Fairly and very attached 1.16*** .98***  .96*** .91***  .96*** .77*** .23 .33 .62 







   
Pseudo R2 
.00 .14  .00 .11  .00 .20    
N 15996 13493  21768 16989  17097 14222    
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all individuals would be able to rank their attachment to each of the 
levels. On the contrary, it is one of the points of this study that people 
can be equally strongly attached to more than one level. Hence, it is 
possible that someone might indicate his or her strongest attachment to 
two or even all three levels of attachment. My classification is thus or-
ganized according to the level, or combination of levels, to which a 
person has the strongest degree of attachment. There are six different 
categories: unattached, primarily sub-national, all domestic, primarily 
national, supra-national etc. (with a few persons being equally strongly 
attached to one more level), and finally all levels equal (i.e., with the 
same strength of attachment to all levels). 
 
Table 3.10 Effect of combined dimensions of attachment on politi-
cal trust in Sweden, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate 
OLS estimates) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01 
Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The trust indexes are coded 1–5, where 5 is the highest degree 
of trust (further described in the measurement section). The attachment variables are dummies, coded 0–1 (see 
Chapter 2 and the main text for more information about the categorization); those selecting sub-national attachment 
as the strongest comprise the base category. The control variables are the same as in Table 3.4, but are suppressed.  

















     
Primarily sub-national .10 -08 .07 -.20** -.11 
All domestic .03 -.04 .06 -.01 -.22*** 
Primarily national  .16*** -.11*** -.18*** -.06 -.17*** 
Supra-national etc. .17*** .11* -.06 .10 .48*** 
All levels equal .35*** .35*** .32*** .29*** .48*** 
      
Basic model 
     
Strongest attachment (base = unattached)      
Primarily sub-national .06 .27** .27** .14 .09 
All domestic .13 .31*** .25** .31*** .03 
Primarily national  .05 .27** .09 .28** .09 
Supra-national etc. .30*** .43*** .15 .41*** .62*** 
All levels equal .46*** .64*** .48*** .57*** .61*** 
      
Full model including control variables 
     
Strongest attachment (base = unattached)      
Primarily sub-national .04 .23* .32** .16 .03 
All domestic .05 .25** .24* .30*** -.02 
Primarily national  -.01 .21* .12 .24** .04 
Supra-national etc. .23** .34*** .14 .35*** .54*** 
All levels equal .39*** .57*** .48*** .53*** .58*** 
      
Constant 2.05*** 1.77*** 1.96*** 1.87*** 1.83*** 
Adjusted R2 for full model .21 .16 .18 .19 .14 
N 1263 1282 1205 1343 1418 
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Using the combined measure in analysing trust in different objects and 
levels emphasizes and strengthens both the relevance of the horizontal 
principle, and the effect of being equally attached to all levels. Exempli-
fying the horizontal principle in Table 3.10, people with primarily sub-
national and all domestic attachments tend to trust sub-national politi-
cal institutions and actors, in comparison with the unattached who 
form the base category. The logic of the horizontal principle is clear, 
since the primarily national group does not have a significant effect on 
sub-national trust, but rather on national trust, and since the all domes-
tic group trusts both the sub-national and national levels. Similarly, 
supra-national trust is mostly affected by people having a supra-
national attachment among their strongest attachments. This can be 
compared to the results in Table 3.4, where national attachment barely 
had a significant effect on national trust. These results indicate the need 
not only to consider attachments to one territorial level at a time, but 
simultaneously to consider the other levels to which a respondent is 
attached, and how strong each attachment is. 
The result, that people whose strongest attachment is to all three lev-
els equally (all levels equal) have the strongest positive significant effect 
on all trust indices, also holds when controlling for other factors. How-
ever, an interesting comparison is that the effect of the supra-national 
etc. category is not significantly related to the sub-national trust index, 
and the all levels equal group also has much stronger effects on trust in 
all levels and objects. Hence, it is not enough to have a supra-national 
attachment per se, as could be assumed from the analyses of the level 
dimension. Instead, these results clearly signal the importance of having 
attachment to all levels, in order to enhance political trust in all levels. 
To foster trust in institutions and politicians at all levels, it is not 
enough to be attached only to the highest level in a multi-level system.  
As well, all the attachment categories have generally stronger (and 
more significant) effects on trust in political actors than on trust in po-
litical institutions. Compared to the unattached group, all the attach-
ment categories have a positive effect on trust in political actors, al-
though most noticeable is the effect of the all levels equal group (.57). 
General trust in political institutions is, on the other hand, only signifi-
cantly positively influenced by the two categories containing a supra-
national attachment. There is still no support for the idea that trust in 
political actors would be more easily influenced by other short-term 
factors and thus less by attachments; however, it should be remembered 
that the supra-national level captures trust in Swedish MEPs, not all 
MEPs. For someone whose strongest attachment is domestic, the emo-
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tional distance from a Swedish MEP could well be less than the emo-
tional distance from EU institutions. 
In the Eurobarometer data, all categories have significant positive ef-
fects on all three trust indices, even when controlling for other explana-
tory factors. Just as in the Swedish data, the strongest effects on all trust 
indices come from those people who feel equally strongly attached to all 
three levels. This is reflected in the predicted probabilities presented in 
Table 3.11, which are highest for people in the all levels equal category 
(compared to the unattached group); the predicted probability of an 
unattached person trusting supra-national institutions is .35, whereas it 
is .68 for a person who feels equally strongly attached to all levels.  
 
Table 3.11 Effect of combined dimensions on trust in political insti-
tutions in EU25, 2004 (ordered logistic regression coef-
ficients and predicted probabilities) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The institutional index ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institu-
tion) to 5 (tend to trust all institutions in the index). The national index ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 2 
(tend to trust both institutions in the index). The supra-national index ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 3 
(tend to trust all three institutions in the index). The attachment categories are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 
(do not have such attachment) and are dummies; the unattached group is the base category. The control variables 
are the same as in Table 3.5, but are repressed. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in 
EU25. The predicted probabilities are calculated with the other attachment category variables set to zero and the 
control variables set to their means. Only the extreme values of the predicted probabilities for each trust index (i.e., 
trusting all included institutions) are presented in the table. 
The impact of those people who feel the strongest attachment to the 
supra-national level (and maybe one more level) is weaker, displaying 
the same overall pattern as in the Swedish data. However, one differ-
ence is that, whereas none of the domestic attachments affected trust in 
the supra-national level in the Swedish data, this is not the case in the 
EU25 data. In the Europe-wide data set, I find that that trusting all 
domestic levels not only has the strongest impact on national trust (as 
Trust indices: The institutional 
trust index 




P(I) P(N) P(S) 
Model Basic Control  Basic Control  Basic Control  
            
Strongest attachment 





      .10 .16 .35 
Primarily sub-national 
.63*** .63***  .61*** .60***  .55*** .51*** .17 .26 .55 
All domestic 
.88*** 1.01***  .86*** 1.01***  .71*** .72*** .23 .35 .60 
Primarily national  
.80*** .79***  .78*** .89***  .62*** .49*** .19 .32 .54 
Supra-national etc. 1.44*** .91***  1.07*** .78***  .82*** .74*** .21 .30 .60 
All levels equal 1.70*** 1.24***  1.17*** 1.05***  1.10*** 1.09*** .27 .36 .68 
 
        
   
Pseudo R2 
.02 .15  .01 .11  .03 .19    
N 16036 13521  21843 17036  17141 14253    
 Multi-level Territorial Attachments and Political Trust  95 
anticipated from the horizontal principle), but also has as strong an 
effect as the supra-national etc. category does on trust in EU institu-
tions. 
The answer to question four is thus that the combination of levels 
provides more detailed information than do the results of the analyses 
of each dimension separately. In particular, the difference between those 
people categorized as supra-national etc. and those who feel equally 
strongly attached to all levels (all levels equal) is prominent. Overall 
trust in all the institutions and political actors in a multi-level system 
thus seems to be best upheld by people with equally strong attachments 
to all levels, i.e., those who truly have multi-level territorial attach-
ments. 
 
Chapter summary, conclusions, and theoretical implications 
At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that there were two differ-
ent ways, relevant to the chapter, in which territorial attachments could 
be thought to challenge the state. One such challenge would be if there 
were no relationship between territorial attachments and trust, and 
hence no national political trust based on more emotional (or long-
term) national attachment. Another challenge would be if there were 
such a relationship, but the citizens felt attached to other territorial 
levels, leading to lower national political trust. Neither of these chal-
lenges was empirically supported by my analyses. There is evidently a 
relationship between territorial attachments and trust. The European 
integration process would be challenged if there were no relationship 
between European attachments and trust in EU institutions, or if such a 
relationship led to decreasing national political trust, thus challenging 
the multi-level system. In Chapter 2 we learned that most respondents 
were attached to more than one level, but the results of the present 
chapter indicate that such multi-level territorial attachments do not lead 
to diminished political trust in national political institutions and actors. 
Despite the debated causality between these phenomena, I have ar-
gued that it is theoretically reasonable to expect the direction of the 
causal relationship at the individual level to extend from multi-level 
territorial attachments to political trust. This argument is supported by 
two theoretical views. One is Easton’s (1965; 1975) theory of system 
support, with its distinction between diffuse and specific support. The 
other is to consider multi-level territorial attachments as one of three 
broad categories of theoretical explanations of political trust, namely, 
the cultural theory category (cf. Dalton 2004; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; 
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Mishler & Rose 2001; Putnam, et al. 1993). The other two categories, 
institutional performance and input theories, have contributed to my 
selection of relevant control variables for the analyses. Theoretically, 
the horizontal principle anticipates a correspondence between attach-
ment and trust at the same territorial level. However, no previous the-
ory explains how the combined impact of attachment to several levels 
influences political trust in different levels, which is part of the theoreti-
cal contribution of this chapter. 
The definition of political trust used in this study is limited, only cap-
turing trust in political institutions and actors at social levels ranging 
from municipal executive boards to the European Parliament. Empiri-
cally, several trust indices were constructed to determine whether the 
dimensions of attachment related differently to general trust in institu-
tions or politicians at all levels, compared to trust in both institutions 
and politicians at the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels, 
taken individually. 
Four chapter-specific questions guided the analyses, and indicated the 
theoretical expectations regarding the impact of each of the dimensions 
of multi-level territorial attachments. The first question was how the 
dimension level of attachment (sub-national, national, or supra-
national) related to different forms of political trust. The findings reveal 
support for the horizontal principle, in both the Swedish and the Euro-
pean data − as far as they can be compared. Still more interesting is the 
finding that supra-national attachment tends to have a significant im-
pact on trust in institutions and political actors at all territorial levels. 
These results hold even when controlling for other relevant explanatory 
variables, such as support for government party and evaluations of 
public service. 
The second question was how the dimension form of attachment (ex-
clusive, multiple, or nested) affected the same trust indices. The nested 
form of attachment proved to have a significant influence on all trust 
indices in both the Swedish and European data sets, whereas the multi-
ple form only had an impact on trust in national institutions in the 
Eurobarometer data.  
The focus of the third question was how strength of attachment re-
lated to the trust indices. The findings indicated a domestic and per-
sonal trust pattern in the Swedish data, since these data displayed no 
evidence of significant effects on the institutional and supra-national 
indices (both of which capture trust in EU institutions). In the European 
data, the fact of having an attachment of any sort is what seems to 
make the difference, not how strong that attachment is. However, the 
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differences between the two data sets are partly due to their different 
response options. 
The above results identified the need to combine all three dimensions 
into one new measure, corresponding to the fourth question. I called 
this new measure of combined dimensions the strongest level(s) of at-
tachment. From analysing effects on political trust in the Swedish data, 
I found a difference between those who had a supra-national attach-
ment as their strongest (without being equally attached to all levels) and 
those who felt equally strongly attached to all levels. The former group 
did not affect sub-national trust, whereas the latter group had strong 
positive effects on all trust indices. The difference between the effect of 
having only a supra-national attachment as the strongest attachment, 
and of being equally strongly attached to all levels, indicates that trust-
ing all levels is not so much a spill-over effect of being attached to the 
largest (or highest) level, as it is the result of many people actually hav-
ing strong attachments to all levels.  
In sum, in this chapter I have explored the effects of the three defined 
dimensions of attachment, and the results indicate that all three can 
contribute to improving our understanding. These dimensions can be 
combined into a measure of strongest attachment, which helps deepen 
our understanding of how territorial attachments relate to political 
trust. The effects are generally not very strong, but their significance 
indicates that the concept of multi-level territorial attachments can con-
tribute to our understanding of political trust, and that there is a need 
for further analysis of the impact of this factor.  
Attachments to other than national territorial levels in the EU multi-
level system thus do not challenge the state − at least not by lowering 
political trust. On the contrary, people who have strong attachments to 
all levels tend to trust all the political institutions and actors that are 
part of the multi-level system. In light of discussions of the possible 
need for an EU identity, to foster ongoing support for the European 
integration process, these results indicate the importance of focusing not 
only on the EU level; in a multi-level system, attachments to all levels 
might well be equally important.  
Still, political trust is something that can exist simultaneously at all 
levels, without trust in one level decreasing trust in another. This is no 
zero-sum game: no cost is involved in trusting more levels, and no deep-
seated national values are threatened. In the next chapter I will “up the 
ante”, by analysing the importance of multi-level territorial attachments 
to welfare attitudes. To refer to the system level, it might not be so 
much state legitimacy that is being challenged, as state solidarity.  
 Chapter 4 
 
 Multi-level Territorial Attachments 
and Welfare Attitudes 
 
Now it is time to redirect our attention to the third overall challenge to 
the state and to European integration, namely, the challenge of welfare 
attitudes. At the system level, welfare attitudes are associated with the 
last of the four phases of territorial system building, i.e., redistribution 
(Ferrera 2005), as well as with Marshall’s social component of citizen-
ship (Marshall & Bottomore 1992). In Chapter 1, I discussed how at-
tachments to the territorial community are considered to be particularly 
important in welfare states, in order to support the necessary redistribu-
tion of resources between individuals (Bellamy 2008 ; Habermas 1998; 
Mau 2002; Offe 2000; Scharpf 2000). In this chapter I will analyse this 
statement in more detail, from a multi-level perspective.  
Studying the relationship between territorial attachments and welfare 
attitudes makes for a harder case for the importance of territorial at-
tachments than in the previous discussion of the impact on political 
trust. It is much easier for an individual to trust a political institution or 
a politician than to agree to redistribute part of his or her income to 
other individuals. There is no cost involved in trusting, and no action 
required; as the saying goes, actions speak louder than words.  
This fundamental difference between political trust and welfare atti-
tudes becomes even more obvious in the case of a multi-level system. 
Just because someone trusts the institutions or politicians at a certain 
political level, does not mean that he or she necessarily prefers this level 
to be responsible for social policy or public spending (Svallfors 1999). It 
is completely theoretically plausible for a person to have a very strong 
degree of trust in the institutions and politicians at all political tiers. 
However, redistribution always presupposes taking resources from 
someone to give to someone else, recalling a zero-sum game between 
individuals or territorial levels. Welfare policies usually benefit some 
individuals more than others, and the question of which level one pre-
fers to make decisions regarding social policies can only be answered by 
choosing one level, not all. In fact, the overall idea of sub- and supra-
national attachments challenging the state might be more applicable to 
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welfare attitudes than to political trust. Whereas attachments to several 
territorial levels only seem to increase the overall amount of political 
trust at all levels, welfare attitudes could well bring matters to a head. If 
anywhere, this is where we can expect to find evidence that attachments 
to other than state levels contribute to undermining the (welfare) state.  
Historically it is the (nation) state that has been the guarantor of wel-
fare policies (de Búrca 2005). It is in the frame of the state that the de-
velopment of the generous welfare state has been achievable (Ferrera 
2005). Thus, in many countries there is a strong link between the na-
tional and the welfare state. As in the theoretical literature on political 
trust, the causal direction of these two phenomena is debated, although 
to a somewhat lesser extent regarding welfare politics. Irrespective of 
the assumed causal direction, most scholars in this field emphasize the 
interconnectedness or reciprocity between attachments and welfare. 
Regardless of whether it was the sense of belonging to a nation that 
established the interrelationships of solidarity necessary for the welfare 
state (Habermas 1998; Offe 2000), or whether it was the construction 
of the welfare state institutions that contributed to shaping the national 
identities (McEwen & Moreno 2005), there is a common focus on the 
idea that there is such a relationship between attachments and welfare 
policies at the same level. It is also implied that only one shared territo-
rial attachment, normally national attachment, has a bearing on welfare 
policies. This theoretical tendency to focus on the national level has 
meant that the territorial aspect of welfare politics has been under-
explored, despite the structuring effect territorial factors have been 
claimed to exert on most political developments in Europe (McEwen & 
Moreno 2005; Rokkan 1999; Rokkan & Urwin 1983). 
As before, I will be unable empirically to determine the causal rela-
tionship between these two phenomena. In the theoretical section of this 
chapter, however, I will argue for the reasonableness of analysing the 
relationship as an effect of territorial attachments on attitudes towards 
welfare, and develop the theoretical expectations so as to encompass 
multi-level territorial attachments as well. These expectations will then 
be investigated empirically later in the chapter. First, however, I will 
briefly examine how welfare state policies are challenged by the multi-
level system, which calls for taking a multi-level approach to welfare 
attitudes research. 
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Territorial challenges to welfare state policies 
There are two main ways the classical notion of the welfare state in 
Europe could be challenged. First, welfare policies and public services 
are often parts of policy devolutions to regional and local levels in many 
European countries; Sweden is no exception, approximately two thirds 
of the welfare sector being managed at local or regional levels 
(Johansson, et al. 2001; Montin 2002). Some observers regard the devo-
lution of public service areas as a response to regional identity claims 
(Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Gallego, et al. 2005), or even as contributing to 
undermining the welfare state by compromising the common culture 
and sense of demos that made the welfare states possible in the first 
place (Wolfe & Klausen 1997). These views point directly to the neces-
sity of including attachments to different territorial levels when analys-
ing welfare attitudes. On the other hand, there are several welfare devo-
lution processes in Europe that are not based on such identity claims 
from below, but rather on the economic necessity of states transferring 
responsibility for a costly public service sector to lower political levels 
(Pierre & Peters 2000). In such a situation, sub-national attachments, 
for example, might be less important or even not relevant at all, when it 
comes to explaining support for those policies. 
Second, and more important to this part of the study, are ongoing 
discussions of the formulation of a European social policy at the EU 
level. Some scholars argue that such a policy is needed if European inte-
gration is to continue, whereas others argue that such a process lacks 
the identity basis on which such a joint policy could rest. The former 
position is represented by Habermas (2001), who argues that there is 
definitely a need for deepening European integration and for a Euro-
pean constitution. This necessity concerns, in his view, not only the EU 
itself, but also the preservation of the democratic achievements of the 
European nation states, achievements that have significance beyond the 
borders of the individual EU member states. My view is that his argu-
ment corresponds to Ferrera’s (2005) idea of the different phases of 
territorial system building, and also to the functionalist interpretation of 
Marshall’s components of citizenship, as representing the development 
of citizenship rights from civil rights, through political rights, finally 
arriving at social rights. According to such an interpretation, the evolu-
tion of a “social Europe” would clearly be the next logical step of 
European integration.  
In contrast, Scharpf, among others, argues that there is no prospect 
that welfare-state functions could be effectively federalized in Europe, 
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due to the normative salience of the existing social contract (at the na-
tion state level) between citizens and the state (Scharpf 2000). More 
relevant to this study is the objection to a European social policy based 
on the perceived absence of a European identity: “Europeans still think 
of themselves primarily in national terms; they have not yet developed 
the relations of trust and solidarity on the European level that would be 
necessary to underpin a stronger European governing capacity” (Offe 
2000:38). Empirically, few studies have examined this relationship, but 
some results indicate that the lack of a European identity is one reason 
why there is no public demand for a social Europe (Mau 2005).75 More 
research into this area is clearly needed. 
In sum, welfare state policies can be found at different levels in states, 
and they constitute one of the most crucial factors affecting the future 
of the European Union. It is definitely time to include territorial consid-
erations in theoretical research into the welfare state, as has been 
pointed out by several authors (Ferrera 2005; Kumlin 2007; Moreno & 
McEwen 2003). My contribution to this field will be to investigate how 
multi-level territorial attachments matter to individual attitudes towards 
welfare.  
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TERRITORIAL 
ATTACHMENTS AND WELFARE 
 
There are two main streams of theoretical literature concerning the 
relationship between territorial attachments and welfare. The first 
stream relates to the general macro-theoretical expectations regarding a 
connection between community feelings and the welfare state. The sec-
ond theoretical stream emphasizes the micro, or individual, level. There 
is naturally a relationship between these two levels of inquiry. The 
community–welfare state connection at the macro (or aggregated) level 
would not be intelligible without some correspondence to a comparable 
relationship at the individual level. The interconnectedness of these two 
levels calls for a brief presentation of some of the macro expectations, 
before examining the individual-level relationship in more detail in the 
next section. 
According to macro-theoretical reasoning, Scharpf argues that welfare 
measures require “a collectivity in which the identification of members 
                                                 
75 In addition to other explanations, varying territorial attachments have proved to be 
important factors explaining why individuals do or do not support pan-European social 
policies (Mau 2005). 
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with the group is sufficiently strong to override the decisive interests of 
subgroups in cases of conflict” (Scharpf 2000:12). Moreover, since 
group membership has so far been determined by territorial boundaries, 
it is the identification with politically defined territorial levels that is of 
interest. The territorial borders of a state mark the area that encom-
passes the citizens, and thus, at the same time, the area where the obli-
gations of the state are valid. In this way, territorial borders limit a 
state’s responsibility to care for the welfare of certain individuals, i.e., 
the citizens of the state (Offe 2000).  
The reason for the national focus is the sense of implied solidarity, re-
ferred to by Ferrera (2005) as the process of bounded structuring. The 
process has two dimensions: boundary building (with reference to terri-
tory and membership) and internal structuring (with reference to cen-
tre–periphery relationships, socio−political cleavages, and institu-
tional−organizational forms). The former dimension, boundary build-
ing, is considered to lead to greater closure and fewer exit options, 
whereas the latter dimension leads to greater loyalty and voice (Ferrera 
2005:22f). Historically in Europe, this bounded structuring has oc-
curred at the national level, explaining why welfare policies and redis-
tribution have only been possible in the national frame. 
Over recent decades, however, this situation has gradually changed, 
as previously emphasized, making both the sub-national and the supra-
national levels more relevant when discussing welfare policies. Ferrera 
comments that there is a dual trend in Europe, where the content of 
citizenship is becoming thicker (more social rights) while the container 
of citizenship (i.e., national borders) is thinning out (Ferrera 2005). 
Territorial borders have historically been important for the higher de-
gree of closure needed to bind citizens to a mutual system of social 
rights; however, with free movement in the European Union, this inclu-
sion is contested, as are the preconditions for such solidarity, i.e., na-
tional identity.  
The conclusion is that there is a strong general macro-theoretical be-
lief in the relationship between national identity and the welfare state, a 
relationship considered to be challenged by other territorial identities. 
Despite the emphasis on the national level, I believe there is no theoreti-
cal reason why the same principle would not be relevant at other levels 
too. The relationship between attachment to other political levels and 
welfare policies can be expected to be important, especially if responsi-
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bility for welfare policies is partially or completely transferred to those 
tiers.76 Again I refer to this as the principle of horizontal relationship.  
However, the role of attachment to lower or higher territorial levels is 
more debatable. Although few scholars expressly argue for the necessity 
of a sub-national identity if welfare policies are to be legitimate at these 
levels, some scholars highlight the importance of regional identity 
claims as an underlying reason for the devolution of welfare policies 
(Catt & Murphy 2002; Wolfe & Klausen 1997).77  
Regarding the idea of a “social Europe”, there has been considerable 
theoretical reasoning concerning the importance, or unimportance, of a 
European identity. Earlier in this chapter I cited Offe and his argument 
that the Europeans still lack the European identity necessary to support 
welfare policies at the EU level (Offe 2000). Similar reasoning concern-
ing the legitimacy of welfare policies at the EU level can be found in 
writings by, for example, Habermas (2001) and Scharpf (1999), al-
though there are also other, non-identity-related arguments about the 
inconceivability of supra-national European welfare policies. 
Generally neglected in this theoretical field, irrespective of macro or 
micro level, are arguments and expectations concerning the multi-level 
system in its entirety. Despite increased interest in identities at several 
levels, and parallel interest in the decline of state sovereign control over 
welfare policies, the multi-level perspective is both theoretically and 
empirically underdeveloped.  
 
How multi-level territorial attachments matter to welfare attitudes 
The idea that territorial attachments are imperative for individuals’ 
welfare state attitudes has similarities to a broad category of theoretical 
explanations of welfare state attitudes that I call “theories of normative 
values of fairness and social justice”. Interest in normative concerns as 
explanations of welfare state attitudes is rising (Mau 2003; Svallfors 
2006), and is seen as complementary to the traditionally more investi-
gated second broad explanatory category, which contains theories of 
                                                 
76 In contrast, as Moreno and McEwen (2003) point out, the creation of welfare policies 
at a certain level can contribute to enhancing attachment to this level, which in turn can 
reinforce the support individuals have for such welfare policies. 
77 These claims are usually based on the experience of countries with historically strong 
regions. In unitary states, the expectation is that national attachment would be strong 
enough to support even local or regional social policies, which is something we will return 
to in the next chapter. 
 Multi-level Territorial Attachments and welfare attitudes  105 
the importance of individuals’ self-interest, socio−economic status, and 
class (Baldwin 1990; Edlund 1999; Iversen 2005; Svallfors 2007).78  
Drawing on some of the theories and results from the theoretical 
category of normative values and fairness can contribute to our under-
standing of how multi-level territorial attachments can be expected to 
affect welfare state attitudes. As with political trust, the idea is that 
territorial attachments may complement other known factors explaining 
attitudes to welfare, not least ideology and self-interest, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
A key to improving our understanding of how individuals’ multi-level 
territorial attachments can affect their attitudes towards welfare and 
redistribution is to scrutinize the idea of deservingness perceptions (van 
Oorschot 2006). A deservingness perception can be thought of as a 
mechanism operating between a normatively based independent vari-
able (e.g., a multi-level territorial attachment) and attitudes towards 
welfare. The theoretical concept of deservingness perceptions contrib-
utes to our knowledge of why some groups of people are regarded as 
more deserving of social protection than others are. It is not an inter-
mediate variable to be included in the analyses, but a theoretical 
mechanism explaining in more detail why the relationship can be 
thought to exist. 
van Oorschot theoretically defines five different deservingness criteria, 
and demonstrates empirically that the two most important ones con-
cerning welfare attitudes are, first, control over one’s neediness, and 
second, identity (my emphasis). Regarding the deservingness criterion of 
identity, he says: “needy people who are closer to ‘us’ are seen as more 
deserving” (van Oorschot 2006:26). This criterion seems to be espe-
cially important when neediness is related to ethnic or national minori-
ties: “The deservingness criterion of identity protects the group against 
burdensome support claims from outside the group, while the criterion 
of control protects against such claims from inside the group” (van 
Oorschot 2006:38).  
The deservingness criterion of identity explains how the principle of a 
horizontal relationship between territorial attachments and welfare 
functions at the individual level. Hence, I argue that the deservingness 
criterion of identity makes it reasonable to expect that people with at-
tachments to certain territorial areas will support welfare policies di-
                                                 
78 This second theoretical category explains the choice of control variables later in this 
chapter. Other well-known explanations are macro theories of institutional differences, 
elite opinions, interest groups, and information effects; we will return to some of these as 
contextual factors in Chapter 5. 
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rected to people living in those same areas. This can be expressed as an 
expectation that the multi-level territorial attachment dimension of level 
should be positively related to supportive welfare attitudes directed 
towards the same territorial level.79 On the other hand, the deserving-
ness criterion of identity can also lead to another expectation: people 
who are not part of “us” would not be considered deserving of our 
welfare support. This touches on the downside of feelings of identity. 
Despite the possible benefits of identity feelings, in the form of making 
people feel closer to one another, there is also the reverse side of the 
coin, namely, how we treat the “out-group”, i.e., “them”. In the con-
text of the present study, this translates into an expectation of less sup-
portive attitudes regarding providing welfare support to other people at 
levels to which a person does not feel attached. 
From the same horizontal principle it could be argued that people 
with multiple or nested forms of attachments can be expected to be 
more supportive of social policies existing at several (or higher) political 
tiers, or social policies directed towards a geographically wider range of 
people, than are people with an exclusive form of attachment. 
Regarding strength of attachment, it is more difficult to argue from 
the deservingness criterion of identity that this dimension should be 
important. Identity as a deservingness criterion is supposed to affect 
perceptions of who is worthy of support, not to what extent. However, 
the strength dimension might be interesting in light of the discussion of 
thin versus thick identity presented in Chapter 2. I concluded then that 
thick identity is a narrower concept, more closely connected to issues of 
common culture, empathy, and national pride, than is my concept of 
multi-level territorial attachments, which can encompass both thicker 
and thinner versions (See also Follesdal 2001; Follesdal 2002).  
Several authors, such as Scharpf (1999) and Offe (2000), argue that 
such a thick identity is not a precondition for political legitimacy, but 
that it might play a role in making people willing to share and redis-
tribute their income and tax money to others. Hence, it is plausible that 
an overall stronger degree of attachment might imply thicker feelings, 
and hence have a stronger effect on welfare attitudes. Still, this argu-
ment is more plausible when considering the strength of attachments 
within defined territorial boundaries, not when considering strong gen-
eral attachments. I would thus expect strength of attachment to be more 
important as a part of the combined measure of all three dimensions of 
                                                 
79 Welfare state attitudes can be different in character, and some of their aspects are more 
relevant from a territorial identification point of view. We will return to this shortly, in 
the section “Defining welfare attitudes”. 
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multi-level territorial attachments. My expectation is thus that the com-
bined measure of the level or levels to which one is strongest attached 
will have an impact. If attachments to domestic levels are the strongest, 
any European welfare policies will be regarded unfavourably, and vice 
versa if the European attachment is the strongest. 
From these theoretical arguments and expectations we can formulate 
specific questions about how each of the dimensions of multi-level terri-
torial attachments can be expected to influence attitudes towards wel-
fare. However, for the questions to make sense, I first need to discuss 
what kinds of welfare attitudes I deem relevant to this study. 
 
Attitudes towards welfare – in theory 
Unlike a common perception in the USA, the word “welfare” according 
to a European understanding encompasses many more aspects of soci-
ety and the public sector than merely the social security scheme. Atti-
tudes towards welfare thus encompass a broad spectrum of aspects, 
mainly due to the variety of welfare institutions – both within and be-
tween countries (Kumlin 2007; Mau 2003; Svallfors 1991, 1996, 2003; 
Taylor-Gooby 1999).  
In this study I embrace a broad definition of welfare. Naturally, wel-
fare policies have redistributive features (Iversen 2005), but in my opin-
ion welfare can be seen as a broader concept than simply redistribution. 
Welfare is broader because it encompasses the provision of public ser-
vices that do not presuppose any direct redistribution of resources from 
some individuals to others. However, all public financing of common 
goods and public services is based on taxation, and thus has an indirect 
redistributive aspect. Likewise, even a universal welfare state, with 
transfers to all citizens, has a redistributive effect when evaluating the 
outcome after both taxes and transfers (Rothstein 2001). I also include 
attitudes about redistribution that does not occur between individuals, 
but between different territorial areas, and attitudes about what level of 
government should concern itself with welfare issues. 
One important distinction when considering welfare attitudes can be 
made between general support for the idea of a welfare state and spe-
cific support for particular welfare policies (Svallfors 1996, 2003).80 
Both of these categories are relevant to this study. General welfare sup-
                                                 
80 Three levels of abstraction are common regarding welfare attitudes: general welfare 
support, support for specific policies, and evaluation of specific policies. The latter does 
not fall within the scope of this study and will not be considered further here (Kumlin 
2007; Svallfors 2003). 
Chapter 4 108 
port captures attitudes towards redistribution and the size of the public 
sector in general. More specific welfare support, for example, concern-
ing schools, pensions, and healthcare policies, has the advantage of 
being more easily connected to certain tiers in the political system. 
However, the distinct welfare areas are not of interest in their own right 
because of the explorative nature of this study. As well, the theoretical 
underdevelopment of this research field does not provide sufficiently 
detailed expectations regarding individual welfare policies.81 Rather, I 
need to investigate whether the overall anticipated relationship between 
territorial attachments and welfare attitudes exists, and holds when 
controlling for other known explanatory factors. Hence, I will combine 
a number of specific welfare attitudes into indices, in accordance with 
the considerations discussed below. 
One aspect of welfare attitudes relevant to this study is the question 
of scope (Borre & Goul Andersen 1997; Borre & Scarbrough 1995). 
When discussing beliefs about the scope of government, Borre and 
Goldsmith (1995:4) refer both to the range of government activity and 
to the degree to which governments engage in activities. According to 
their definition, range concerns the multiplicity of social aspects in 
which the government is active, whereas degree captures the intensity of 
such involvement.  
The question of range and degree of government activities can be 
compared to individuals’ attitudes towards the degree of government 
responsibility for various welfare policies (Svallfors 1991), or in other 
words, whether people prefer private or public management of a certain 
welfare service. Since it is more expected that public welfare manage-
ment will contain elements of redistribution between individuals or 
groups of individuals (hitherto in the frame of the nation state), we 
would especially expect sub-national and national attachments to corre-
spond to a stronger preference for public management, as long as it 
takes place in a national frame. Inversely, the strong connection to the 
nation state might make people with supra-national attachments more 
supportive of private management and consequently less nationally 
bound alternatives. The same reasoning is applicable to the difference 
between welfare attitudes regarding social equality and social security, 
                                                 
81 It could be an interesting direction for future research, to explore in detail whether the 
effects of multi-level territorial attachments are stronger or weaker regarding different 
specific welfare areas. Such differences could, for example, be theoretically plausible given 
the varying normative moral logic implied in different welfare programs (Mau 2003). 
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the former containing a larger element of redistribution, the latter being 
based on the idea of individual contributions (Mau 2003).82  
I argue that the question of who is considered eligible for welfare 
support, or entitled to social benefits, is also part of the scope aspect. 
The scope of welfare, in this sense, is relevant from a multi-level system 
perspective, and is clearly connected to the concept of multi-level terri-
torial attachments. Within what boundaries, or to whom, are people 
willing to have their tax money redistributed? This corresponds directly 
to the deservingness criterion of identity discussed earlier (van Oorschot 
2006).  
In political terms, this is largely an issue of the preferred level of gov-
ernment (De Winter & Swyngedouw 1999) for welfare policies, where 
we expect people primarily to prefer that welfare issues be determined 
at the level of government corresponding to their territorial attach-
ments. Given the strong historical connection between the state and 
welfare policies, the main controversial issue in Europe concerning the 
level of government responsible for welfare issues is whether or not 
there should be a specifically European social policy, and whether wel-
fare issues should therefore be subject to EU decision-making. Thus the 
question of scope, from a multi-level and eligibility perspective, should 
definitely concern attitudes regarding the preferred level of government, 
and regarding solidarity and the redistribution of resources to other EU 
citizens or other parts of Europe.83  
 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS WELFARE IN SWEDEN AND THE EU 
 
Given that welfare attitudes are the theme of this chapter, the choice of 
Sweden as a case is especially germane. To some people the words Swe-
den and welfare state are almost synonymous. The Swedish, or Scandi-
navian, welfare model is historically renowned, and closely connected 
to the nation-building process: “[N]owhere has the link between ‘be-
longing’ and ‘sharing’ become so strong in institutional as well in sym-
bolic terms as in the Nordic countries: the Swedish metaphor of the 
                                                 
82 This also corresponds to the difference between general welfare service, with services 
and/or support being provided for everyone, and more specific welfare programs designed 
for those most in need, although this distinction is not part of this study. 
83 Of course, there are other interesting aspects of welfare attitudes that are not part of 
this study, such as attitudes regarding how much money the government should spend on 
different policies, and taxation policies (Edlund 1999; Svallfors 1991). The reason for not 
including them is that the deservingness criterion of identity identifies who is deserving of 
help, not how much help they deserve or how the taxation system should be designed. 
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welfare state as ‘the people’s home’ (folkhemmet) is the most popular 
and effective testimony of such a link” (Ferrera 2005:65).  
However, Sweden has not been spared from economic decline in re-
cent decades, and there were important retrenchments in the welfare 
system in the 1990s. Following these retrenchments, the proportion of 
the population supporting the public sector has been approximately 15–
20 per cent higher than the proportion wanting to reduce the sector 
since the mid-nineties (Nilsson 2005). Another important though lesser-
known feature of the Swedish system is the extensive devolution of 
social policies that was carried out, especially in the 1990s. Sweden’s 
counties (or regions) and unusually large municipalities are now respon-
sible for most (approximately 2/3) of welfare services in Sweden.84 This 
situation makes Sweden an interesting case in which to study the rela-
tionship between multi-level territorial attachments and attitudes to-
wards welfare and redistribution. The historically strong link between 
national attachment and the welfare state in Sweden makes it a difficult 
case, however, in terms of discerning the importance of both sub-
national and supra-national attachments. 
With the help of Eurobarometer data, it is possible to compare the ef-
fects of multi-level territorial attachments across all EU member states. 
The internal organization of welfare and redistributive policies differs 
between states, a matter to which I will return in the next chapter. Here 
the focus is on the general attitudes among all EU citizens regarding the 
question of the preferred decision level for social policies.  
 
Welfare attitudes in Sweden 
In this chapter, the dependent variables regarding attitudes towards 
welfare have been chosen in accordance with the theoretical aspects of 
welfare attitudes and state responsibilities discussed above. In the Swed-
ish SOM survey 2004, one set of indicators asks respondents about 
their opinions on a number of proposals emerging from the political 
debate. I have selected three proposals that concern welfare policies: 
reducing the size of the public sector, preventing for-profit companies 
from running hospitals, and having more private management of health 
care. Before making any analyses, I will first present the response fre-
quencies, to be better able to explain the indices I will construct later. 
The three items correspond to different aspects of welfare attitudes.  
                                                 
84 The municipalities and counties/regions are responsible for about two thirds of Swedish 
public consumption, and three quarters of people working in the public sector are em-
ployees of municipalities or counties (Johansson, et al. 2001; Montin 2002). 
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The first captures general welfare attitudes. Despite the range in atti-
tudes evident in Table 4.1, the most common responses to the sugges-
tion to reduce the size of the public sector are either not to take a stand, 
or to find it a rather bad idea. In the context of Sweden, with its large 
public sector, these responses can be interpreted as indicating that many 
people are relatively content with the current size of the public sector. 
These results correspond to those of international studies, which find 
ongoing and relatively strong general support for the welfare state, 
despite the economic pressures and retrenchments of the 1990s (Pierson 
2001). The fact that there is variation in the response patterns means it 
is relevant to use this question in the ensuing analyses, to determine 
whether there is a relationship with multi-level territorial attachments. 
The strong national connection to welfare policies suggests a positive 
relationship with attachments to domestic levels. 
 
Table 4.1 Attitudes towards welfare management, redistribution, 
and preferred government level of social policies, in Swe-
den 2004 (per cent) 
Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004.  
The other two welfare issues concern attitudes about the scope of gov-
ernment involvement in specific welfare policies, or more precisely, the 
preference for private or public management of healthcare services. 
These attitudes are relatively evenly distributed in Table 4.1, although 
there is a small predominance of responses favouring public manage-
ment. Over the past decade, the number of privately run service institu-
tions has increased in Sweden, and according to these results, approxi-
mately one third of Swedes are in favour of such private management in 
the health sector. However, most of the privately provided health ser-
vices in Sweden are still publicly financed. These two items will be com-
bined into a health care index and used as a dependent variable in the 
analyses presented in this chapter.  
Opinions about politically 















        
Reducing public sector size 10 19 26 25 19 100 1606 
        
Preventing for-profit companies 
from running hospitals 28 19 22 19 12 100 1669 
        
More private  
management of healthcare  10 21 28 21 20 100 1682 
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The Swedish SOM survey contains another set of items asking about 
a preference for public or private management of six different welfare 
services.85 Respondents are asked to rate, on a scale of between one and 
five, whether and to what extent they would prefer each public service 
area to be run only by the public sector (1) or any combination of pub-
lic and private up to run solely by the private sector (5). Formulated in 
this more precise way, approximately 40 to 50 per cent of respondents 
prefer purely public management of each of the six service areas. Un-
employment insurance and health insurance are the two areas in which 
purely public management is most strongly preferred, 52 per cent of 
respondents preferring that they be run by the public sector only. The 
lowest preference for public management concerns care of the elderly 
and hospital care, although 39 and 40 per cent, respectively, still want 
no private management whatsoever in these service areas. In the later 
multivariate analyses, these six items will be merged to form a public 
welfare management index, encompassing more social service areas 
than does the health care index.86 
Public management of welfare and social services is assumed to im-
prove the prerequisites for redistribution and equality between citizens, 
since the there is no expectation of profit. The ideal is that such basic 
services should be supplied to all citizens in accordance with their needs 
rather than with their resources. Hence, there is a redistributive aspect 
to the public management of welfare services, closely connected to the 
national framing of the Swedish fokhem, so I anticipate that attach-
ments to domestic levels will be positively related to a preference for 
public management (naturally under control for other explanations, 
such as ideology).  
In the theoretical section, I proposed incorporating the question of 
who is considered eligible for welfare policies as another aspect of 
scope. As Ferrera (2005) points out, the eligibility problem is usually 
solved with the help of territorial boundaries, and corresponds directly 
to the deservingness criterion of identity (van Oorschot 2006). In prac-
tical terms, the question of eligibility is thus connected to the aspect of 
preferred decision level concerning welfare policies. 
                                                 
85 The six service areas are primary schools, eldercare, hospital care, pensions, unemploy-
ment insurance, and health insurance. 
86 The variables in the public healthcare index correlate between .31 and .49, with a 
Chronbach’s alpha of .68. The variables in the public welfare management index correlate 
between .44 and .78, with a Chronbach’s alpha of .89. Both indices present one-factor 
solutions in factor analyses. 
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There are no questions about the preferred decision level in the Swed-
ish SOM 2004 study, but I was fortunately able to include a question 
regarding multi-level territorial attachments in the Swedish European 
Union Parliament election study, 2004 (Oscarsson, et al. 2006), where 
such a question about preferred decision level is available. The most 
controversial and immediate aspect of decision level applicable to social 
policies and redistribution is whether or not any such policies should be 
determined at the EU level. Therefore, it is logical to use the question 
that asks respondents to rate, on a scale between 1 and 7, the degree to 
which they prefer a number of policy areas to be determined at the 
national level only (1) or at the EU level only (7).87 According to the 
Swedish European Union Parliament election study, 2004, very few 
Swedes prefer any social policy area to be determined solely at the EU 
level, and the overwhelming majority (approximately 70 per cent) pre-
fers the national level to retain at least most control over welfare deci-
sions. This is not very surprising, considering the history and large 
scope of the public sector and welfare policies in Sweden, compared to 
what is usual, on average, in the EU.  
The Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004 also included 
two questions that more directly capture the issue of solidarity with 
individuals from another EU member state. The questions ask whether 
or not respondents agree with two different suggestions: 1) to provide 
social benefits to EU citizens living in Sweden, and 2) to prioritize em-
ploying Swedes over other EU citizens who might be willing to come 
and work in Sweden, if there is unemployment.  
 
Table 4.2 Attitudes towards solidarity with other EU citizens, in 
Sweden 2004 (per cent) 
Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study, 2004.  
                                                 
87 The policy areas selected as relevant to this study are unemployment, social welfare, 
educational policy, and taxation policy. 
 














       
Priority to employ Swedes before 
other EU citizens living in Sweden 38 33 17 12 100 1304 
       
No social welfare rights 
for EU citizens living in Sweden 20 31 29 20 100 1249 
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In particular, the question about prioritizing the employment of Swedes 
was supported by most respondents in the Swedish European Parlia-
ment election study, whereas the possibility of providing social welfare 
to EU citizens living in Sweden garnered almost as much opposition as 
support. These two groups of questions, capturing the preferred deci-
sion level for a number of welfare issues and solidarity with other EU 
citizens, will be used to create two additive indices.88 Given the connec-
tion to the eligibility aspect and the deservingness criterion of identity, I 
expect that supra-national attachment will have a positive statistical 
effect on these attitudes, whereas attachment to domestic levels will 
have a negative statistical effect. 
 
Welfare attitudes in the European Union  
In the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004, the only questions that are directly 
relevant to the problems discussed in this chapter are those concerning 
the preferred decision level for a number of social policies.89  
The preferred decision level varies across policy areas, as is evident in 
Figure 4.1, ranging from the preference of most respondents that the 
national level should determine health and welfare issues, to a rather 
palpable support for European decision-making when it comes to sup-
porting underdeveloped regions and alleviating poverty.  
These are also two policy areas where the EU level is already involved 
in policy making, and provides financial support via, for example, the 
structural funds. Economic conditions vary greatly between EU regions, 
more than between countries, and poverty is especially prevalent in the 
newest member states.90 Transferring the decision-making power re-
garding these policy areas to the EU level would increase the redistribu-
tion between all EU countries. In some countries, such a development is 
expected to be beneficial, whereas in others it is expected to increase the 
cost of EU membership and/or decrease existing levels of welfare and 
social rights. However, there is also (see Figure 4.1) clear opposition to 
the EU being the decision level for policy areas tied to culture and na-
                                                 
88 The items of the decision level index correlate between .42 and .49 (alpha .77), while 
the items of the EU citizen solidarity index correlate .33 (alpha .50). Both indices give 
one-factor solutions. The second index has a somewhat lower alpha score than is pre-
ferred in an index, but theoretical and other considerations mean it is still reasonable to 
construct such an index. 
89 These policy areas are health and welfare, education, the challenges of an aging popula-
tion, unemployment, poverty, and support to poor regions. 
90 The 2004 enlargement involved ten new member states in which over 90 per cent of the 
population lived in regions where the GNP per capita was below 75 per cent of the EU 
average (CEC 2004).  
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tion-building projects, such as education, health, and welfare (Bruter 
2005; McEwen & Moreno 2005). 
 
Figure 4.1 Preferred level of decision for different policy areas, in 
EU25, 2004 (weighted per cent)  
 
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. 
 
Despite the variation between people’s attitudes in connection with the 
various policy areas, the variables do correlate enough to form part of a 
single index concerning the degree to which a person prefers the EU as 
the decision level for social policies.91 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the empirical analyses, to 
explore the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and 
the welfare attitudes presented here. First, however, I will present a 
short summary of the theoretical expectations discussed earlier, in the 
form of four specific questions about this relationship. 
 
Questions of multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes 
The expectations concerning the relationship between multi-level terri-
torial attachments and welfare attitudes differ depending on both the 
particular dimension of multi-level territorial attachments and the type 
of welfare attitude. The four specific questions below are intended to 
guide the ensuing empirical analyses, and they summarize the discus-
sions presented in the previous sections by identifying specific expecta-
tions.  
1. The first question concerns the dimension territorial level of at-
tachment (sub-national, national, and supra-national). The horizontal 
                                                 
91 The correlations vary between .27 and .48, the Chronbach’s alpha is .78, and the factor 
analysis indicates a one-factor solution with factor loadings of approximately .60−.75. 
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principle implies that territorial attachments to a specific level should be 
positively related to support for welfare policies at the same territorial 
level (or to a preference that welfare decisions be made at that level). 
Together with the solidarity criterion of identity and the indirect redis-
tributive features of public services discussed before, I ask how the level 
dimension affects the following attitudes: general welfare attitudes, 
preference for public or private management of welfare services, pre-
ferred decision level for welfare issues, and solidarity with other EU 
citizens (controlling for other known explanations of welfare attitudes). 
My theoretical expectation is that, due to the strong historical connec-
tion between the nation and welfare policies, people with national or 
sub-national attachments will be more supportive of welfare policies in 
general and of the public management of welfare. I also expect such 
respondents to have less solidarity with other EU citizens, and to be 
more inclined to prefer that a domestic level of government handle these 
issues; I expect to see the inverse pattern among people with a supra-
national attachment. 
2. The second question concerns the dimension form of attachment 
(exclusive, multiple, or nested) and how it relates to the preferred deci-
sion level for welfare issues and to solidarity with other EU citizens. In 
line with the deservingness criterion of identity, I expect that people 
with a nested form of attachment will be more supportive of welfare 
policies that include a larger group of people (or higher levels) than will 
people with an exclusive form of territorial attachment. I have no theo-
retical expectations regarding the effect of form of attachment on the 
preference for public or private management, since this question con-
cerns a change at the same territorial level. 
3. The third question concerns the role of the strength of territorial 
attachment dimension. As stated earlier, the mechanism of the deserv-
ingness criterion of identity only affects the perception of who is worthy 
of support, not necessarily to what degree. Still, it is somewhat plausible 
that stronger attachment might correspond to a “thicker” feeling of 
attachment. Thicker feelings are assumed to be more exclusive, which 
could plausibly be connected to greater support for the pre-existing 
national welfare system, less preference for joint European decision-
making regarding welfare issues, and less solidarity with other EU citi-
zens. 
4. The fourth and final question concerns the combined effects of 
these three dimensions, when investigated as the effect of a combined 
variable, measuring the level or levels to which a person feels the 
strongest attachment. Using such a combined measure, the deserving-
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ness criterion of identity is more noticeable. Hence, when multi-level 
territorial attachments are measured in this combined way, my theoreti-
cal expectation is that people whose national or sub-national attach-
ments are the strongest will be more supportive of the public sector, 
prefer public over private management, prefer that a domestic level of 
government handle welfare issues, and display less solidarity with other 
EU citizens. I also expect people whose strongest attachment is to the 
supra-national level to be less supportive of the public sector, display 
more solidarity with other EU citizens, and be more supportive of EU-
level decision-making regarding welfare issues.  
Evidently, all these relationships must hold when controlling for other 
known explanatory factors. In the following section, I will present a 
short overview of the most important explanations of welfare attitudes, 




I am selecting control variables from the two broad categories of expla-
nations of welfare attitudes mentioned earlier, namely, “theories of 
normative values of fairness and social justice” and “theories of the 
importance of individual self-interest, socio−economic status, and 
class”. 
In the first category, theories of normative values of fairness and so-
cial justice, one of the most established explanations of welfare attitudes 
is ideology and partisanship (Borre 2001; Borre & Goul Andersen 
1997). Social policy and welfare issues are at the centre of the political 
debate, and political parties usually have ideologically divergent posi-
tions regarding the role and scope of government and welfare policies. 
Partisanship functions as a shortcut to preferences regarding welfare 
and redistribution, or as Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom put it, “citizens’ 
partisan leanings cue their preferences regarding welfare spending and 
the role of welfare more generally” (Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom 2003). 
People who support left-wing parties are thus expected to favour ex-
panding welfare programs, increased government spending, and greater 
government responsibility for public services, than are people who sup-
port parties that are more right-wing. Thus, including left–right posi-
tion, or some other measure of ideology/partisanship, in the analyses as 
a control variable is theoretically justifiable. Hence, I will control for 
political ideology by including measures of left–right position (1–5) and 
support for government party (1–0) when using the Swedish SOM data, 
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and a measure of left–right position (0–10) in the Swedish European 
Parliament election study and (1–10) in the Eurobarometer data. It is 
important that the relationship between territorial attachments and 
welfare attitudes should still remain after using such a control. 
Believing that the system is fair is another normative dimension of 
explanations of social policy preferences. Both procedural and distribu-
tive justice can be important. The term “moral economy” has been used 
to capture this dimension in the field of welfare state attitudes (Mau 
2003; Svallfors 2004, 2006). Moral economy usually implies a recipro-
cal relationship between benefactors and beneficiaries, where the soli-
darity is conditional on the correspondence between norms of social 
exchange and policy practices. This aspect varies with the institutional 
design of the welfare state, and will be further developed in the next 
chapter. Another example is that if a political system is regarded as fair, 
in the sense that people pay taxes according to what is conceived to be 
just, and everyone else does too, then acceptance of the tax system is 
higher (Liebig & Mau 2005). According to this view, the motivation is 
not a feeling of altruism, but rather a sense of justice, a preparedness to 
comply with those just institutions that apply to us (Rawls 1980; Roth-
stein 1998). Unfortunately there are no good measures of distributional 
or institutional justice in the data sets we use; however, regarding pro-
cedural justice, I will include a subjective measure of how much one 
believes that one can influence the EU (the Swedish EUP election study) 
or that one’s voice counts in the EU (the Eurobarometer). 
Turning to the second large group of theories, self-interest and 
socio−economic status comprise the best known of a group of factors 
explaining welfare state attitudes, corresponding well to common-sense 
perceptions of welfare attitudes. To most people, it is fairly intuitive 
that people who themselves benefit from social welfare policies (or are 
likely to use them in the future) would be more inclined to favour them.  
One important aspect of self-interest is the idea of risk. Some groups 
of people are supposed to be at greater risk of poverty, unemployment, 
and ill health, for example, and are thus expected to be more in favour 
of government spending on social policies and social security (Borre & 
Goul Andersen 1997; Edlund 1999; Iversen 2005; Oskarsson 2007; 
Svallfors 1991). This is not just a question of risk in itself; it also in-
volves the costs of premiums, costs that can be anticipated to increase 
for high-risk groups in a system designed to operate according to mar-
ket mechanisms. In general, this means that the lower socio−economic 
strata of society are supposed to be more supportive of redistributive 
and welfare policies than higher strata are. Socio−economic factors such 
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as income, age, gender, and class are thought to be important, for ex-
ample, the poor being more supportive of such policies than the rich, 
the unemployed more than those who work full-time, and the working 
class more than the middle class. Working in the public sector is also 
supposed to enhance the self-interest aspect of supporting welfare poli-
cies.  
Despite these theoretical expectations, the results of previous empiri-
cal investigations are somewhat mixed. Earlier research has demon-
strated, for example, that the underprivileged are not as economically 
“leftist” as could be expected (Derks 2004). In the case of preferences 
for a social Europe, Mau (2005) demonstrates that there are no appar-
ent differences between high-status and low-status groups. With an 
increasing number of social policies being of a more general character, 
more people than those previously cited will benefit from them; the 
personal gain can be either immediate or expected in the future. Iversen 
and Soskice (2001), for example, find evidence that people prefer gov-
ernment spending on areas that are particularly useful for their own 
personal welfare, while other studies identify even non-recipients as 
very supportive of welfare programs (Sanders 1988). These mixed re-
sults can somewhat be explained by the use of different sorts of welfare 
attitudes as dependent variables, and by how the socio−economic and 
self-interest factors were measured empirically; notably, however, these 
results also emphasize that self-interest is not the only relevant explana-
tion of welfare attitudes. Still, including measures of socio−economic 
status and public service use as control variables in the analyses is 
clearly theoretically justifiable.  
Due to the longer tradition of citing gender, age, and education as ex-
planatory factors, more measures are normally available that capture 
these aspects in most data sets, so I will control for these factors in all 
analyses. Some measure of personal financial situation will also be in-
cluded (either income or subjective judgment of personal financial situa-
tion), where higher income groups are expected to be less supportive of 
the public sector for reasons of self-interest. Similarly, one’s occupa-
tional status is expected to matter, where self-employed and managers 
are supposed to have less need of social welfare services than the work-
ing class does, and are thus assumed to be less supportive. Being em-
ployed in the public sector provides another kind of self-interested rea-
son for supporting more publicly managed welfare programmes.92 
                                                 
92 Whether a person lives in the countryside or a city is sometimes also seen as explaining 
some welfare attitudes; however, it is not included here, due to my focus on attitudes 
possibly affected by territorial attachments, for example, preferred decision level. 
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Finally, concerning questions of which level of government one pre-
fers when it comes to welfare issues (national or European), I also need 
to include a measure of whether a person believes his or her country’s 
membership in the EU is a good or a bad thing. Negative attitudes to-
wards the EU have a strong influence on whether or not one would 
prefer welfare issues to be determined at the EU level (De Winter & 
Swyngedouw 1999).93 
In the remainder of this chapter I will present the empirical analyses 
and answers to each of the four chapter-specific questions about the 
impact of the different dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments 
on welfare attitudes. I will thus investigate whether the expected rela-
tionships remain after controlling for the factors discussed in this part 
of the chapter. 
 
ANALYSES OF MULTI-LEVEL TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS 
AND WELFARE ATTITUDES 
 
Whether and how multi-level territorial attachments affect welfare atti-
tudes will be investigated according to the four chapter-specific ques-
tions about the impact of each of the attachment dimensions (as well as 
the combined effect). Thus, not all the discussed dependent variables 
will be analysed in exploring the impact of all the dimensions of at-
tachment. 
One group of dependent variables is only found in the Swedish SOM 
data and concerns public sector support and the preference for public or 
private management of public services. Initial correlations between 
these variables and the original attachment variables display the ex-
pected patterns of positive relationships between attachments to domes-
tic territorial levels and general support for the public sector and a pref-
erence for public management in the healthcare sector. In contrast, the 
correlations are negative between supra-national attachments and sup-
port for the public sector.94 These attitudes are thought to be influenced 
only by the level of attachment dimension and the combined measure of 
strongest attachment. 
                                                 
93 Since this variable is similar to the dependent variable, I will present two control mod-
els, one excluding and one including this EU attitude. 
94 However, this does not imply a general negative attitude towards redistribution among 
people with supra-national attachments, for example, the correlation with support for aid 
to developing countries is .057 (although this factor is not included due to my multi-level 
system focus). 
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Another group of dependent variables can be found in the Swedish 
EUP and the Eurobarometer data, i.e., solidarity with other EU citizens 
and preferred decision level for welfare issues. The initial correlations of 
all the original variables (EUP04) display a relationship between na-
tional attachment and support for the preferential employment of 
Swedes over other EU citizens (in Sweden), and a negative relationship 
with the inclusion of other EU citizens in the Swedish social security 
system. Supra-national attachments, on the other hand, tend to corre-
late positively with solidarity with other EU citizens. National attach-
ment thus seems to have a stronger, but negative, correlation with such 
solidarity than do public sector attitudes. Since these matters concern 
welfare and redistribution beyond national borders, this is in line with 
the theoretical expectations. Preferring the EU as the decision level for 
welfare and redistributive policies tends to correlate positively with 
supra-national attachments and more negatively with domestic attach-
ments. These variables will be merged to form indices, allowing us to 
explore the influence of all the multi-level territorial attachment dimen-
sions. 
 
Level of attachment and welfare attitudes 
The level dimension is expected to affect a broader range of welfare 
attitudes than the other two dimensions are, and measures of different 
aspects of public sector support will be explored in this section. Starting 
with general welfare support, in the first chapter-specific question it was 
assumed that people with sub-national or national attachments would 
be more supportive of welfare, due to the historical connection between 
the national and the welfare state; people with supra-national attach-
ments are accordingly assumed to be less supportive.  
The same historical link also makes it plausible that people with na-
tional or sub-national attachments would prefer more public than pri-
vate management of welfare policies in a state (due to the somewhat 
stronger redistributive features of public management), and be more 
inclined to prefer that a domestic level of government handle welfare 
issues. A supra-national attachment can thus be assumed to be com-
paratively more supportive of private management in a state, and of the 
idea of having some welfare issues determined at the European level.  
The overall patterns of the impact of level of attachment are con-
firmed by the regression analyses (see Table 4.3) of the Swedish SOM 
data. Some of these results deserve extra attention, starting with general 
support for the public sector. Theoretically, I argue that attachments to 
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domestic levels could be expected to have a more positive influence on 
general support for the public sector, given the historical link with the 
welfare state (especially so in Sweden) (Ferrera 2005). The bivariate 
effect of sub-national attachment supports this expectation, and in-
creases both when controlling for other levels of attachment, and when 
controlling for other known factors (from .16, to .25 to .32). Since most 
public sector services are handled by sub-national levels in Sweden, this 
result is logical. 
 
Table 4.3 Effect of level of attachment on welfare attitudes in the 
Swedish national SOM survey (unstandardized multivari-
ate OLS estimates) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The three indices range from 1 to 5, where 5 is the most public-
sector-friendly position. The attachment variables are coded 0–1, indicating attachment to the level, but they are not 
mutually independent, since a person can simultaneously be attached to more than one level. For each index, the 
left-most estimates in italics display the bivariate relationships, the middle columns present the estimates of the basic 
model where the effect of the attachment variables is measured when controlling for each other, and the last column 
displays the estimates of the full model, including the control variables. 
 General support 








  Basic Control  Basic Control  Basic Control 
          
Level of attachment          
Sub-national attachment  .16*. 25** .32*** .20** .33*** .32*** .18*** .27*** .20*** 
National attachment  .10 .03 .09 .03 .00 -.09 .11 .10 -.07 
Supra-national attachment  .12* -.16** .04 -.25*** -.30*** -.16** -.24*** -.30*** -.16*** 
       
Left–right position (1–5)  .45***  -.48***  -.22*** 
Support government party   .04  .18***  .14*** 
Male (female = 0)  .12*  .00  .04 
Age (in years)  -.01***  .00  .01*** 
Education (base = low)       
Medium low education  -.01  -.02  -.08 
Medium high education  -.22**  -.31***  -.18** 
High/university education   -.28**  -.37***  -.28*** 
Income (eight categories)  -.02  -.04**  -.02* 
Profession (base = workers)       
Self-employed  -.11  -.33**  -.01 
Managers  .06  -.03  .01 
White collars   .25**  -.08  .00 
Work in private sector (1–0)  .28***  -.18***  -.22*** 
Public service evaluation of 
last year (base = got worse) 
  
    
Municipality: is same   .05  .09  .10 
Municipality: improved  .07  .07  -.08 
National: is same  -.14  -.11  -.04 
National: improved  -.41  -.36  -.36 
       
Constant  3.11*** 4.91***  3.17*** 4.94***  3.94*** 4.51*** 
Adjusted R2  .00 .26  .02 .33  .03 .25 
N  1563 1123  1613 1179  1392 1033 
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More surprising is that national attachment, on the other hand, has 
no impact whatsoever, not even bivariate, despite the theoretical expec-
tation of the opposite. As discussed in the previous chapter, this result 
might partly reflect the great number of people who claim to have a 
national attachment. The results also suggest, however, that the mere 
presence of national attachment is not salient enough in analysing at-
tachments and welfare attitudes; rather, the full range of multi-level 
attachments to all territorial levels must be considered.  
The effect of supra-national attachment was negative in the bivariate 
analysis and when controlling for the other levels, but this effect disap-
peared when the control variables were included in the analysis. The 
effect of ideology is especially strong, people on the right being less 
supportive of the public sector, but higher education and working in the 
private sector also have negative effects. The general public sector is 
supported by people with local or regional attachments, but not by 
people with national and supra-national attachments.  
The next analysis, presented in the middle columns of Table 4.3, con-
cerns the public health index. Again, I find the same effect of the impact 
of the sub-national attachment, this time on preference for the public 
management of healthcare. When it comes to the provision of health-
care services, I do find the theoretically expected significant negative 
effect of supra-national attachment, even when controlling for the other 
variables, such as left–right position (although in this case the effect is 
reduced). National attachment still has no effect.  
The last columns present a broader index covering more welfare areas 
in which people can prefer public or private management. The pattern 
is still the same, except for the slightly lower effect of sub-national at-
tachment when controlling for other factors.95  
The conclusion so far from the Swedish SOM analyses of public sec-
tor support is that the territorial level of attachment dimension contrib-
utes somewhat to explaining general welfare support and a preference 
for public or private executive authority over welfare services. In par-
ticular, it is sub-national attachment that has a positive effect. Unlike in 
the previous chapter, where people with supra-national attachments 
were found to trust political institutions and actors at all levels, here 
they are found to be less supportive of the public management of wel-
fare policies. Despite the decreased effect evident after controlling for 
ideology, a small but significant independent effect remains. Hence, the 
                                                 
95 It does not matter whether the public service areas are divided into two separate indices 
according to the level at which they are provided; the patterns remain the same. 
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third overall challenge to the state might be more serious, although 
further analyses are needed, especially concerning the possible impact of 
territorial attachments on solidarity with other EU citizens, and the 
preferred decision level for welfare policies. 
 
Solidarity with other EU citizens and preferred decision level 
Given the theoretically mandated national connection to welfare poli-
cies, the really crucial test of who one is prepared to include in the re-
distributive “us” (van Oorschot 2006) is to focus on solidarity and 
redistribution at the European level. The EU solidarity index concerns 
whether one supports the inclusion of other EU citizens in one’s social 
security system and workforce. The other index concerns whether one 
prefers social policy issues to be determined at the national or the EU 
level, and the Swedish EUP study makes it possible to investigate this 
aspect. The theoretical expectation and some previous empirical results 
suggest that supra-national identity may have a positive impact on sup-
port for welfare policies at the EU level (Mau 2005; Scharpf 1997). In 
line with these expectations, the regression analyses presented in Table 
4.4 indicate the negative effects of national attachments on both soli-
darity with EU citizens and the preference for the EU as the decision 
level for welfare issues.  
When controlling for socio−economic status, a factor that might ex-
plain, for example, resistance to employing non-Swedes in Sweden and 
to allowing other EU citizens living in Sweden access to Swedish social 
welfare, the effects decrease somewhat but remain significant. In fact, 
the negative effect of national attachment remains even when control-
ling for all other variables, including attitudes towards the EU (b = 
−.38).  
People with a supra-national attachment, on the other hand, are more 
inclined to support the idea of including other EU citizens in the Swed-
ish social service system and in the Swedish work sector, although this 
effect decreases by half (but remains significant) after the EU attitude is 
included in the controls.96  
The finding that one’s opinion of EU membership affects one’s atti-
tude towards this issue is as expected. In fact, it is plausible that some 
                                                 
96 A comment on the control variables: In line with the self-interest theories, people with 
higher education are also more likely to display solidarity with other EU citizens. They are 
the most mobile category and hence the most likely to themselves benefit from social 
protection in other EU countries.  
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of the effect of supra-national attachment could be exerted indirectly 
via the attitude towards the EU, since the two factors do correlate.97 
 
Table 4.4 Effect of level of attachment on welfare attitudes in the 
Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004 (un-
standardized multivariate OLS estimates) 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study, 2004. The solidarity with EU citizens in 
Sweden index ranges from 1 to 4, where 4 represents the most solidarity. The social welfare at EU level index ranges 
from 1 to 7, where 7 signifies that only the EU should make decisions concerning all the included social policy areas. 
The attachment variables are coded 0 or 1, 1 indicating feeling attachment to the level; however, they are not mutu-
ally interdependent, since a person can feel attached to more than one level. The unattached group is excluded. For 
each index, the left-most estimates in italics indicate the bivariate relationships, the next columns present the esti-
mates of the basic model where the effect of the attachment variables is measured when controlling for each other, 
and the last columns display the estimates including the control variables (without and with the EU attitude, respec-
tively). 
                                                 
97 This effect of the EU attitude is more apparent in the Swedish EUP Election study, 
because the question of supra-national attachment is formulated as attachment to the 
European Union, and we know from the SOM study results that general European at-
tachment is broader and less connected to political organization (see Chapter 2).  
 Solidarity with 
EU citizens living 
in Sweden (index) 
The EU is the preferred 
decision level for 
social policy (index) 
  Control Incl. EU  Control Incl. EU 
       
Level of attachment        
Sub-national attachment .01 .06 .11 .11 -.00 -.01 .04 .03 
National attachment -.38*** -.51*** -.41** -.38** -.11 -.28 -.56** -.54** 







Left–right position (0–10)  -.07*** -.07***  .06*** .05** 
Can influence the EU (1–0)  .10*** .08**  .20*** .14*** 
Male (female = 0)  .09 .08  .19** .17** 
Age (in years)  .00 .00  .00 .00 
Education (base = low education)       
Medium low education  .14 .16*  .07 .08 
Medium high education  .53*** .51***  .39** .36** 
High education   .62*** .60***  .32** .28* 
Exp. financial sit. next year  





Exp. financial situation will be the same  .04 .01  .06 -.04 
Exp. financial situation will be improved  .09 .06  .12 .03 
Profession (base = workers)       
Self-employed  .23** .23**  -.05 -.07 
Managers  .16* .15*  .03 -.02 
White collar   .04 .03  .06 -.00 
Work in private sector (1–0)  .01 -.01  -.01 -.06 
EU attitude (base = my country’s mem-
bership is a bad thing) 
 
 
    
EU membership is neither good or bad   .22**   .57*** 




    
Constant 2.54*** 2.11*** 2.04*** 2.63*** 1.89*** 1.79*** 
Adjusted R2 .05 .15 .17 .09 .12 .17 
N 1203 781 775 1218 801 797 
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However, the fact that supra-national attachment still has a significant 
effect, although small, under these hard controls, only strengthens our 
interpretation of the results as supporting the theoretical expectations. 
The effect of supra-national attachment is not just an artefact, and does 
not merely capture the EU attitude − as is sometimes claimed. 
Regarding the issue of preferred level of government for welfare poli-
cies, the national (in this case, Swedish) and European levels are clearly 
in opposition to each other. The theoretical expectation is thus that 
national attachment should have a negative effect, and supra-national 
attachment a positive effect, when controlling for other explanatory 
factors. From the results presented in Table 4.4, it is evident that the 
preferred decision level is strongly affected by the control variable 
measuring the EU attitude. In the right-hand column, the bivariate ef-
fect of supra-national attachment is seen to be .72; it decreases to .49 
(although it stays significant) when controlling for most factors, but 
declines to .19 (still significant) when the EU attitude is also included in 
the analysis.  
Also in line with the theoretical expectation, is the negative effect of 
national attachment on preferring the EU as the decision level for social 
policy issues. In fact, when controlling for other known factors, the 
negative effect increases and becomes significant. This can be inter-
preted as indicating that the control variables, especially education, 
were hiding a relationship. Yet again this measure captures something 
other than just an EU attitude. 
Sweden might be a special case when it comes to welfare state issues, 
given its long tradition of building a strong welfare state. In combina-
tion with the known Swedish scepticism towards the EU (Holmberg 
2001), the results so far might be specific for the Swedish case and not 
representative of all Europeans. Therefore, the relationship between 
territorial level of attachment and preferred decision level has also been 
analysed using the Eurobarometer data.  
The results indicate that national attachment has a strong negative ef-
fect on the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, 
just slightly decreasing when controlling for the EU attitude (–.62 to –
.57). This is the same result as found in the Swedish data. A difference 
between the data sets is in the effect of the sub-national attachments, 
which is seen to have a significant negative effect in Table 4.5. This 
effect seems to have been hidden by counteracting factors in the bivari-
ate analyses, but turns out to be significant and negative (–.14) when 
the control factors are held constant. Sub-national attachments were 
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expected to matter in this way, due to the devolution of welfare poli-
cies. 
 
Table 4.5 Effect of level of attachment on welfare attitudes in 
EU25, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS esti-
mates, weighted for EU25) 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The index is constructed from six items capturing the pre-
ferred decision level for social policy and redistribution matters (national level = 0, EU = 1), added to make a 0–6 
scale. The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment), but they are 
not mutually independent. Dummies for all countries but one (Slovenia) have been included in the analyses, but are 
not presented in the table. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25.  
A reason these results appear in the European data, but not in the 
Swedish data, could be the stronger rights of regional levels in some 
European countries to pass legislation and be solely responsible for all 
welfare issues. This would make the horizontal principle more apparent 
in a Europe-wide setting, as will be considered in Chapter 5.  
Also notable in the Swedish data is the tendency for supra-national 
attachments to have a strong positive effect on preferring the EU as the 
decision level for welfare issues. The effect of the EU attitude as a con-
trol is substantial even in the Eurobarometer data, although the effect 






    
Level of attachment     
Sub-national attachment -.00 -.15*** .-14** 
National attachment -.62*** -.61*** -.57*** 
Supra-national attachment .96*** .67*** .44*** 
    
Left–right position (1–10)  .04*** -.03*** 
My voice counts in the EU (0–1)  .63*** .45*** 
Male (female = 0)  .16*** .13*** 
Age (in years)  -.00*** -.00** 
Education (base = stopped before 16 years old)    
Education stopped at 16–19 years  .16*** .16*** 
Education stopped at 20+ years  .30*** .23*** 
Still studying  .38*** .26*** 
Expected household financial situation (base = worse)    
Household financial situation will stay the same  -.01 -.09** 
Household financial situation will get better  .00 -.10** 
Profession (base = workers)    
Self-employed  -.19*** -.18*** 
Managers  .06 -.00 
White collar  -.06 -.12*** 
EU attitude (base = my country’s  
membership is a bad thing)  
 
 
Membership in the EU is a good thing   1.04*** 
Membership in the EU is neither a good or bad thing   .53*** 
    
Constant 2.85*** 3.10*** 2.61*** 
Adjusted R2 .05 .17 .20 
N 21634 16410 16167 
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does not decrease as much; it might thus be of interest to further ana-
lyse the indirect effect on the Eurobarometer data as well. On the other 
hand, this is a difficult test of my expectations, and the fact that signifi-
cant effects still remain after I control for the EU attitude confirms my 
expectations, indicating the theoretical importance of multi-level terri-
torial attachments as interesting and relevant independent variables.  
The answer to the first question is that the level of attachment dimen-
sion matters for welfare attitudes. In the national framework, the public 
sector and the public management of public services are supported 
mainly by people with sub-national attachments, even when controlling 
for such important factors as left–right position; people with supra-
national attachments tend to be less supportive. Once we go beyond 
state borders, however, the patterns change. It is supra-national at-
tachment that has a positive effect on the preference for the EU as the 
decision level for welfare issues, and on support for the idea of includ-
ing other EU citizens in national welfare systems and work markets; in 
contrast, national attachment has a negative effect. In other words, 
there are signs suggesting the relevance of the challenge of welfare atti-
tudes, where increased attachments to other than state levels may con-
tribute to undermining support for welfare state policies. 
 
Form of attachment and welfare attitudes 
The second chapter-specific question concerns the form dimension of 
multi-level territorial attachments (exclusive, multiple, or nested). Com-
pared to the level dimension, where it was theoretically relevant to ex-
pect an impact on all welfare attitudes, this dimension is not expected 
to be theoretically relevant to some welfare attitudes.98  
However, it is theoretically justifiable to expect form of attachment to 
impinge on preferred decision level and on attitudes about solidarity 
extending beyond national borders. In line with the deservingness crite-
rion of identity, people with a nested form of attachment (i.e., who feel 
attached to all levels) can be expected to be more supportive of welfare 
policies that extend to more territorial tiers, than can people with an 
                                                 
98 I argued in the theoretical section that there are no theoretical reasons to anticipate that 
the form of attachment dimension should have any effect on the preference for public 
versus private management, and the analyses conducted support this. It is theoretically 
unclear what kind of relationship to expect in the case of general welfare support, al-
though multiple and nested attachments could be thought to lead to inclusive, and thus 
supportive, public sector attitudes. There are no bivariate effects, but under control, both 
the multiple and nested forms of attachment are found to be positively related (.50 and 
.61).  
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exclusive form of territorial attachment (especially since exclusive at-
tachment is generally directed towards domestic levels).99  
Hence, in the Swedish EUP04 data, the effect on solidarity with other 
EU citizens is analysed, to explore whether or not individuals with 
nested attachments are more inclined to display solidarity with EU citi-
zens. The results reveal a strange pattern. At first, the bivariate analyses 
indicate that both exclusive and multiple forms of attachment have 
negative effects that even increase when controlling for each other (–.69 
and –.64), whereas the nested form of attachment changes sign. When 
controlling for the other explanatory variables, all the estimates become 
positive, but not significant, regardless of whether or not EU attitude is 
included (see Table A4.1 in the Appendix). Hence, the results prove my 
expectations to be wrong, and the form of attachment dimension does 
not affect solidarity with other EU citizens. This result differs greatly 
from the effect of form of attachment on political trust, in which case 
people with a nested form of attachment were much more trusting of 
political institutions and politicians at all social levels. However, it is 
important to remember the difference in nature between the questions 
of trust and of solidarity across national borders: It is easier to trust 
institutions, since this does not cost anything.  
This is also relevant to the preferred level of government to handle 
decision-making regarding welfare matters. The preferred level could be 
any level for people with a nested form of attachment, as they are at-
tached to all levels and moreover trust all levels more than others do. 
Still, of the three forms of attachment, it is only the nested type that is 
expected to be linked to a preference for European decision-making in 
the welfare sector. For someone with a multiple or an exclusive form of 
attachment, the preferred decision level would probably be the national 
level, given the nature of the question (and even more so, since people 
with exclusive or multiple forms of attachment tend to be attached 
mainly to domestic levels). The initial bivariate analyses indicate that 
nested attachments have a positive effect on preferring the EU as the 
decision level for welfare issue; however, when controlling for other 
variables this effect disappears, and the direction changes to a negative 
but not significant effect. The other forms of attachment are also nega-
tive under control, but none of the estimates are significant.  
                                                 
99 Theoretically, it is of course equally plausible for a person to have an exclusive form of 
attachment to the European level, but given the national connection to welfare policies, I 
would still not expect such an exclusive form of attachment to be more supportive of an 
extension of national solidarity to encompass other EU citizens as well. If anything, the 
differences might counterbalance each other and have no effect at all. 
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As it is, form of attachment has very little independent explanatory 
power regarding welfare attitudes in the Swedish data. Sweden, with its 
long welfare state tradition and known scepticism towards the EU, 
might be too hard a case on which to test the theoretical expectations. It 
is time to see whether the same strange pattern appears in the Euro-
barometer data regarding the effect of form of attachment. 
 
Table 4.6 Effect of form of attachment on welfare attitudes in 
EU25, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS esti-
mates, weighted for EU25) 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The index is constructed from six items capturing the pre-
ferred decision level regarding social policy and redistribution (national level = 0, EU = 1), added to make a scale of 
0–6. The attachment items are dummies coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment), with 
the unattached group as the base category. For information about the control variables, see Table 4.6. No control 
variables are displayed in the table due to their similarity to the comparable values presented in Table 4.6. All 
coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25.  
The results presented in Table 4.6 indicate that the expectations were 
only partly met. The multiple form of attachment displays a significant 
negative effect on the preference for the EU as the decision level for 
welfare issues. The effect decreases slightly, from –.44 to –.38, when EU 
attitude is included in the analysis, but still remains significant. The 
existence of a multiple form of attachment thus indicates a preference 
for determining social policy at the national level. In all fairness, this 
result does not contradict the theoretical expectations; the multiple 
form tends to be dominated by attachments to domestic levels, which, 
in line with theory, could lead to a preference for national control of 
welfare issues.  
It is the nested form of attachment that does not display the antici-
pated pattern; it does have a bivariate positive effect on the preference 
for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, which was expected. 
However, this effect disappears under control, and the direction 
changes to negative (but insignificantly so) when EU attitude is in-
cluded. If a person has a nested form of attachment and thus feels at-






(excl. EU attitude) 
Under control (including 
EU attitude) 
Form (base = unattached) .07***    
Exclusive form of attachment -.12** -.04 -.00 -.00 
Multiple form of attachment -.72*** -.44*** -.41*** -.38*** 
Nested form of attachment .68*** .32*** .02 -.15 
     
Constant  2.87*** 2.88*** 2.36*** 
Adjusted R2  .03 .16 .19 
N  21634 16410 16167 
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tached to all levels, but for whatever reason does not believe his or her 
country’s membership in the EU to be a good thing, it is not very sur-
prising that the preference would be to keep responsibility for welfare 
issues at the national level. The effect is not significant, however, and 
the theoretical expectation that nested attachment is the form of at-
tachment most likely to have a positive effect on preferring the EU as 
the decision level is thus not met. I argued that the theoretical expecta-
tion, according to the horizontal principle, could be thought to allow a 
nested-attached person to prefer any territorial level, so the results 
might not be too surprising considering the much-debated issue of a 
“social Europe”. People with nested attachments tend to trust political 
institutions at all territorial levels, but as the results indicate, that does 
not mean that they prefer that welfare issues be determined at the EU 
level.  
 
Strength of attachment and welfare attitudes 
The third question for this chapter concerns the role of strength of terri-
torial attachment. There are only weak theoretical reasons to expect 
that stronger feelings of attachment in themselves would affect welfare 
attitudes, since the deservingness criterion of identity is supposed to 
affect the perception of who is worthy of our support, not to what de-
gree.100 However, it could be argued that strength could correspond to 
what Scharpf (1999) calls “thick identity”; hence, it is more cultural 
and exclusive, and is thus related to the traditional state-bound welfare 
policies and less supportive of sharing across borders. 
Initially, a feeling of solidarity with non-Swedish EU citizens was seen 
to be negatively related to having either very strong or a mixture of very 
and fairly strong territorial attachments. However, these effects disap-
pear and become non-significant when the control variables are in-
cluded in the analyses (see Table A4.2 in the Appendix). Strength of 
attachment in itself is not a good predictor of Swedes’ preferred deci-
sion level either. In the EUP04 data, the bivariate effects correspond to 
the above reasoning, but no significant effects remain after including the 
                                                 
100 For example, strength of attachment is not expected to have any effect on inclination 
towards public or private management of welfare services, and no such effect emerges in 
the data either. General public sector support turned out to be somewhat affected by 
strength of attachment when other variables were controlled for. However, there was 
almost no variation among the different degrees of strength, suggesting that it is the 
existence of an attachment, rather than its strength, that is important.  
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control variables in the analyses. In the Eurobarometer data, however, 
the pattern is different, as can be seen in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7  Effect of strength of attachment on welfare attitudes in 
EU25, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS esti-
mates, weighted for EU25) 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The index is constructed from six items capturing the pre-
ferred decision level regarding social policy and redistribution (national level = 0, EU = 1), added to make a range of 
0–6. The attachment items are dummies coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment). For 
information about the control variables, see Table 4.6. No control variables are displayed in the table due to their 
similarity to the comparable estimates presented in Table 4.6. All coefficients are weighted according to the national 
populations in EU25.  
The reported pattern regarding the effect of strength of attachment on 
decision level preference indicates that those individuals with overall 
fairly strong degrees of attachment have an initial significant preference 
for the EU as the decision level, but that the effect becomes insignificant 
and changes direction when controlling for other common explanations 
(including EU attitude). The effects of having stronger attachments, 
where attachments to some levels are fairly strong and others are very 
strong, or all attachments are very strong, were small and not signifi-
cant in the basic model (when the factors are controlled for each other). 
Under control, however, the effect turns out to be significant and nega-
tive, and even more so when the EU attitude is included in the analysis.  
Such a change can be the result of existing counteractive factors, 
which disappear when controlling for other factors. The controlled 
effects of having fairly and very strong attachments can be argued to 
support the idea that thick identities are more exclusive − but that is 
something that needs further scrutiny. Despite unclear theoretical ex-
pectations and little evidence from the Swedish data, the Eurobarometer 
results indicate that it might also be relevant to consider the degree of 
strength when exploring the relationship between multi-level territorial 
attachments and welfare attitudes. There is no general indication that 
the stronger the attachment, the stronger the solidarity, and very strong 






(but not EU attitude) 
Under control (including 
EU attitude) 
Strength (base = unattached)      
Fairly attached  .19*** .21** .05 -.04 
Fairly and very attached  -.19*** -.00 -.21* -.30*** 
Very attached  -.02 .06 -.24** -.31*** 
      
Constant   2.86** 2.80*** 2.30*** 
Adjusted R2   .00 .15 .19 
N   21273 16239 16007 
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attachments may in fact render the development of a European social 
policy very difficult. The third challenge thus may not only concern the 
role and function of the welfare state, but also some limitations of the 
multi-level system process. Together with the earlier results presented in 
this chapter, these results identify the need to explore the effects of 
combinations of all three dimensions, using the combined variable of 
strongest attachment.  
 
Combined dimensions of attachment and welfare attitudes 
The strongest level of attachment classification combines all three di-
mensions, and is categorical according to the level, or combination of 
levels, to which a person has the strongest degree of attachment. It is 
not a new dimension; instead, aspects of the other three dimensions are 
captured in one combined measure. There are six different categories: 
unattached, primarily sub-national, all domestic (combined sub-
national and national), primarily national, supra-national etc. (occa-
sionally one more level attached to), and finally all levels equal (people 
who indicate the same strength of attachment to all levels).101  
Earlier, I argued that this combined measure of the three dimensions 
should be able to detect more clearly the effect on all the welfare atti-
tudes, compared to using each of the dimensions separately. This is 
because the working mechanism of the deservingness criterion of iden-
tity (i.e., which influences who we think deserves our support) could be 
expected to function more precisely when examined this way (i.e., when 
it concerns not only having an attachment, but also how strong the 
attachment is and which levels are included).  
Regarding general support for the public sector, it turns out that the 
Swedish SOM data (see Table A4.3 in the Appendix) indicate that indi-
viduals who are most strongly attached to domestic levels tend to be 
more supportive of the public sector, clearly in line with the theoretical 
expectation. Individuals who feel equally strongly attached to all levels 
are also more supportive of the public sector, which is logical given that 
they feel equally strongly attached to all levels, including domestic ones. 
In fact, the least supportive group is the one I call supra-national etc.102  
                                                 
101 See Chapter 2 for more details about the combined measure of all three dimensions. 
102 I also analyzed the preference for private versus public management of healthcare and 
other welfare services. Theoretically, attachment to domestic levels should lead to a 
stronger preference for public management; unexpectedly, however, the analyses indicate 
that almost no effect remains when controlling for other factors. Moreover, if six is used 
as the breakpoint between having and not having an attachment, none of the three Swed-
ish SOM questions are significantly affected. 
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Leaving the national frame and considering welfare attitudes that 
concern cross-border issues, this same group is the only one that dis-
plays solidarity with non-Swedish EU citizens in analyses of the Swed-
ish EUP election study data (see Table 4.8). This group is thus more 
supportive of offering social welfare benefits to non-Swedish EU citizens 
staying in Sweden, and of not giving priority to employing Swedish 
citizens over other EU citizens, even if there is unemployment, than are 
people with a sub-national attachment (the base category). Theoreti-
cally, this is exactly what should be anticipated, since this group not 
only has supra-national attachment, but also the least attachment to 
domestic levels.    
The results are equally clear, but in the opposite direction, regarding 
people who have all domestic and primarily national attachments, i.e., 
these attachments have negative effects on solidarity with other EU 
citizens. These effects are in comparison to the primarily sub-national 
group (the base category), and the results hold even when controlling 
for EU attitude. The all levels equal group could theoretically be ex-
pected to be supportive of both domestic and supra-national solidarity, 
which might explain the lack of a significant effect. 
 
Table 4.8 Effect of combined dimensions of attachment on welfare 
attitudes in the Swedish European Parliament election 
study, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates) 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study, 2004. The solidarity with EU citizens in 
Sweden index ranges from 1 to 4, where 4 implies the most solidarity. The attachment variables are dummies. For 
information on control variables, see Table 4.6. No control variables are presented in this table due to their similarity 
to the values presented in Table 4.6. All estimates are controlled for each other. 
The obvious expectation regarding the question of preferred decision 




EU citizens in Sweden (index) 
EU preferred decision level 
for welfare issues (index) 


















(base = sub-national)         
Unattached  .40 -.68 -.63  -.33 .08 .35 
Primarily sub-national .09    -.02    
All domestic -.13** -.19* -.29*** -.27** -.27*** -.21 -.34* -.31* 
Primarily national  -.16*** -.19* -.31*** -.31*** .13* -.07 -.24 -.24 
Supra-national etc.  .61*** .48*** .41*** .33** .97*** .90*** .33 .12 
All levels equal .29*** .17 -02 -.11 .48*** .43** .03 -.15 
         
Constant  2.37*** 2.14*** 2.05**  2.72*** 1.61*** 1.53*** 
Adjusted R2  .05 .17 .21  .06 .10 .17 
N  1197 780 778  1211 799 795 
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for whom it is also their strongest attachment, should prefer that wel-
fare issues be determined at the EU level. The supra-national etc. group 
meets that criterion, and the bivariate analysis supports such an expec-
tation (0.97), but the effect becomes insignificant when controlling for 
other factors. In fact, the only significant effect after all the controls 
have been included, is the negative effect of the all domestic group. The 
effect is negative initially, but when controlling for other factors, such 
as attitude towards the EU, it becomes insignificant. 
These weak effects of the combined measure of attachment on the 
preferred decision level for welfare policies might be more typical of the 
Swedish case. Earlier, I mentioned that Sweden might be one of the 
hardest cases for these analyses, given its generous welfare system and 
scepticism towards the EU.  
Turning to the Eurobarometer data, it is possible to investigate 
whether these results are merely Swedish artefacts, or whether they are 
consistent with analyses of all the EU countries regarding the preferred 
decision level for welfare policies. The results in Table 4.9 are clearer 
when considering all the EU25. As it is, all the estimates remain signifi-
cant when holding the control factors (including EU attitudes and coun-
try dummies) constant – apart from the group of unattached people.  
 
Table 4.9 Effect of combined dimensions of attachment on welfare 
attitudes in EU25, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate 
OLS estimates, weighted for EU25) 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The preferred level of decision index is constructed from six 
items capturing the preferred decision level regarding social policy and redistribution (national level = 0, EU = 1), 
added to make a range of 0–6. The attachment items are dummies coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not 
have such attachment). The base category is the group of people with sub-national attachments. For information 
about the control variables, see Table 4.5. No control variables are displayed in the table due to their similarity to the 
comparable values in Table 4.5. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25.  






(but not EU attitude) 
Under control 
(including EU attitude) 
Strongest attachment (base = sub-
national) .21***  
 
 
Unattached -.07 .11 .16 .19* 
All domestic -.47*** -.16*** -.21*** -.32*** 
Primarily national  .41*** -.16*** -.31*** -.20*** 
Supra-national etc. .57*** .69*** .50*** .32*** 
All levels equal .62*** .65*** .28*** .16*** 
     
Constant  2.76** 2.81*** 2.26*** 
Adjusted R2  .04 .17 .20 
N  21305 16269 16037 
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In this analysis, the theoretical expectations are met. People who belong 
to the all domestic or primarily national groups are significantly more 
unsupportive of making welfare decisions at the EU level, even when 
controlling for the EU attitude. In comparison, having the supra-
national level among the strongest attachments has significant positive 
effects. This is especially apparent in the supra-national etc. group, 
where the effect on preferring that welfare decisions be made at the EU 
level (.32) is twice that of the other category.  
The other significantly positively related (.16) category regarding the 
preference for the EU as the decision level is the all levels equal group, 
i.e., people equally strongly attached to all levels. The difference be-
tween this and the supra-national etc. group, both of which encompass 
supra-national attachment, is notable. The difference indicates that the 
relationship is not as straightforward as it would be if supra-national 
attachment automatically led to a stronger preference for the EU as the 
decision level for welfare issues. For the all levels equal group, the con-
nection is weaker, which is logical given that members of this group are 
equally attached to domestic levels as well. In comparison, regarding 
the effect on political trust, the order of precedence between these two 
categories was reversed: the all levels equal group had the strongest 
effect on trust in both supra-national political institutions and political 
institutions at other levels. 
These individuals have the most “multi-level” attachment found in 
this study. Having such an attachment has the strongest impact on 
higher degrees of political trust, but not the same degree of impact on 
the preference for a social Europe (where the supra-national etc. group 
has a stronger impact). This situation is understandable in light of the 
divergent character of these two dependent variables.  
 
Chapter summary, conclusions, and theoretical implications 
Chapter 4 explored the third challenge to the state posed by the multi-
level system, i.e., the relationship between multi-level territorial attach-
ments and solidarity (or, more precisely, welfare attitudes). Neither the 
existence of multi-level territorial attachments, nor their impact on po-
litical trust, seems to challenge either state legitimacy or the whole 
multi-level system as such; however, the relationship with solidarity can 
be argued to be stronger and more exclusive. It is possible to have po-
litical trust in several different territorial levels simultaneously without 
reducing the strength or size of the individual kinds of trust; in contrast, 
the question of welfare policies or redistribution between levels and 
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individuals resembles a zero-sum game. It is less demanding to trust 
than to share. 
Theoretically, there are both macro and micro expectations of such a 
relationship, for example, arguments about the necessary closure of 
nation state borders as a pre-condition for the establishment of a wel-
fare state (Ferrera 2005), and how the collective identity of the nation 
makes it possible to override subgroup interests (Offe 2000; Scharpf 
2000). Despite some arguments about the causal direction of the rela-
tionship, most scholars agree on the reciprocity between these phenom-
ena, and there is a clear emphasis on the connection between national 
identity and the welfare state. 
By drawing on and referring to other normatively based theories of 
values and of the “moral economy” (Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006), I dis-
cuss how multi-level territorial attachments can be expected to matter 
to welfare attitudes. A key to this is the deservingness criterion of iden-
tity (van Oorschot 2006), which provides a theoretical explanation of 
how territorial attachments influence welfare attitudes (i.e., people 
closer to “us” are seen as more deserving). A logical outgrowth of this 
explanation is the horizontal principle concerning the relationship be-
tween attachments and who is considered deserving. 
From the theoretical discussion, four specific questions were formu-
lated concerning the relationship between each of the three dimensions 
of multi-level territorial attachments (and concerning the combined 
effect of all three dimensions) and different welfare attitudes.  
The first question concerned the level dimension, and the horizontal 
principle implied that attachments to a specific level should have a posi-
tive effect on welfare attitudes concerning the same territorial level. 
Analysis of the Swedish data indicates that sub-national attachments are 
positively related to general support for the public sector and to a pref-
erence for the public management of welfare services. People with a 
supra-national attachment, on the other hand, tend to prefer more pri-
vate implementation of welfare policies. Notably, these effects remain 
significant even when controlling for ideology. This result can be under-
stood in light of the strong historical connection between the national 
and the welfare state. National identity has been suggested to have the 
effect of overriding subgroup interests; this notion was supported, since 
the effects hold when controlling for ideological position and 
socio−economic status. Once we go beyond state borders, however, the 
pattern changes. It is supra-national attachment that supports the pref-
erence for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, and that fos-
ters extended solidarity that includes other EU citizens; national at-
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tachment, in contrast, has a negative impact. Again, all results are con-
trolled for important factors such as ideology and education. In other 
words, there is some evidence of the relevance of the challenge of wel-
fare attitudes, in that increased attachments to other than state levels 
may undermine support for the welfare state. 
The second question concerned the form dimension, and how it re-
lates to welfare attitudes. In line with the deservingness criterion of 
identity, individuals with a nested form of attachment are expected to 
be more supportive of welfare policies that include a larger group of 
people than are those with an exclusive form of territorial attachment. 
Regarding solidarity with other EU citizens, the results prove my expec-
tations to be wrong: neither the form of attachment dimension nor the 
preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare policies has any 
effect in the Swedish data. However, the Eurobarometer results indicate 
that people with a multiple form of attachment prefer the national level 
as the decision level. In other words, people who possess a nested form 
of attachment trust political institutions at all territorial levels, but that 
does not mean that they prefer welfare issues to be determined at the 
EU level. Compared to the dimension level, the difference is striking: 
when only attachment to the supra-national level is considered the ef-
fect is positive, but not when the form indicates that a person is at-
tached to all levels. 
The third question concerned the role of the strength of territorial at-
tachments. There are few theoretical expectations concerning this di-
mension taken by itself, since attachment strength does not really con-
cern the question of who is considered deserving (rather than to what 
degree). On the other hand, strong attachment could correspond to 
thicker feelings of attachment, assumed to be more exclusive, and thus 
lead to more support for the pre-existing national welfare system and 
less preference for EU decision-making regarding welfare issues. Some 
initial support for such reasoning is discernable, but no estimates re-
main significant after control for other factors in the Swedish data. In 
all the EU countries the pattern is for mixed and very strong attachment 
strengths to have significantly negative effects on the preference for the 
EU as the decision level for welfare issues, lending further support to 
the idea that “thickness” corresponds to attachment strength. Since it 
does not hold that the stronger the attachment, the stronger the solidar-
ity, the existence of very strong attachments may obstruct the develop-
ment of a European social policy. The third challenge thus may not only 
concern the role and function of the welfare state, but may also limit 
the further development of the European multi-level system. 
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The fourth and final question concerned the combined effects of these 
three dimensions, when investigated as the effect of a new, combined 
variable that categorizes individuals according to the level or levels to 
which they have the strongest degree of attachment. I suggested that the 
deservingness criterion of identity would be more noticeable in the im-
pacts of this variable. Regarding general support for the public sector, 
people with the strongest attachment to domestic levels tend to be more 
supportive of the public sector, in line with the theoretical expectation; 
the group referred to as supra-national etc., i.e., most strongly attached 
to the supra-national and occasionally to one other level, is the least 
supportive of the public sector. On the other hand, this is the only 
group with a positive effect on solidarity with other EU citizens. It is 
difficult to find any preference for the EU as the decision level for wel-
fare issues in the case of Sweden; however, the Eurobarometer data 
indicate the anticipated pattern: people with strongest domestic attach-
ments are unsupportive, whereas people who include the supra-national 
level among their strongest attachments are more supportive. This is 
especially noticeable for the supra-national etc. category. In compari-
son, people who are equally strongly attached to all levels (all levels 
equal) are the most trusting of all levels, but do not have the strongest 
preference for a social Europe. 
From the analyses presented in this chapter, we can conclude that the 
theoretical reasoning of Scharpf and other scholars (Offe 2000; Scharpf 
1997) is generally supported, and that there is a relationship between 
territorial attachments and welfare attitudes. General support for the 
public sector is positively affected by sub-national attachments, and the 
preference for public management of public services is negatively af-
fected by attachments to levels above the nation state. According to the 
same logic, there is a pattern of resistance to shifting the responsibility 
for welfare issues to the European level, if one is not strongly attached 
to that level.  
On the other hand, these conclusions must be discussed with some 
caution, as more research is needed. One problem is that these relation-
ships have not been analysed at all institutional levels, especially not at 
the sub-national level. Another possible objection is that the measures 
(in particular, decision level preference) do not solely capture the shar-
ing of welfare with a broader range of people, but may also capture 
aspects of power. The attitude towards the EU naturally has a strong 
impact on whether one would prefer welfare policy issues to be deter-
mined at the EU or national level, and is also related to supra-national 
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attachment. Given such a strong impact, it is remarkable that supra-
national attachment still has a significant, albeit small, effect.  
Despite these problems, intriguing observations can be made when 
comparing this chapter’s results to those of the previous one. In the 
previous chapter we noted that having equally strong attachments to all 
levels, and not simply being attached to the supra-national level, was 
important in fostering trust in both EU and other institutions. In this 
chapter, however, the tendency under discussion is different. It is among 
people with the strongest attachment to the supra-national level, not 
with equally strong attachments to all levels, that the most positive 
impact on the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare 
policies is found. This supports the initial supposition that, while it is 
possible simultaneously to trust all political levels equally, transferring 
decision-making power over welfare issues to a higher political level is a 
much more sensitive matter. It is more acceptable to consider the EU as 
a multi-level system in terms of trust than in terms of welfare issues, 
which is understandable given the position of welfare issues at the core 
of nation state functioning. Increasing the number of individuals 
strongly attached to all levels of the European multi-level system could 
thus be expected to raise the degree of political trust in the multi-level 
system as a whole − including the EU level; however, expectations re-
garding the positive effect of any such increased attachment on support 
for EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues are less sup-
ported. On the other hand, general public sector support is stronger in 
this group, as long as there is no question of changing the governmental 
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The Institutional Context 
 
The earlier chapters have demonstrated that the possibility of individu-
als having territorial attachments to several levels in fact does not chal-
lenge either the role of the state or European integration. Multi-level 
territorial attachments do not cause decreasing levels of trust in either 
national political institutions or actors. However, in the previous chap-
ter we saw some indications that multi-level territorial attachments 
tended to affect welfare attitudes in such a way that, in particular, in-
creasing supra-national attachments might challenge the preconditions 
for the formation of welfare states, at the same time as support for a 
social Europe seems to be low. Thus far, all of these analyses have used 
data applying only to Swedes or to all EU citizens taken together. In this 
chapter, I suggest that there are important reasons to expect that the 
impact of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust and wel-
fare attitudes will be influenced by varying institutional context. This 
context can, for example, comprise structural variations in the institu-
tional structure in which different citizens live, and the varying experi-
ences they have of a multi-level system. At the system level, the strong 
influence of various institutional contexts could be problematic for 
individual states and for European integration if the relationships re-
ported in earlier chapters are weaker in certain kinds of countries, for 
example, in older versus newer member states.  
It is reasonable to expect individuals’ attitudes to be affected by the 
institutional contexts in which they live, and this is a common subject 
of academic study (e.g. Hall 1997; March & Olsen 1989; Svallfors 
2007). It may, for example, be intuitively reasonable to expect the rela-
tionship between the territorial level of attachment dimension and po-
litical trust to be stronger in older than in newer EU member states. The 
territorial restructuring of Europe into a multi-level system (Hooghe & 
Marks 2001; Keating 2003) can thus be thought to have had its most 
immediate impact in how the institutional contexts in which citizens 
exist influence their feelings and attitudes. Hence, theoretical arguments 
about how institutional context can be expected to matter to individual-
level relationships need to be elaborated. I will suggest introducing insti-
tutional context variation, not as a direct effect, but as an effect on the 
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relationship between territorial attachments and political trust and wel-
fare attitudes, respectively − something usually known as an interaction 
effect. This presupposes discussion of what institutional contexts would 
be relevant, and what empirical analyses should be conducted in line 
with the theoretical model. 
It is a demanding undertaking, both theoretically and empirically, to 
include institutional contexts as interaction effects in a model of the 
implications of territorial attachments. In this chapter, I will therefore 
elaborate theoretically on the kinds of institutional contexts that are 
relevant, and justify why I believe them to matter. Empirically, the ob-
jective is rather limited, since analysing institutional context effects 
could easily be a whole study on its own. However, I will select a num-
ber of relevant institutional contexts, representative of different theo-
retical perspectives, with which to explore the usefulness of the institu-
tional perspective and identify productive areas for further empirical 
analyses.  
I will build on the empirical analyses of the individual-level relation-
ships from previous chapters, but with some important restrictions. One 
concerns the multi-level territorial attachments; not all three dimensions 
of multi-level territorial attachments will be included, but the analyses 
in this chapter will concentrate on the territorial level dimension, and 
on the combination of all dimensions, i.e., the strongest attachment. 
This strategy is motivated by the results of the previous chapters indi-
cating that territorial level is the dimension that tends to have the larg-
est impact, and that the other two dimensions (form and strength) are 
generally more interesting when all three dimensions are combined. 
Moreover, due to the overall interest in challenges to the multi-level 
system, it is the relationship between the level dimension and political 
attitudes that is most relevant for my study. Institutional context varia-
tion across countries also implies that only the Eurobarometer data are 
relevant. This naturally leads to fewer available indicators of political 
trust and welfare attitudes. The emphasis will be on trust in national 
and EU institutions and on preference for national or European deci-
sion levels, with reference to a number of social policy areas.  
The selection of these individual-level relationships will also affect 
theoretical arguments about what institutional contexts are relevant to 
the analyses. All the indicators emphasize territorial levels, especially at 
the national and the supra-national levels. Apart from the empirical 
arguments, the focus on territorial levels is also appropriate given the 
theoretical multi-level approach of the study. As will be discussed in 
more detail shortly, the relevant institutional contexts must therefore be 
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connected to the issue of different territorial levels. Before discussing the 
selection of institutional contexts, I will present a short review of the 
general theoretical relevance of an institutional context perspective to 
the study of people’s preferences and attitudes. 
 
How institutional contexts matter 
In the introduction, I mentioned the close link between the institutions 
of a nation state and feelings of national attachment. The idea of a state 
representing people who share a common identity is thought to enhance 
state legitimacy, and can also be used to justify, for example, redistribu-
tive taxation. In particular, the social welfare systems of European 
states are said to have necessitated the formation of central public insti-
tutions of redistribution, which in turn contributed to the indistinct 
demarcation between society and state. Inter-country differences in 
historical evolution, combined with these processes of welfare state 
building, have contributed to for example crystallizing the varying 
cleavage structures in Europe, and to the emergence of a variety of wel-
fare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 
1999; Rokkan & Urwin 1983).  
Moreno and McEwen (2005:3) claim that the nation-building process 
is still important today, and that modern states must continue this proc-
ess to survive as national states. Through the development of the wel-
fare state, the state improved its ability to interfere with and shape its 
citizens’ lives. However, the amount and form of social protection 
guaranteed by the state varies considerably between countries, thus 
affecting the relationship between citizens’ attachments and their politi-
cal trust and welfare attitudes in different ways. 
These differences in institutional design and structural contexts are 
highlighted as important factors influencing the attitudes and behaviour 
of individuals in the abundant research into the role of institutions (See 
e.g. Hall & Taylor 1996; March & Olsen 1989; Peters 1999; Weaver & 
Rockman 1993). The general idea is that all individuals live in and are 
thus more or less affected by their surrounding society and institutional 
context. The nature and amount of this impact must, however, be speci-
fied for each institutional context and individual preference, since there 
is no single, common theory as to how institutions impinge on individ-
ual preferences (Huckfeldt & Sprague 1993).103  
                                                 
103 There are two main theoretical views of the relationship between institutions and 
individual preferences. The first is rational choice institutionalism, which holds that 
preferences can only be held by individuals, and thus are exogenous to institutions, but 
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The model presented in Chapter 1 demonstrates that it is the interac-
tion effect of institutional contexts that is the focus.104 In other words, I 
am interested in how institutions influence the relationship between 
multi-level territorial attachments and political trust or welfare atti-
tudes, rather than the direct influence one or more of those institutional 
contexts may have on either one of the individual-level variables. I ar-
gue that the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and 
political trust or welfare attitudes can differ between various institu-
tional settings. This approach to the influence of the institutional con-
text is more complex, both theoretically and empirically, than simply 
investigating a direct institutional impact. 
One can justify this approach using an example that is also plausible 
according to a common-sense line of reasoning. For example, for most 
people it is plausible that trust in EU institutions should be greater in 
older than in newer member states. However, such an assumption must 
be explored in more detail, or it will remain unclear whether the con-
nection between the experience of long-term EU membership and trust 
in EU institutions is really influenced by the longer experience of mem-
bership, or by the possibility that more people living in the older mem-
ber states may have individual features and experiences that make them 
trust EU institutions more (e.g., more people with a supra-national 
attachment). Hence, it is necessary to explore the effect of both the 
individual-level factors and institutional context factors taken together, 
considering how they interact, and controlling for each other.  
Moreover, the relationship is not aggregated attachments and aggre-
gated trust in EU institutions; on the contrary, it is the emotional at-
tachments and attitudes of the individuals that I am exploring. Hence, it 
is also plausible that not all individuals would be affected in exactly the 
same way by the institutional contexts in which they live. As individu-
als, they have many unique features and experiences. It is thus likely − 
continuing the example − that someone with a supra-national attach-
ment will have more trust in EU institutions if he or she lives in a coun-
                                                                                                         
endogenous to individuals (Hall & Taylor 1996; Peters 1999; Rothstein 1996). Hence, 
institutions influence the interactions between actors (by shaping how rational certain 
actions are), but they do not influence the preferences per se. The other approach is more 
sociological, where institutions are seen as influencing what the actors ought to prefer in a 
given situation, often referred to as a “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen 1989). 
The role of institutions is thus regarded as more profound in this approach, having the 
possibility of socially constructing the preferences and identities of actors (Hall & Taylor 
1996; Rothstein 1996). 
104 An interaction effect is said to exist when the effect of an independent variable on a 
dependent variable differs depending on the value of a third variable, known as an inter-
action or a moderator variable (Jaccard 2001). 
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try that has been a member of the EU for a long time, than will another 
person, also with a supra-national attachment, but who lives in a coun-
try that is a more recent EU member state. This reasoning provides an 
example of an interaction effect. This example illustrates how the effect 
of having a supra-national attachment is moderated by the institutional 
context (in this case an old or new member state) in which a person 
lives (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003).  
Institutional contexts exert their effect by interacting with, or moder-
ating, and thus influencing the relationship between the attachments 
people have and the attitudes they hold regarding both political trust 
and decision level preferences. I argue that both individual characteris-
tics and institutional context factors may impinge on individual prefer-
ences. However, exactly which of the individual characteristics and 
institutional context factors are important can vary, depending on 
which individual-level relationship one is interested in studying.  
 
The selection of institutional context factors 
The choice of interaction variables to be included in this study is al-
ready partly limited by the institutional contexts concept itself. This 
concept combines the two terms “institution” and “context”, both of 
which have received much attention in the social sciences. The common 
ground is the emphasis on structure rather than actors, to refer to an 
almost classical distinction in political theory (Rothstein 1988).  
Starting with the first part of the concept, institutions, one of the 
most commonly cited definitions of institutions comes from Douglass 
North, who states that institutions “provide a set of rules of the game 
that define and limit the choice set” (North 1990:383); this definition is 
sometimes said to be in accordance with a rational choice institutional-
ism approach (Hall & Taylor 1996; Peters 1999; Rothstein 1996). In a 
sociological institutionalism approach, there is normally agreement 
about defining institutions according to the rules of the game. However, 
in this approach “rules” does not refer only to the routines and proce-
dures of political activity; instead, the institutions are defined more 
broadly, to include the beliefs, symbol systems, culture, and moral 
codes that guide human action (Hall & Taylor 1996; March & Olsen 
1989).  
The second part of the overall concept, “context”, has in contrast 
tended to have more of a geographical dimension (Books & Prysby 
1991), which seems applicable to this study and its multi-level perspec-
tive, although the geographical dimension of the context is debated (see 
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e.g. Huckfeldt & Sprague 1993). There is also a theoretical distinction 
between, on the one hand, contextual features based on compositional 
factors, i.e., assigned to the combination (or composition) of people 
with certain characteristics in an area and, on the other hand, those 
based on contextual features that cannot be classified according to the 
individuals’ composition, but rather capture objective structural factors. 
Strömblad (2003) suggests the term institutional context as a generic 
term for the non-compositional factors, able to capture a broad range 
of variations from, for example, the economic conditions in a particular 
area to the political institutions at different levels. 
In this study, I define the term institutional context as a non-
compositional institutional variation with a clear territorial level dimen-
sion. This is justified by the notion that territorially bounded structur-
ing processes challenge states (Ferrera 2005) and by the overall multi-
level system approach, which emphasizes territorially defined political 
levels. I am not, however, interested in each country as a specific con-
text; instead, different countries will be classified according to their 
institutional variations.  
This provides a general idea of the kinds of institutions that can be 
relevant to the study. The challenges to the state that I have emphasized 
concern the institutional context, which can be connected to the devel-
opment of a multi-level system in Europe in which the political levels 
both above and beneath the state level increase in importance. Two 
matters warrant mention. First, the states in Europe have followed dif-
ferent historical paths of evolution, leading to the creation of a broad 
range of institutional configurations. Second, the loosening of national 
borders and the impact of European integration has also been a gradual 
process proceeding at different paces in different countries.  
Moreover, to be relevant as interaction variables in my model, the in-
stitutional context variables need to be theoretically related to the de-
pendent variables, since an interaction effect can be described as one 
factor moderating the effect of another factor on the dependent variable 
(Jaccard & Turrisi 2003). The selection of theoretically relevant institu-
tional context variables is thus facilitated by considering the macro 
theories, mentioned earlier, that explain political trust and welfare atti-
tudes. 
In doing so, I must consider what institutional context factors are jus-
tified by both the model and the multi-level perspective, especially the 
relationship between the national and EU levels. These considerations 
lead to an emphasis on institutional contexts that can be used to catego-
rize different types of states, in particular, contexts that form part of the 
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European multi-level political system. I will not delve deeper into the 
more detailed institutional variation found in each country and con-
sider, for example, the different functions of social security and health-
care systems, despite their importance for other research questions 
(Mau 2003; Rothstein 2001).  
Since each institutional context should be individually specified and 
theoretically justified, I will structure the descriptions of my selected 
variables according to three broad categories of macro explanations of 
political trust (and welfare attitudes), highlighting the importance of 
institutions. Though there are several theoretically possible interaction 
variables in each category, I will select one institutional context variable 
from each category (apart from the first category where I investigate 
three institutional contexts) to serve as interaction variables in my em-
pirical analyses.  
 
Institutional culture 
The first broad category of explanations comprises various theories as 
to the influence of institutional culture on individual attitudes, for ex-
ample, what is perceived to be natural in a certain institutional context. 
The type of variation of institutional culture between European coun-
tries that is relevant to this study is that concerning the European multi-
level territorial system, and more specifically (due to data limitations), 
the relationship between the national and European levels.  
The most important variation of institutional culture for the purposes 
of this study and from the multi-level perspective is European integra-
tion. Hence, I argue that EU exposure is important as an interaction 
variable for the impact of multi-level territorial attachments on both 
trust in EU institutions and the preference for the EU-level responsibility 
for social policy issues. EU exposure can be seen as a socialization proc-
ess, and one aspect can be the duration of EU membership of different 
countries (Bruter 2005). Exposure to the EU will be measured in two 
ways in this study. First, as the difference between the newest member 
states (who joined the year the data were collected, 2004) and the older 
member states (with at least ten years of EU exposure). This is a di-
chotomous variable, coded as being a new member state or not. This is 
a questionable variable, since it could capture other factors than just 
experience of the EU. Eight of the ten newest member states are former 
non-democratic states, with all that that implies regarding preconditions 
for trust in national institutions and so forth. Many of the other mem-
ber states have varied backgrounds, however, so I will naturally use 
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country dummies as controls. Moreover, I will also explore this aspect 
in more detail, by analysing the interaction effect of the phase of EU 
enlargement during which a country became a member of the EU, i.e., 
original members from the 1950s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, or from the 
newest enlargement of 2004 (see the Appendix for a list of all countries 
and their coding). This categorization also captures the variety of new 
dimensions of European integration being added with each successive 
phase of enlargement (Bruter 2005:59f). In this way, it is even more 
likely to detect a systematic interaction effect of the exposure to the EU. 
The theoretical expectation is that the longer a country has been a 
member state of the EU, the more its citizens have been exposed to the 
EU. In the older member states, the manifestations of the EU have been 
more profound, which I argue can contribute to moderating the rela-
tionship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in EU 
institutions, or the preference for the EU as the decision level for social 
policies. 
The difference between old and new member states also has theoreti-
cal consequences for trust in national political institutions (Linde 2004). 
In eight of the new member states (not Cyprus and Malta), the political 
articulation of the national has changed with the end of the communist 
regimes and the democratization process. Mistrust of old governments 
and the initial transition problems can thus be expected to interact with 
the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in 
national political institutions, leading to a weaker relationship in the 
newest member states. 
Regarding the preferred decision level for welfare policies (national or 
European), in most European countries the welfare institutions are 
tightly connected to national, or even sub-national, levels; however, 
there is also the discussion of whether or not there should be a Euro-
pean social policy (Habermas 2001; Mau 2005). The question of pre-
ferred decision level (national or EU) for welfare issues is thus relevant 
as dependent variable in my analyses. Compared to the question of 
political trust, which at least in theory can be equally strong in political 
institutions at all levels, the question of the preferred decision level for 
welfare issues clearly presupposes a choice between territorial levels (see 
Chapter 4). The specific nature of this question makes it plausible that 
the interaction effect of being a new or old member state will be more 
pronounced, i.e., that in the older member states people with national 
attachments will be more negative, and people with supra-national 
attachments will be more positive towards the EU as the decision level 
for welfare issues. 
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One of the most common (but criticized) institutional cultural varia-
tions referred to by scholars concerning comparative research into wel-
fare attitudes is the issue of welfare state regimes. The best-known cate-
gorization is Esping-Andersen’s system of three different welfare re-
gimes: the corporatist continental regime, the liberal Anglo-Saxon re-
gime, and the social-democratic Nordic regime (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
In each of these regimes, the institutional design is based on some sort 
of “welfare doctrine” (or culture), and the specific configurations of the 
welfare institutions have been shaped in accordance with the general 
ideological view or doctrine. The three regimes are thus thought to have 
different impacts on such diverse factors as the provision of social ser-
vices, the quality of social rights, and the organization of the labour 
market (Svallfors 2003).  
The idea of welfare regimes has been widely used and much criticized 
in comparative welfare state research.105 The regimes have been rede-
fined concerning what countries should be included in each regime,106 
and the welfare regime concept has been expanded, especially by the 
inclusion of an Eastern European and a Mediterranean regime (Cerami 
2005; Ferrera 1996).107 Since the idea of welfare regimes continues to be 
used in research, despite the criticism, I have chosen to categorize the 
EU member states in accordance with the expanded regime, i.e., these 
five regimes, in line with most common classifications found in previous 
research (see the Appendix). 
I argue that the welfare state regimes should be included as interac-
tion variables in my analyses, since the relationship between multi-level 
territorial attachments and the preferred decision level for welfare issues 
can be expected to vary according to the type of regime. This is because 
the type of welfare regime determines the rules governing entitlement to 
receive welfare, and thus concerns the deservingness criteria I discussed 
                                                 
105 The regime concept has been criticized theoretically as well as empirically, as research-
ers have found more individual variation within countries/regimes than between them (see 
e.g. Kasza 2002; Svallfors 2003). 
106 Scholars referring to more specific welfare institutions when classifying states still tend 
to find support for a classification system similar to that of Esping-Andersen, with signifi-
cant distinctions between social policy in different countries (Korpi & Palme 1998; Saint-
Arnaud & Bernard 2003). However, some countries seem more difficult to classify than 
others, for example, the Netherlands, Cyprus, and Malta are not part of my classification 
system, since I have not found any good arguments as to the specific welfare regimes to 
which they should belong. 
107 Apart from the theoretical justification, this addition of two new categories has found 
empirical support from, for example, the classification of European welfare states accord-
ing to a large number of social indicators by Ferreira and Figueiredo (2005), who found 
that the Southern and the Central/Eastern European states clearly clustered as distinct 
groups.  
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in Chapter 4, operating as a mechanism between multi-level territorial 
attachments and welfare attitudes. Svallfors (2006) makes a similar 
point regarding the moral economy of welfare states, as does Mau 
(2003), who has developed a motivational taxonomy of how different 
reciprocity interpretations relate to different institutional welfare set-
tings. He argues that the generalized reciprocity of universal benefits 
has a stronger solidarity motivation, than does, for example, the insur-
ance-based motivation of a balanced reciprocity system, or the liberal 
egalitarian ethos characteristic of risk reciprocity (Mau 2003:38). These 
categories roughly correspond to the Nordic, conservative, and liberal 
welfare regimes, respectively. In a similar vein, the broader support for 
universal welfare programs is discussed and explained by Rothstein 
(2001). Given such arguments, it is reasonable to expect the relation-
ship between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes to 
vary between regimes, and to be the strongest in the Nordic welfare 
regimes, due to the higher degree of solidarity implied by more univer-
sal welfare policies.  
Compared to the EU exposure factor, the type of welfare regime is 
more state related and contains less multi-level institutional variation, 
especially since I cannot consider sub-national levels in connection with 
it. However, the idea of a European social policy may be conceived as 
more or less threatening (or positive) depending on the experiences and 
moral codes that characterize different welfare regimes. 
 
Institutional performance  
The second theoretical category contains macro theories of institutional 
performance, economic utility, or self-interest. Regarding trust or wel-
fare attitudes at different political levels, these theories tend to highlight 
the importance of economic performance or the provision of public 
goods. For my model, and for the exclusive focus of this chapter on the 
relationship between the national and EU levels, the main interesting 
institutional performance aspect is whether or not a country gains eco-
nomically from EU membership. Both theoretical and empirical investi-
gations have identified the balancing effect of utility- and emotionally 
based factors concerning legitimacy and political trust. For example, 
people are more likely to accept less economic gain (or even loss) if 
emotional support is strong (Easton 1975; Gabel 1998a).  
Hence, I argue that it is important to consider whether people live in 
countries that are EU net contributors or net recipients. The relation-
ship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in EU institu-
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tions can be moderated by whether one’s country is a net contributor or 
net recipient. The argument is somewhat more complicated regarding 
the interaction effect of a country being a net contributor to or recipient 
from the EU on the relationship between multi-level territorial attach-
ments and trust in national institutions. Arguably, gaining from EU 
membership could reflect positively on a national government, indicat-
ing successful negotiations in Brussels. On the other hand, if a country 
is a net recipient from the EU it could also be seen as indicating poor 
national economic performance, something expected to decrease na-
tional trust (Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Mishler & Rose 2001). Being 
a net-recipient country is thus expected to interact with the effect of 
territorial attachments (especially domestic ones) on national trust, 
making this relationship weaker than in economically stronger coun-
tries. 
As well, I argue that the institutional context variable of whether a 
country is a net contributor to or net recipient from the EU also affects 
preferred decision level for social policy. In net-contributing countries, 
EU membership is not connected to economic utility, and it is likely that 
transferring power over social policy areas to the EU would lead to 
more redistribution among countries and thus higher costs for the net 
contributors. This leads to an expectation of an interaction effect on the 
relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and the pre-
ferred decision level for welfare issues. The relationship is supposedly 
stronger in net-contributing countries, especially concerning the impact 
of national attachments on resistance to transferring responsibility for 
social policies to the EU. For net-recipient countries, such a transfer can 
be expected to increase the economic gain, strengthening support for 
the idea, especially among people with European attachments. 
The categorization is dichotomous (see the Appendix), depending on 
whether or not a country is a net contributor. The size of the net con-
tributions or receipts has varied somewhat over time, but the categori-
zation captures the status as a net contributor or net recipient over time, 
since a nation joined the EU. 
 
Institutional procedure or design 
The third broad category consists of input theories that emphasize the 
importance of formal rules and of the fairness of political institutions in 
enhancing political trust. Much attention has been put into comparing 
different types of national political institutions and how these institu-
tions affect government quality (Kaiser, et al. 2002; Lijphart 1999) and 
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human behaviour and attitudes (Rothstein 1998; Weaver & Rockman 
1993). Naturally, a number of such political institutions are arguably 
relevant as an interaction effect on the relationship between territorial 
attachments and political trust or welfare attitudes. However, my selec-
tion must take account of the multi-level system perspective, so the 
political autonomy of different territorial levels is relevant.  
Once a country is an EU member, the relationship between the state 
and the EU becomes basically the same as it is for all other member 
countries. However, there is relevant variation between countries con-
cerning the power distribution between different domestic territorial 
levels. This factor is captured by government structure, which can also 
be referred to as inter-governmental relationships, i.e., how power is 
distributed between different governmental levels in the political system 
of a country. Theoretically, the distribution of powers between all po-
litical levels is relevant, since the feeling of being represented (and thus 
political trust) can be expected to increase if strong attachments to re-
gional territories, for example, are matched with political self-
determination or influence (Catt & Murphy 2002; McEwen & Moreno 
2005).108 
In this chapter, I can only measure trust in institutions at the national 
and EU levels, and which of these two levels people would prefer made 
social policy decisions. In this case, variations, for example, in regional 
strength are redundant for the ensuing analyses. Hence, I am only con-
sidering the formal governmental structure of a country, described as 
either federal or unitary (see the Appendix), which also is an important 
part of Lijphart’s divided-power dimension of democracy (Lijphart 
1999). In federal states, the territorial dimension is institutionalized, 
and a founding principle is the separation of powers between different 
levels. Some observers see this separation of powers as a source of insti-
tutional conflict (Rahn & Rudolph 2005), while others see such disper-
sal of power as instrumental in promoting consensus democracy and, by 
extension, enhancing political trust (Lijphart 1999).  
Government structure thus varies between countries, making it an 
appropriate institutional context factor that can be thought to interact 
in the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust 
in national political institutions. Following Lijphart (1999), the rela-
tionship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust − 
                                                 
108 For other research questions and when more detailed data are available, institutional 
contexts that better capture the procedure for influencing the EU decision-making struc-
ture could be relevant (e.g., number of MEPs, number of votes, and whether a country 
has one or two commissioners).  
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especially trust in national institutions − can be expected to be stronger 
in federal states. Government structure is less immediately relevant to 
the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in 
European political institutions, since the government structure at the 
European level is the same for all member states. I argue, however, that 
a nation’s pre-existing government structure and division of power 
might well affect how it fits into the EU level. For example, the EU level 
could be perceived as just yet another of many levels, in a federal state, 
or as something unique and very strange, from a unitary state perspec-
tive. 
In unitary states, the centralization of welfare institutions has given 
the state influence over the development of social services and empha-
sized the state as the provider of social security (McEwen & Moreno 
2005). In contrast, federal states have usually shared political compe-
tencies between different political levels, issues of welfare and social 
services in particular tending to be considered sub-national responsibili-
ties (Loughlin, et al. 1999).109 It is thus plausible that, compared to citi-
zens of unitary states, people with sub-national attachments in federal 
states may be more reluctant to transfer power over these issues to the 
EU level.110  
After this presentation of the theoretically based, three broad catego-
ries of institutional context, I will proceed to the specific questions that 
guide the empirical analyses presented in this chapter. Moreover, the 
questions will specify in more detail the expectations as to the impact of 
each of the institutional contexts when included as interaction variables 
in the analyses. 
 
Questions about the interaction effects of institutional contexts 
The theoretical part and the discussion of which institutional context 
variables to include as interaction variables were structured around 
three broad categories of macro explanations of political trust and wel-
                                                 
109 It should be remembered that the devolution process in Europe has resulted in a shift of 
power over welfare issues to local or regional levels in most countries; legislative power, 
however, still remains centralized in many unitary states. 
110 In a similar vein, the electoral systems of different countries could be justified since they 
comprise another political institution commonly cited as important for the quality of 
democracy, political trust, and welfare policy (Lijphart 1999; Rahn & Rudolph 2005). 
Regarding social policy, for example, Iversen and Soskice (2006) have shown that coun-
tries with proportional electoral systems tend to redistribute more resources than others 
do. However, due to the lack of variation at the EU level, and to the difficulties of theo-
retically arguing a plausible chain of cause and effect at this level, I have excluded this 
factor from the analyses. 
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fare attitudes. The specific questions and preliminary empirical analyses 
presented in this chapter will also focus on these three aspects.  
First, I would like to consider the interaction effect of institutional 
culture on the relationship between territorial attachments and political 
trust and preferred decision level for welfare issues, respectively. With 
regard to institutional culture, I am specifically interested in the EU 
exposure, measured as new or old member state or the phase of 
enlargement when a country joined the EU.111 In the older member 
states, the experience and the political articulations of the EU have been 
more profound, so I expect supra-national attachment to have a 
stronger impact on trust in EU institutions in older than in newer mem-
ber states. Moreover, most newer member states are still struggling with 
the democratic transition process, so I expect the relationship between 
national attachments and national trust to be stronger in the older 
member states. To continue this argument, I also expect old or new 
member state to affect the relationship between multi-level territorial 
attachments and the preferred decision level for welfare issues. The 
assumption is that national attachment will be more negatively related, 
and supra-national attachment more positively related, in the old mem-
ber states.  
The variation in welfare regime between countries might also have an 
interaction effect. There are theoretical reasons to expect more resis-
tance to transferring responsibility for social policies to the EU level in 
welfare regimes with many universal and redistributive features. Hence, 
I especially expect the impact of national attachment to have a stronger 
negative effect in the Nordic welfare regime.   
Second, I want to know whether institutional performance has a 
moderating effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial 
attachments and political trust or preferred decision level for welfare 
issues. Institutional performance will be captured by whether a country 
is a net contributor to or net recipient from the EU. Since affective feel-
ings are assumed to be able to balance issues of institutional perform-
ance concerning legitimacy, I expect supra-national attachment to be 
more important to trust in EU institutions in countries that are net con-
tributors. On the other hand, it is plausible that the combination of 
supra-national attachment and economic gain may lead to a stronger 
positive effect on EU trust in net-recipient countries. The flip side of the 
latter argument leads to an expectation of a stronger relationship be-
                                                 
111 New or old member state is coded 1 for new and 0 for old. The phase of enlargement 
categories are 1950s, 1970s, 1980s, and 2004, and dummy coding using the 2004 group 
as the reference category. 
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tween territorial attachments (especially domestic ones) and national 
trust in the net-contributing countries, since the economic performance 
of the national institutions is lower in net-contributing countries. 
Since the issue of EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues 
has stronger consequences and is a clear issue of choice of one level over 
another, I believe that the moderating effect of living in a net-
contributing or net-recipient country will be even more noticeable. The 
expectation is that the preference for national-level responsibility for 
welfare issues will be stronger among people with a national attachment 
in net-contributing than in net-recipient countries. It is also plausible 
that in a net-contributing country, only people with supra-national 
attachments would support the idea of a social dimension of the EU, 
since this probably would increase the cost of EU membership for their 
country. 
Third, I will highlight the possible interaction effect of variations in 
formal institutional design or procedure. I will analyse how the gov-
ernment structure (federal or unitary state) interacts with the effect of 
multi-level territorial attachments on political trust and on preferred 
level of government for welfare issues. Since the idea of separation of 
powers between territorial levels is part of the federal system, I expect 
the effect of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust to be 
stronger in federal than in unitary states. Regarding the preferred deci-
sion level for social policies, such policies are normally the responsibil-
ity of sub-national levels in federal states. The idea of transferring the 
responsibility for these issues to the EU level can thus be expected to be 
resisted more strongly among people with a sub-national attachment in 
federal than in unitary states. 
  
Methodological aspects  
Including interaction effects in my theoretical model increases the com-
plexity of the empirical analyses and renders the interpretation of the 
results more difficult. Due to the model’s increased complexity, the 
analyses in this chapter should merely be considered preliminary inves-
tigations of theoretically interesting effects, which clearly could be ana-
lysed in more detail, including more interaction variables and using 
more statistically advanced methods.112  
                                                 
112 For forthcoming and more advanced statistical investigations of the effect of macro-
level variations on individual level outcomes, the multilevel analysis approach can be 
useful (see, e.g., (Snijders & Bosker 1999).  
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Moreover, the overall aim of this chapter is wider than that of the 
empirical analyses contained in it. The overall aim includes: 1) theoreti-
cally examining the relevant kinds of institutional contexts to find a 
way in which they may affect the relationships between multi-level terri-
torial attachments and political trust or welfare attitudes, and 2) explor-
ing whether there are any indications of empirical support for these 
theoretical arguments. Given the overall explorative approach of this 
study, I argue that analysing the interaction effects of theoretically rele-
vant factors is a reasonable first step in investigating whether institu-
tional contexts matter to the individual-level relationships in a theoreti-
cally logical way. If there are no indications of any interaction effects 
(despite their varying theoretical features), the justification for continu-
ing to do more advanced analyses is clearly weakened. 
The main challenge to the statistical analyses presented in this chapter 
is including an interaction term in the regression analyses, and interpret-
ing the results. I will use multiplicative interaction terms, and for each 
institutional context analysis will include the institutional context vari-
ables (dummy coding, 0–1) and multiplicative interaction terms that are 
the products of the independent variable(s) of interest and the institu-
tional variable (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003).113 The large number of vari-
ables in a regression table that includes multiplicative interaction terms 
can be confusing. For simplicity, I will therefore only display the effect 
of each independent variable (calculated twice to give the results for 
both values of the institutional context), and indicate whether the inter-
action term is significant by itself (in an extra column or using bold-
faced type). Though it may appear that the regression has been run 
twice, once for each group of individuals, this is not the case. 
In OLS regression analyses, the coefficients can be interpreted as fol-
lows. The original attachment variables (e.g., sub-national attachment) 
indicate the effect when the interaction variable and all other variables 
in the model are zero. For pedagogical reasons, I will also calculate the 
coefficients for when the interaction variable is one. However, to inves-
tigate whether or not the difference between these coefficients is signifi-
cant, the product terms must be consulted. The coefficients of the prod-
uct terms indicate the difference in effect between the interaction 
groups, and whether or not this difference is significant.  
Interaction effects are especially challenging to handle in logistic re-
gression analyses. The dependent variables in logistic regression analy-
                                                 
113 For example, I will include a dummy variable capturing whether or not a country is 
unitary, and three variables multiplying “unitary” by sub-national, national, and supra-
national attachment. 
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ses are not scales but categorical, hence the relationship with the inde-
pendent variables is non-linear (i.e., the estimated effect is not the same 
for all values of the independent variable). This makes interpreting the 
coefficients even more difficult; hence, in Chapter 3, I presented the 
predicted probabilities for trusting all the institutions included in each 
trust index, to facilitate the interpretation of the results. In logistic re-
gression analyses, however, the predicted probabilities do not function 
in the same manner, and sometimes produce illogical results when 
multiplicative interaction terms are included. Hence, Jaccard (2001) 
recommends using the odds ratios instead, to help the interpretation of 
interaction effects in logistic regression analyses. The odds ratios of the 
multiplicative interaction terms provide some basis for determining 
whether or not the difference in odds ratios between the interaction 
groups is significant.114   
 
INTERACTION EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 
 
It is time to focus on the second part of the aim of this chapter, namely, 
the empirical analyses of interaction effects in the Eurobarometer data. 
The approach is explorative, and I will discuss the interpretation of the 
results in light of the theoretical expectations presented in the specific 
questions above. The three questions for this chapter correspond to 
three kinds of theoretically justified interaction effects; the results sec-
tion is structured similarly, starting with institutional culture as an in-
teraction effect. 
 
Institutional culture as interaction effect 
The first question is how institutional culture can matter as an interac-
tion effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attach-
ments, and political trust and preferred decision level for welfare issues, 
respectively. Starting with the relationship between territorial attach-
ments and political trust, I am including EU exposure as an interaction 
effect. EU exposure is measured in two different ways: as the difference 
between old and new member states (since 2004), and as the specific 
phase of enlargement in which a country joined the EU. In the older 
                                                 
114 The use of odds ratios in interpreting interaction effects in logistic regressions has been 
debated (See e.g. Norton, et al. 2004). The exponent of the coefficient of the interaction 
term is not an odds ratio, but rather the odds ratio of the odds ratios between groups. 
However, given that predicted probabilities are even more criticized, odds ratios are seen 
as the better option of the two. 
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member states, the experience and manifestations of the EU have been 
more profound, so I expect supra-national attachment to have a 
stronger impact on trust in EU institutions in older than in newer mem-
ber states. Another expectation is that, since most newer member states 
are still in a democratic transition process, it is reasonable to expect the 
relationship between national attachments and national trust to be 
stronger in older member states.  
This last expectation is met to some extent. In the uppermost part of 
Table 5.1, I first indicate the direct effect of belonging to a new member 
state on political trust; this direct effect is negative, indicating that the 
degrees of national trust are lower overall in newer than in older EU 
member states.115 The next two columns present the estimates from the 
ordered logistic regression analyses including multiplicative interaction 
terms (although these interaction terms are suppressed for simplicity). I 
have also, after the regression, calculated the coefficients for the new 
member states, for easier comparison. The coefficients reported in Table 
5.1 are thus computed in ordered logistic regression models incorporat-
ing multiplicative interaction terms, and the Sig. column indicates 
whether and to what degree the difference between the two groups of 
countries (old and new) is significant. In this manner I have investigated 
the interaction effect of living in an old or a new (i.e., since 2004) 
member state and of having, or not having, an attachment to each of 
the levels.  
The estimated relationships between the territorial level dimension 
(especially national and supra-national attachment) and national trust 
are stronger in the older than the newer member states. However, the 
differences are almost not significant; supra-national attachments have 
a somewhat more positive effect on national trust in the older than the 
newer member states, though this difference is barely significant.116 If 
the differences between the two types of countries are significant, this is 
indicated in Table 5.1 by the asterisks appearing in the Sig. column 
                                                 
115 As in Chapter 3, the trust indices are not scales, but refer to the number of institutions 
trusted, making it better to use an ordered logistic regression analysis. 
116 The estimates in logistic regression analyses are difficult to interpret, so it is common to 
use other techniques to facilitate the interpretation of strength of effects. In Chapter 3, 
predicted probabilities were used, however, it is much debated whether they should be 
used when interpreting interaction effects in logistic regressions, so I have calculated odds 
ratios instead. Odds ratios are produced by dividing the odds of one group by those of the 
other. If the two odds are identical, the odds ratio equals 1.0. If the odds of one group 
differ from those of the other, the odds ratio will deviate from 1.0, the further away from 
1.0, the more significant the difference between the groups. In this case, each odds ratio 
indicates the difference in odds between having an attachment (e.g., sub-national) and not 
having the attachment (or the base category unattached for the combined measure).  
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(indicating that the suppressed multiplicative interaction terms were 
significant). 
 
Table 5.1 New member state as interaction effect on the relation-
ship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust 
in national and EU institutions, EU25, 2004 (logistic re-
gression coefficients and odds ratios) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the trust indexes, see Chapter 3. The national 
index ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 2 (tend to trust both institutions in the index). The supra-national 
index ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 3 (tend to trust all three institutions in the index). The attachment 
items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment). The Level of attachment items are 
not mutually independent, but the Strongest attachment items are, with the unattached group as the base category. 
All the coefficients are computed controlling for the control variables used in Chapter 3, plus multiplicative interaction 
terms, although they are suppressed in the table. The Sig. column indicates whether or not the multiplicative interac-
tion term and the odds ratio are significant, and hence whether the difference in effect between the two categories of 
countries is significant.  
The relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in 
national political institutions is also measured as the impact of the 
combined measure, strongest attachment. Compared to the level dimen-
sion, this combined measure is mutually exclusive, and all the results 
should be interpreted in relation to the group of unattached people, 
which is the reference category. It is clear from both the coefficients (all 



















National trust index 
      
Level of attachment:       
Sub-national  .18*** .15** .47**  1.167 1.598 
National .70*** .72*** .38  2.046 1.463 
Supra-national .25*** .27*** .05 * 1.312 1.046 
New member state 1.68*** -1.47**     
Strongest attachment:       
Primarily sub-national .60*** .70*** -.10 * 2.005 0.902 
All domestic 1.01*** 1.13*** -.07 *** 3.110 0.937 
Primarily national  .89*** .99*** .03 ** 2.696 1.035 
Supra-national etc. .78*** .88*** -.04 ** 2.400 1.045 
All levels equal 1.05*** 1.16*** .16 ** 3.196 1.176 
New member state .02 1.05**     
Supra-national trust index 
      
Level of attachment:       
Sub-national  .28*** .30*** .20  1.348 1.225 
National  .24*** .27*** -.12 (*) 1.316 0.884 
Supra-national  .81*** .83*** .73  2.282 2.078 
New member state .44 .98     
Strongest attachment:       
Primarily sub-national .51*** .52*** .74  1.678 1.605 
All domestic .72*** .75*** .57  2.111 1.767 
Primarily national  .49*** .48*** .57  1.614 1.763 
Supra-national etc. .74*** .72*** .86**  2.062 2.364 
All levels equal 1.09*** 1.10*** 1.02***  2.745 2.785 
New member state .45 .51     
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the multiplicative interaction terms were significant, as indicated in the 
Sig. column) and the odds ratios indicating that, regardless of a person’s 
territorial attachment, the positive relationship with national trust is 
stronger in older than in newer member states.117  
It is also necessary to do the analyses in more detail, considering the 
specific phase of enlargement in which a country joined the EU (see 
Table A5.2 in the Appendix). This is not only is a question of duration 
of EU exposure; rather, the meaning of European integration has 
changed, becoming more supra-national and involving several more 
areas of decision-making responsibility. Bruter (2005), for example, has 
discussed the differences between the dominant ideas characterizing 
each of the five earliest phases of enlargement, indicating that they 
might have had different impacts on individuals who became citizens of 
Europe at different times. Therefore, I am analysing the possible inter-
action effect of each phase of EU enlargement separately; in so doing, 
the pattern becomes even clearer. In these analyses, the interaction ef-
fect of each enlargement phase is compared to that of the 2004 
enlargement, indicating that strongest level of attachment has signifi-
cant positive effects on national trust in the very oldest member states 
that joined in 1958 and in 1973; moreover, the multiplicative interac-
tion terms are significant too, indicating that this institutional context 
difference is significant.  
These results correspond to the idea of the development of a multi-
level system in Europe over time. Regardless of the level to which a 
person has the strongest attachment (in the countries that joined the EU 
in 1958 or 1973), there is a positive relationship with trust in national 
political institutions. Neither supra-national nor sub-national attach-
ments are perceived as conflicting with trust in national institutions in 
these countries. In comparison, in countries that joined the EU in the 
1980s, sub-national attachment is negatively related to national trust, 
whereas it is positively related in the countries that joined in the 1990s. 
Supra-national attachment tends to be mainly positively related to na-
tional trust in all groups, apart from the newest member states. Hence, 
the fear that the European multi-level system will challenge the role of 
the state is not supported concerning trust in national political institu-
tions. In fact, since this relationship seems to be the strongest in the 
                                                 
117 The odds ratios indicate that the odds are between two and three times stronger that 
attached, rather than non-attached, people in older member states will trust national 
political institutions. In comparison, there is no such pattern in the new member states, 
where the odds ratios are close to 1.0, indicating almost no difference between being 
attached or not. 
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oldest member states, it could be seen as supporting the idea of an inte-
grated multi-level system; with time, such a system might well come to 
be perceived as more natural by the citizens – at least as reflected by 
trust in national political institutions. 
Turning to supra-national trust (lower half of Table 5.1), I expected 
supra-national attachment to have a stronger positive impact in older 
than in newer member states, due to, for example, longer exposure to 
the EU. Apart from the different significances of the integration at the 
different enlargement phases mentioned above, there is also the situa-
tion that the longer a country has been a member state, the more its 
citizens have been exposed to EU institutions, and the more pronounced 
the manifestations of the EU. Surprisingly enough, however, there is no 
support for such notions. Indeed, there are positive significant relation-
ships between all levels of attachment and supra-national trust in the 
old member states; however, the relationships seem, despite not being 
significant, to be similar in the newest member states, so there is no 
interaction effect of living in an old or new member state.118 The idea of 
an interaction effect of longer EU exposure in the older member states is 
thus not supported. The same pattern of similar results between the 
older and newer member states also appears when analysing the impact 
of strongest attachment on supra-national trust. There is no indication 
of the expected interaction effect. When I conduct more detailed analy-
ses, looking at the possible interaction effect of each enlargement phase, 
there are a few indications of supra-national attachment having a 
stronger impact in the earliest enlargement phases, but the differences 
are weak (see the Appendix).119 
Whether one lives in an old or new member state can also be expected 
to moderate the effect of individuals’ multi-level territorial attachments 
on the preferred decision level for welfare issues. Although welfare insti-
tutions and policies in most European countries are closely connected to 
the national, or sub-national, levels, there is discussion of whether or 
not there should be a European social policy, making relevant the ques-
tion of individual preference for national- or European-level responsibil-
ity for welfare issues. In Chapter 4, I discussed how the matter of pre-
                                                 
118 There is only one almost significant difference in the multiplicative interaction term of 
the difference in national attachment, which has a positive effect in the older, but a nega-
tive effect in the newer member states. This is also evident in the odds ratios for trusting 
all supra-national institutions, which are over 1.0 for the older and under 1.0 for the 
newer member states. 
119 The expected pattern appears when the analyses are done without country dummies; 
once the country dummies are included, however, the interaction effects become non-
significant. 
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ferred decision level presupposes that people take a stand, choosing 
between the national and supra-national level, unlike the matter of 
political trust. Because of this, and because of the historically strong 
connection between the welfare state and national attachment, multi-
level territorial attachments can be expected to have stronger effects on 
preferred decision level in older than in newer member states. The ex-
pectation is that national attachment should be more negatively, and 
supra-national attachment more positively, related to the idea of the EU 
as the decision level for welfare issues, in older member states. This 
expected pattern is found to some extent in Table 5.2, both only when 
focusing on the impact of level of attachment and the combined meas-
ure of strongest attachment. 
 
Table 5.2 New member state as interaction effect on the relation-
ship between multi-level territorial attachments and pre-
ferred decision level for welfare issues, EU25, 2004 
(OLS regression coefficients) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. See Chapter 4 for more information on the preferred decision level 
index, which ranges from 0 to 6. The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such 
attachment). The level of attachment items are not mutually independent, whereas the strongest attachment items 
are, with the sub-national attachment group as the base category. All the coefficients are computed controlling for the 
control variables used in Chapter 4, plus the multiplicative interaction terms, although they are suppressed in the 
table. The rightmost column indicates whether or not the multiplicative interaction terms are significant, and hence 
whether the difference in effect between the two categories of countries is significant.  
The results are from a standard OLS regression with multiplicative 
interaction terms (suppressed, but indicated by stars in the rightmost 
column if significant), and the results concerning the level dimension 
indicate that the effect of being attached to both the national and supra-
national levels affects the preferred decision level for social policies in 
the expected manner. National attachment has a stronger negative im-
pact in the older than the newer member states. Supra-national attach-
  Interaction effects  
Social policies should be 









Level of attachment:     
Sub-national  -.14** -.16*** -.02  
National -.57*** -.62*** -.07 *** 
Supra-national .44*** .46*** .29*** * 
New member state .31    
Strongest attachment:     
Unattached .24** .26** -.28  
All domestic -.27*** -.37*** .03 *** 
Primarily national  -.17*** -.22*** .10  
Supra-national etc. .42*** .38*** .24*  
All levels equal .23*** .18*** .10  
New member state .29 .19   
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ment is positively related, but more strongly so in the old member 
states. The differences between older and newer member states are sig-
nificant, since the multiplicative interaction terms are significant (al-
though these are not displayed in the table). The lower half of the table 
presents the strongest attachment classification, where there is only one 
clear interaction effect. Despite the overall congruency with the ex-
pected pattern, only those people whose strongest attachments are all 
domestic significantly differ in their impact on preferred decision level 
for welfare issues, between old and new states. 
This pattern is even clearer when considering each of the enlargement 
phases. In the oldest member states (joining in 1958 and 1973), people 
with national attachments are most opposed to transferring decision-
making power over social policies to the EU, whereas people with su-
pra-national attachments in these countries are the most in favour. The 
differences from the newer groups of countries are significant, accord-
ing to the multiplicative interaction terms (although they are suppressed 
in the table; however, the significant differences are emphasized in bold-
faced type). The pattern is the same for the other groups of countries, 
but is weaker and lacks significant differences.  
 
Table 5.3 Phase of joining the EU as interaction effect on the rela-
tionship between level of attachment and preferred deci-
sion level for welfare issues, EU25, 2004 (OLS regres-
sion coefficients) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. The preferred decision level index is constructed from six items 
(national level = 0, EU = 1), added to make a range of 0–6. The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attach-
ment) and 0 (do not have such attachment). The level of attachment items are not mutually independent, but the 
strongest attachment items are, with the group of primarily sub-national attachment as the base category. All the 
coefficients are computed controlling for the control variables used in Chapter 4, plus the multiplicative interaction 
terms, although they are suppressed in the table. The boldfaced coefficients are significantly different from the base 
category. 
 Social policies should be determined at the EU level 
Phase of EU admission 1958 1973 1980s 1995 2004 
Level of attachment:      
Sub-national  -.13* -.16 -.26 -.12 -.02 
National -.64*** -.76*** -.31** -.47* -.07 
Supra-national .43*** .77*** .22*** .32** .29*** 
      
Strongest attachment:      
Unattached .25* .44 .25 -.26 -.28 
All domestic -.42*** -.36*** -.18* -.32 .03 
Primarily national  -.24*** -.12 -.23 -.20 .10 
Supra-national etc. .36*** .72*** -.02 .09 .24 
All levels equal .13** .51*** .24** -.10 .10 
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When considering not only political trust, but also willingness to trans-
fer decision-making concerning social policies to the EU level, there is a 
pronounced tendency for level of attachment to have a stronger impact 
in the older member states. The stronger resistance of people with na-
tional attachments, and the stronger support of people with supra-
national attachments, is in line with the theoretical expectations.  
Living in a nation that has been an EU member state for longer does 
not seem to influence the relationship between territorial attachments 
and trust in EU institutions, nor does it make people with national at-
tachments more willing to support the EU as the decision level for wel-
fare issues (though people with supra-national attachments are more 
supportive than others). For those who advocate the future develop-
ment of a social Europe, these are not encouraging results. 
A different aspect of this institutional culture category is that of wel-
fare regime. I discussed earlier how the different welfare regimes en-
compass different welfare and redistribution regimes, and how the type 
of welfare regime determines the rules governing entitlement to receive 
welfare. These rules are closely connected to the deservingness criterion 
that functions as a mechanism between multi-level territorial attach-
ments and welfare attitudes, so it is plausible that the welfare regime in 
which a person lives could moderate the relationship between his or her 
territorial (especially national) attachments and attitudes towards the 
preferred decision level for social policy issues.  
The theoretical expectation is that the idea of a common European 
social policy can be seen as more or less positive depending on the kind 
of welfare regime in which a person currently lives. The expectation is 
that resistance to EU-level decision-making regarding social policy is-
sues might be stronger among people with national attachments who 
live in regimes with more universal and redistributive features (i.e., the 
Nordic regime), because of the stronger solidarity base of such a regime 
(Mau 2003). As can be seen in the Appendix (Table A5.4), however, 
this is not at all the pattern revealed by the analyses. Instead, resistance 
to EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues is stronger among 
people with national attachments in corporatist and liberal regimes. On 
the other hand, the most supportive attitudes are also found in these 
regimes, among people with supra-national attachments. These differ-
ences are at least partly significant, according to the multiplicative in-
teraction terms.  
The institutional context of welfare regime thus did not produce the 
expected effect. This could be because many of the corporatist and lib-
eral welfare regimes examined are initial or early member states of the 
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EU, characteristics that could also account for the detected pattern. It is 
necessary to continue to analyse different institutional cultural varia-
tions as institutional contexts, but preferably using other data and 
methods, to allow consideration of more institutional context variation. 
 
Institutional performance as interaction effect 
The second specific question examined in this chapter is whether, and 
how, institutional performance can have a moderating effect on the 
relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political 
trust or the preferred decision level for welfare issues. The most relevant 
institutional performance variable for this study is to consider whether 
a country is a net contributor to or net recipient from the EU. The over-
all expectation is that the cost of EU membership will increase the im-
portance of multi-level territorial attachments in net-contributing coun-
tries, making the effects larger. In this section, Easton’s idea of a bal-
ance between diffuse and specific support will be explored by consider-
ing the relationship between individuals’ feelings of attachments and the 
economic utility of EU membership. 
The overall stronger effects of territorial attachments in the net-
contributing countries are not supported empirically in Table 5.4, but 
regarding trust in national political institutions there is such a pattern, 
especially when investigating the interaction effects of net contribution 
and strongest attachment on national political trust. The results of the 
ordered logistic regression analyses indicate that every one of the at-
tachment categories has a stronger positive effect on national political 
trust in net-contributing countries than does the unattached group.  
The differences between the net-contributing and net-recipient coun-
tries are significant according to both the multiplicative interaction 
terms (suppressed, but the level of significance is displayed by asterisks 
in the Sig. column) and the odds ratios. One example is the group of 
people who feel equally attached to all levels. They tend to trust their 
national political institutions in both groups of countries, but the differ-
ence between them and unattached people is greater in the net-
contributing countries (the odds ratio is slightly over 1.6 in the net-
recipient countries, but is almost 3.5 times higher in the net-
contributing countries). 
For the supra-national trust index, supra-national attachment was 
expected to be more important to trust in EU institutions in net-
contributor than in net-recipient countries. In comparison, the fact that 
net-recipient states gain economically from membership could be sup-
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posed to balance out the importance of the attachments, in line with the 
reasoning of Gabel (Gabel 1998a) and Easton (Easton 1965) for exam-
ple. However, my results do not support this expectation at all. As pre-
viously demonstrated, the results indicate stronger trust in EU institu-
tions among people who have supra-national attachments, but there is 
no significant difference between the two groups of countries. 
 
Table 5.4 EU net contribution as interaction effect on the relation-
ship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust 
in national and supra-national institutions, EU25, 2004 
(logistic regression coefficients and odds ratios) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the index and the attachment items, see Table 
5.1. All the coefficients are computed controlling for the control variables used in Chapter 3, although they are 
suppressed in the table. The table shows the logistic regression coefficients from an interaction model with multiplica-
tive interaction terms, computed for both EU net contributors and recipients. The Sig. column indicates whether or not 
the multiplicative interaction terms are significant, and hence whether, and to what degree, the difference in effect 
between the two kinds of countries is significant.  
The preliminary results can be interpreted as reflecting the lower na-
tional institutional performance in net-recipient countries, which is 
assumed to decrease the levels of political trust. The lack of variation 
between these groups of countries concerning trust in EU institutions 













National trust index 
      
Level of attachment:       
Sub-national  .18*** .06 .21***  1.064 1.237 
National .70*** .92*** .64*** * 2.519 1.891 
Supra-national .25*** .10 .31*** ** 1.108 1.360 
EU contributor 1.68*** 1.65**     
Strongest attachment:       
Primarily sub-national .60*** -.11 .83*** *** 0.896 2.298 
All domestic 1.01*** .42 1.20*** ** 1.527 3.340 
Primarily national  .89*** .33 1.08*** ** 1.386 2.939 
Supra-national etc. .78*** .38 .93*** * 1.466 2.525 
All levels equal 1.05*** .50* 1.24*** ** 1.642 3.459 
EU contributor 1.65***      
Supra-national trust index 
      
Level of attachment:       
Sub-national  .28*** .12 .32***  1.128 1.378 
National  .24*** .39*** .20***  1.472 1.225 
Supra-national  .81*** .78*** .82***  2.186 2.278 
EU contributor -.44 -.49     
Strongest attachment:       
Primarily sub-national .51*** .27 .58***  1.313 1.793 
All domestic .72*** .58** .79***  1.779 2.199 
Primarily national  .49*** .44 .51***  1.560 1.661 
Supra-national etc. .74*** 1.07*** .68***  2.901 1.967 
All levels equal 1.09*** 1.16*** 1.05***  3.202 2.854 
EU contributor -.45 .51     
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was surprising, but seems more promising from a European integration 
viewpoint. Perhaps trust in EU institutions might not be as dependent 
on the economic gain of one’s country as was theoretically expected, at 
least not as an interaction effect with multi-level territorial attachments. 
Turning to the preferred decision level for welfare issues, the overall 
expectation is that the cost of EU membership will increase the impor-
tance of multi-level territorial attachments, making resistance stronger 
in net-contributing states. There is a choice between one level and an-
other, and the choice concerns some of the most nationally connected 
political issues. The fact that the costs of social policies are very high, 
and more or less imply redistribution, makes it pertinent to explore 
whether a country’s being a net recipient or contributor could moderate 
the impact of multi-level territorial attachments on individual attitudes. 
 
Table 5.5 EU net contribution as interaction effect on the relation-
ship between multi-level territorial attachments and pre-
ferred decision level for welfare issues, EU25, 2004 
(OLS regression coefficients) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the index and the attachment items, see Table 
5.2. All regression coefficients are controlled for the other variables from Chapter 4 (although they are not presented 
in the table). The interaction models include multiplicative interaction terms, though they are repressed in the table. 
The right-hand column indicates the level of significance for the interaction term, i.e., whether, and to what degree, 
the difference between the groups is significant. 
In this case the theoretical expectations hold. In the upper half of Table 
5.5, one can see that people living in net-contributing countries and 
who have a national attachment tend to be more strongly (and signifi-
cantly) unsupportive of the transfer of decision-making power over 
social policies to the EU level than are people in net-recipient countries. 
On the other hand, people with a supra-national attachment are more 
inclined to be supportive of such EU-level decision-making in net-









Level of attachment:     
Sub-national  .14** -.08 -.15**  
National -.57*** -.24** -.67*** *** 
Supra-national .44*** .24*** .52*** *** 
EU net contributor .96*** -.68   
Strongest attachment:     
Unattached .24** -.04 .26  
All domestic -.17*** -.16 -.42*** *** 
Primarily national  .27*** -.10 -.22***  
Supra-national etc. .42*** .14 .41*** *** 
All levels equal .23*** .15* .17***  
EU net contributor 1.00** -.86***   
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contributing than recipient countries. Both of these group differences 
are significant according to the significance of the multiplicative interac-
tion terms. The effects are generally low: considering the preferred deci-
sion level as an index from 0 to 6, having a national attachment lowers 
the preference for the EU by .67 in net-contributing countries, and by 
.24 in net-recipient countries. It should be remembered, however, that 
these are the extra, independent effects of national attachments, holding 
all other factors constant, including ideology and education level.  
This pattern is also confirmed in the lower half of the table, where the 
strongest level of attachment is presented. It turns out that people with 
the strongest attachment to both the sub-national and national levels in 
the contributing countries are the least supportive of transferring social 
policy decision making to the EU level. This is theoretically reasonable, 
considering that some welfare issues are handled locally or regionally in 
many countries. 
The fact that net EU contribution did not function as an interaction 
effect on multi-level territorial attachments regarding trust in EU insti-
tutions, but did regarding the preference for either national or EU-level 
responsibility for welfare issues, adds to the conclusions of the previous 
chapter. It is neither the multi-level territorial attachments by them-
selves nor their impact on political trust that could challenge the role of 
the states or the European integration process, but rather the more sen-
sitive and politically significant issue of welfare state politics.  
 
Institutional procedure or design as interaction effect 
Time (or phase) of joining the EU, and EU net contribution status are 
institutional context factors that can vary over time. The third question 
also includes variations in formal institutional design, which in most 
European countries is a more stable factor. More precisely, I suggest 
that government structure (federal or unitary) might interact with the 
effect of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust and pre-
ferred decision level for welfare issues.  
Starting with the question of trust in national political institutions, 
the uppermost part of Table 5.6 initially indicates few results supportive 
of the ordered logistic regressions. The level of attachment has rather 
similar effects in both unitary and federal states, except there is a small, 
barely significant tendency for people with supra-national attachments 
to trust national institutions to a somewhat greater degree in unitary 
states (the odds ratio difference between 1.1 and 1.3 is significant at the 
90 per cent level).  
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More detailed explorations of the interaction effect on the impact of 
the strongest attachment on trust produces results in line with expecta-
tions. In federal states, the relationships between all strongest attach-
ment categories and national trust are positive, and significantly 
stronger than in unitary states. The odds ratios for trusting national 
institutions in unitary states, if a person is most strongly attached to all 
domestic levels (compared to an unattached person), is slightly over 2.3 
in unitary states, whereas it is almost 5 in federal states, and the odds 
ratio of this difference is significant at the 95 per cent level. 
 
Table 5.6 Governmental structure as interaction effect on the rela-
tionship between multi-level territorial attachments and 
trust in national and supra-national institutions, EU25, 
2004 (logistic regression coefficients and odds ratios) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the index and the attachment items, see Table 
5.1. All the above coefficients are computed controlling for the control variables used in Chapter 3, although these are 
suppressed in the table. The table presents the logistic regression coefficients, computed for both federal and unitary 
states. The right-hand columns indicate whether or not the multiplicative interaction terms are significant, and hence 
whether, and to what degree, the difference in effect between the two kinds of countries is significant.  
This theoretical expectation comes from the separation of powers be-
tween different territorial levels encompassed in the federal institutional 













National trust index 
      
Level of attachment:       
Sub-national  .18*** .13 .19**  1.143 1.211 
National .70*** .72*** .69***  2.062 1.999 
Supra-national .25*** .14* .28*** * 1.153 1.326 
Unitary -.08 -1.33***     
Strongest attachment:       
Primarily sub-national .60*** 1.20*** .44*** ** 3.321 1.560 
All domestic 1.01*** 1.60*** .87*** ** 4.937 2.381 
Primarily national  .89*** 1.42*** .76*** * 4.129 2.144 
Supra-national etc. .78*** 1.35*** .64*** * 3.846 1.898 
All levels equal 1.05*** 1.60*** .93*** * 4.954 2.524 
Unitary -1.20*** -.50     
Supra-national trust index 
      
Level of attachment:       
Sub-national  .28*** -.06 .38*** *** 0.938 1.466 
National  .24*** .42*** .17** * 1.526 1.186 
Supra-national  .81*** .54*** .90*** *** 1.713 2.465 
Unitary .45 .01     
Strongest attachment:       
Primarily sub-national .51*** -.00 .63*** * 0.998 1.885 
All domestic .72*** .01 .94*** *** 1.012 2.564 
Primarily national  .49*** -.01 .65*** ** 0.989 1.925 
Supra-national etc. .74*** .27 .87*** * 1.311 2.391 
All levels equal 1.09*** .34 1.34*** *** 1.399 3.823 
Unitary .50      
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design. Such a separation of powers is argued by Lijphart (1999) to 
bridge territorial conflict, promote consensus democracy, and thus en-
hance political trust. In line with such reasoning, trust in EU institutions 
could be expected to be stronger among people with supra-national 
attachments and residing in federal states, since a supra-national level 
and its legitimacy might fit more naturally with a federal system in 
which citizens are used to the territorial division of powers. In the lower 
half of Table 5.5 it can be seen that this expectation is not met, regard-
less of whether the interaction is with level of attachment or the com-
bined measure of strongest attachment. Moreover, not only supra-
national attachment, but also attachments to all other territorial levels, 
are more strongly connected to trust in EU institutions in unitary states. 
Hence, there is no evidence that a supra-national level is more easily 
accepted as just another level in a federal system, thus affecting this 
individual-level relationship. 
 
Table 5.7 Governmental structure as interaction effect on the rela-
tionship between multi-level territorial attachments and 
preferred decision level for welfare issues, EU25, 2004 
(OLS regression coefficients) 
 
* p <.10 ** p <.05 *** p <.01  
Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the index and the attachment items, see Table 
5.2. All coefficients are controlled for the variables used in Chapter 4, although these are not displayed in the table. 
The coefficients are computed for both groups of countries simultaneously, with interaction terms. The right-hand 
columns indicate the level of significance for the interaction terms, i.e., whether, and to what degree, the difference 
between the groups is significant. 
The third question also concerns how the government structure matters 
as an interaction variable, regarding the preferred decision level for 
welfare issues. In federal states, social policy issues are largely regarded 
as the responsibility of sub-national levels, whereas in unitary states 
there is a wider range of distribution of competencies, as well as over-









Level of attachment:     
Sub-national  .14** -.22* -.13**  
National -.57*** -.60*** -.55***  
Supra-national .44*** .35*** .47***  
Unitary state .13 -.10   
Strongest attachment:     
Unattached .24** .50** .12  
All domestic -.17*** -.31*** -.28***  
Primarily national  .27*** -.36*** -.16***  
Supra-national etc. .42*** .34*** .37***  
All levels equal .23*** .04 .22*** * 
Unitary state .36* .08   
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lapping competences between levels. I therefore expected the resistance 
to EU-level determination of welfare issues to be stronger among people 
with sub-national attachments in federal states; however, this is not at 
all evident in Table 5.7. 
The overall regression results indicate very few differences between 
people living in federal or unitary states, in terms of support for EU-
level decision-making on social policy issues. In both kinds of countries, 
people with domestic attachments tend not to favour, whereas people 
with supra-national attachments are more in favour of, such EU-level 
decision making. The only exception is people who feel equally strongly 
attached to all levels, who tend to be somewhat more supportive in 
unitary states, the difference being significant according to the multipli-
cative interaction term. Still, it is a difference that can be at least rea-
sonably interpreted in line with theory. These people feel equally at-
tached to all levels, but live in countries where responsibility for welfare 
issues is usually at the regional level; a shift of responsibility from a sub-
national to the EU level can thus be considered a much larger change, 
despite the pre-existing multi-level attachment. 
 
Chapter summary, conclusions, and theoretical implications 
In this chapter, I have argued that there are important reasons to expect 
that the impact of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust 
and welfare attitudes may vary, depending on the institutional contexts 
in which people live and on their particular experiences of multi-level 
systems. The institutional context can thus be problematic for the state 
(or to European integration) if the relationships reported in earlier 
chapters are much weaker in certain types of countries. Including insti-
tutional contexts in the analyses deepens our understanding of the pre-
conditions for multi-level territorial attachments that seem to matter the 
most to political trust and welfare attitudes. 
The aim of this chapter has been twofold: to extend the theoretical 
model to include the institutional context, and to conduct empirical 
analyses in line with the theoretical expectations. I argue that the insti-
tutional contexts do matter in my model as interaction effects; in other 
words, I expected the relationship between multi-level territorial at-
tachments and political trust, and preferred decision level for welfare 
issues, respectively, to be different in different institutional contexts. 
Depending on the institutional context, the expected interaction effect 
can be different, which I have elaborated in this chapter. The selection 
of relevant institutional context factors had to take account of both the 
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multi-level approach of the model and the overall study. As well, it had 
to be theoretically relevant to be expected to interact with the individ-
ual-level relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and 
political trust and welfare attitudes. With the help of macro theoretical 
explanations of political trust and welfare attitudes, I suggested that 
three kinds of institutional contexts were relevant, namely, institutional 
culture, institutional performance, and institutional procedures (or de-
sign); the variables selected for analysing these contexts were, respec-
tively, old or new member state (or phase of enlargement) and welfare 
state regime, EU net contributor or recipient, and federal or unitary 
state. 
Eurobarometer data were used for these analyses because they cap-
ture the necessary variation across countries, so the dependent variables 
have been somewhat limited. As a result, the multi-level perspective in 
this chapter concentrates on the relationship between the state and the 
EU, leaving the sub-national level to future studies. Another limitation 
is the focus of the multi-level territorial attachment concept on the terri-
torial level dimension, and on the combined measure of the level(s) to 
which one has the strongest attachment.  
The overall results of the analyses indicated that all three kinds of in-
stitutional contexts (culture, performance, and procedures) can have 
some interaction effect on the relationship of multi-level territorial at-
tachments to political trust and to preferred decision level for welfare 
issues; however, there were clear differences between the various chosen 
institutional context factors. Among the interaction variables, old or 
new member state did not have the expected effect on trust in EU insti-
tutions; moreover, the effects were not significantly different between 
old and new member states. Regarding national trust, though, all level 
attachments were stronger and more positively related in the older 
member states. This pattern was even more pronounced in countries 
that had been EU members for at least 30 years. These results could be 
partly interpreted as reflecting the turmoil faced by the newest coun-
tries, due to recent transition to democracy and overall lower levels of 
national trust regardless of territorial attachments. As well, the impact 
of level of attachment on the preference for the EU as the decision level 
for welfare issues was stronger in the oldest member states, correspond-
ing to the idea of longer time of EU exposure, and varying significance 
of the membership during different phases of enlargement. The interac-
tion did not, however, indicate more positive relationships in the older 
member states; instead, the negative effect of national attachments on 
preference for the EU as the decision level was amplified, as was the 
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positive effect of supra-national attachments. Hence, longer exposure to 
the EU does not lead to generally more benevolent attitudes towards the 
EU as the decision level for welfare policy, but rather amplifies the resis-
tance among people with national attachments. 
The latter relationship was also analysed with welfare regime differ-
ence as the interaction variable, but the results did not support the ex-
pectation of stronger resistance among people with national attach-
ments in the Nordic regime (due to the more universal welfare policies 
requiring a stronger solidarity base). In fact, the resistance was strongest 
in the liberal and conservative regimes, where support among people 
with supra-national attachments, on the other hand, was the strongest. 
Apart from general uncertainty as to the usefulness of the welfare re-
gime concept, I also note that most liberal and conservative countries 
are early EU member states, which might provide a more plausible ex-
planation. However, the lack of an interaction effect on, for example, 
the Nordic regime gives no indication that more generous welfare states 
are extra challenged by multi-level territorial attachments. 
Institutional performance, as gauged by a country being a net con-
tributor to or net recipient from the EU, was expected to make the 
individual-level relationships stronger in the net-contributing countries. 
This was the case for national trust, but, counter to expectations, not 
for trust in EU institutions. People with national attachments were not 
less trusting of EU institutions in EU net-contributing countries, and the 
utility aspect did not reduce the strength of the relationship with trust. 
Concerning the preferred decision level for welfare issues, however, 
people with national attachments were less supportive in the net-
contributing states (where the supra-nationally attached were, however, 
more supportive). This can be interpreted as indicating that when there 
is no economic gain, the affective impact becomes larger. 
Finally, institutional design, as captured by federal or unitary state, 
met the expectation that the relationship between territorial attach-
ments and trust would be stronger in federal states, with regard to trust 
in national institutions. In contrast, for supra-national trust the pattern 
was the opposite, being strongest in unitary states. The idea that a su-
pra-national level would fit more naturally, and thus be deemed more 
legitimate and hence trustworthy, into a federal system was thus not 
borne out. When investigating the same interaction effect regarding the 
preferred decision level for welfare issues, hardly any difference was 
found between federal and unitary states. When using other data and 
methods, however, I believe it would be productive to include the sub-
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national aspect (e.g., regional strength as an institutional context) in 
analyses of these individual-level relationships. 
The overall conclusion of this chapter is thus that the relationship be-
tween multi-level territorial attachments and national trust was influ-
enced by most institutional context factors, whereas the relationship 
with trust in EU institutions was only moderated by the governmental 
structure. For the states, this indicates that the multi-level system may 
pose more of a challenge to some sorts of states than to others (e.g., 
states in democratic transition); clearly, this is an area needing more 
research. The preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare 
issues is a much more sensitive issue in most states, where both the 
resistance of people with national attachments and the support of peo-
ple with supra-national attachments are amplified by duration of EU 
exposure (and earlier enlargement phase) and cost of membership. The 
question of a social Europe will most likely continue to be debated. 
I have theoretically argued for the necessity of considering the institu-
tional context when exploring relationships between multi-level territo-
rial attachments and political trust and welfare issues, respectively. 
Moreover, I have suggested the kinds of theoretically relevant institu-
tional contexts (i.e., culture, performance, and procedure), and how 
(i.e., interaction effects) these contexts are theoretically relevant. De-
spite the limitations of the empirical analyses conducted, I believe I have 
proved the usefulness of making further enquiries using combined micro 
and macro approach, and have also identified a selection of institutional 





 Chapter 6 
 
Multi-level Europeans and  
the Challenges of a Multi-Level System 
 
At the system level, the overarching theoretical question of this study is 
how the multi-level system in Europe can be seen as challenging both 
traditional state roles and the European integration process. In line with 
the system-building tradition (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005; Hirschman 
1970; Rokkan 1974, 1999), I have emphasized the role of territorial 
identity and its expected importance for the subsequent legitimacy and 
solidarity steps. However, I have argued that such a discussion should 
take account of all levels of the multi-level system, and that it would 
benefit from shifting its focus from the level of the system to the indi-
viduals who live in it, i.e., European citizens. This means that the theo-
retical discussions in this study concern both the system level (used in 
stating the overall problem and explain how the parts of the study are 
interlinked) and the individual level (used in the separate parts). The 
empirical analyses, in contrast, focus mainly on the individuals, by in-
vestigating the influence of individuals’ territorial attachments on politi-
cal trust and welfare attitudes. 
In considering how the European multi-level system can be seen as 
challenging the role of the state and the European integration process, 
we can discern three specific challenges, inspired by the system-building 
tradition and democratic theories, and adapted to a multi-level system 
(e.g. Dahl 1989; Ferrera 2005; McEwen & Moreno 2005; Offe 2000; 
Scharpf 1999). These challenges are: 1) the challenge of territorial at-
tachments, i.e., the possibility that individual attachment to other than 
country levels could lead to decreasing national attachment; 2) the chal-
lenge of political trust, i.e., that trust in national political institutions 
and politicians could decrease as an effect of multi-level territorial at-
tachments; and 3) the challenge of welfare attitudes, i.e., that multi-level 
territorial attachments could lead to less support for welfare state poli-
cies. Moreover, these relationships may be affected by different institu-
tional contexts. I will discuss my theoretical elaborations of each of 
these four aspects shortly, and how my study can be seen as contribut-
ing to the related theories and their continuous development. 
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Empirically, I have explored these challenges by analysing two differ-
ent types of data sets, to investigate the relevance of my theoretical ar-
guments and of the model presented in Chapter 1. The combination of 
broad comparative data from all the EU member states (obtained in 
2004) and more detailed data (including my own fieldwork and indica-
tors) from one country, Sweden, is a strength. The combination allows 
in-depth analyses at all territorial levels using partly unique data, as 
well as cross-national comparisons of all 25 EU member states in 
2004.120  
As I will discuss in more detail below, my results indicate that neither 
the territorial attachments themselves, nor their impact on political 
trust, constitute a challenge to the role of the state (or to the continua-
tion of European integration). Rather, the development of the European 
multi-level system seems to have enhanced both attachment to and trust 
in a number of territorial levels, including the states and the EU.  
The relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and wel-
fare attitudes, on the other hand, is more threatening from the point of 
view of challenges to the state. Sustaining support for the welfare state 
might turn out to be somewhat difficult if the vast majority of people 
develop strong attachments to territorial levels other than the state. At 
the same time, however, the preference for EU-level decision-making 
regarding welfare issues is still low, even among people with European 
attachments, and thus does not indicate any demand for or expectation 
of a “social Europe”. In this regard, the European multi-level system 
may challenge the traditional role of the (welfare) state, but without 
offering any immediate alternative at the European level. Finally, my 
results indicate the relevance of also considering the institutional con-
text, not least regarding variations of the experience and significance of 
the multi-level system.  
 
Multi-level Europeans? 
Returning to the question of how a multi-level system might challenge 
the role of the state and European integration, I have argued that it is 
relevant to start with Europeans themselves and their territorial attach-
ments. One reason for this approach is that political attempts to en-
hance attachments to other levels (e.g., regions and the EU) have fol-
                                                 
120 The Swedish data sets are the National SOM survey, 2004, and the Swedish European 
Parliament election study, 2004 (Holmberg & Weibull 2005; Oscarsson, et al. 2006); the 
European data used are from the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. See Chapter 1 for more 
information on the data sources. 
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lowed in the wake of the development of a European multi-level system, 
and because people’s attachments are supposed to matter to the stability 
of a political system, according to democratic and system building theo-
ries (Dahl 1989; Ferrera 2005; Offe 2000; Scharpf 1999). The problem 
is that almost none of these existing theories have elaborated the argu-
ments concerning the multi-level system, at least not so as to include all 
levels from local to European, and how it could matter if the focus 
shifts from the system to individuals and if people feel attached to levels 
other than the state.  
I have argued that existing signs of increasing attachment to territo-
rial levels both above and beneath the state in Europe, for example, 
regional identity and discussions of an increasing European identifica-
tion (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Bruter 2005; Catt & Murphy 2002; 
Keating 2003), were inconclusive. I addressed two important problems 
in this part of the study: that the theoretical expectations are underde-
veloped, and that there is a lack of empirical investigations (especially 
cross-national ones). Regarding the theoretical underdevelopment, my 
concept of multi-level territorial attachments is more specific than the 
term “identity”, but at the same time broader than national or Euro-
pean pride, and distinct from support for European integration. The 
concept is also individual and territorial, including a range of territorial 
levels from local to supra-national.  
There is a difference of theoretical opinion as to whether or not peo-
ple can feel simultaneously attached to more than one level (Kohli 
2000; Lawler 1992), a difference that I have argued is at least partly a 
consequence of the variety of definitions and interpretations of the con-
cept of identity (Brubaker & Cooper 2000). Moreover, attachments to 
territorial levels other than the nation do not necessarily challenge the 
state, not even if these other attachments are increasing in number or 
strength. Rather, there would need to be indications of decreasing na-
tional attachments before one could speak of such a challenge. From the 
viewpoint of European integration, the signs of a possible increase in 
European attachment can at first glace be considered as very positive. 
On the other hand, the EU is a multi-level system, and the states are still 
the politically most important levels. If territorial attachments were 
some kind of zero-sum game, and increasing European (and regional) 
attachments led to decreasing national attachments, this might cause 
tension between people. Hence, the emergence of concurrent attach-
ments to all levels would pose the least challenge to both EU member 
states and European integration. 
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I have chosen to theoretically define the concept of multi-level territo-
rial attachments as allowing individuals to be attached to more than 
one level at the same time. However, the extent to which people feel 
themselves to be “multi-level Europeans” is an empirical question. As 
long as enough individuals have such feelings, I do not expect them to 
challenge to the role of the states. 
I have also elaborated what I believe to be the three main theoretical 
dimensions of this concept: territorial level, attachment form, and at-
tachment strength. The range of variation in each attachment dimension 
is summarized in Table 6.1. This multi-dimensionality corresponds 
better to the idea of a multi-level political system than merely analysing 
the attachment level by level, since it is not only important whether or 
not there is attachment to a given level, but rather what combinations 
of attachments to different levels individuals have.  
Each of these dimensions highlights relevant aspects of the concept of 
multi-level territorial attachments. When combined, however, as the 
strongest level(s) of attachment, the interplay between the dimensions 
becomes apparent. This classification of individuals can distinguish 
between those who feel attached to the same level, depending on how 
strongly, and to what other levels, he or she feels attached to. As will be 
discussed shortly, this approach has proven itself to be productive in 
analysing the consequences of multi-level territorial attachments. 
 




The second problem was the scarcity of empirical analyses of individu-
als’ attachments to all the levels in the European polity, and compara-
tively between all EU member countries. Together with the underdevel-
Dimensions Level Form Strength 
    
Unattached Unattached Unattached 
Sub-national Exclusive Fairly 
National Multiple Mixed 
 
Variations 
Supra-national Nested Very 
    
 
Strongest level(s) of attachment 
   
 Unattached  
 Primarily sub-national  
 All domestic  
 Primarily national  
 Supra-national etc.  
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oped theoretical expectations, this situation called for an explorative 
empirical approach to analysing individuals’ territorial attachments 
according to the three dimensions. Hence, this study also makes a 
methodological contribution, since I have developed and tested different 
ways to measure these three dimensions, both individually and in com-
bination (see Chapter 2 for details). The dimensions are “pure”, in the 
sense of being independent of one another, which leads to a generous 
definition of when an individual can be said to have an attachment − a 
large proportion of people being attached to at least one level. I argue 
that this is both theoretically and empirically justified. It should not be 
seen as a problem, but rather as one of the main advantages of the ap-
proach: that it is not enough only to consider whether or not a person 
has an attachment to a certain level. For better understanding, it is im-
portant to consider all three dimensions. My empirical analyses of the 
Swedish and European data sets support the theoretical expectation that 
people can have multi-level territorial attachments, and that attach-
ments to other levels complement rather than challenge the role and 
position of the state.  
More specifically, I have demonstrated that most Europeans have at-
tachments to all three levels included in the first dimension, territorial 
level, i.e., the sub-national (local or regional), national, and supra-
national levels. Most people (over 90 per cent) are attached to the na-
tional level. Measured in this manner, no lack of national attachment 
can be seen to have resulted from people’s being attached to other terri-
torial levels. When considering the second dimension, form, the empiri-
cal analyses indicated that only a few per cent of people are unattached 
or have an exclusive form of attachment, but that the largest group of 
people comprise those with nested attachments, i.e., concurrent attach-
ments to all levels. Since both people with multiple and with nested 
attachments are attached to more than one level, it is clear that an 
overwhelming majority of Europeans can be said to have some kind of 
multi-level territorial attachments. Regarding the strength dimension, 
most people also have a mixture of fairly and very strong attachments, 
and the results indicate that there is no overall tendency, for example, 
for the strength of attachment to be stronger among people with an 
exclusive form of attachment or among those with attachments to a 
certain level.  
An additional contribution of this study is the blending of all three 
dimensions, to form the combined measure of the strongest level(s) of 
attachment. Empirically, the largest categories are those that embrace 
national attachment (such as all levels equal or all domestic), which 
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strongly indicates that despite the great many “multi-level Europeans”, 
this situation by itself does not challenge the role of the state. From a 
European integration perspective, it could be seen as positive that a 
fairly large number of Europeans have equally strong attachments to 
Europe and to all other territorial levels. These people are truly “multi-
level Europeans”. This theoretically plausible challenge was thus not 
supported empirically. 
 
Multi-level Europeans and legitimacy 
The second challenge to the role of the state and to the European inte-
gration process can also be disregarded, i.e., that attachments to other 
territorial levels than the nation could lead to less political trust. The 
theoretical understanding is that territorial attachments should impinge 
on the political stability and legitimacy of a political system, something 
that is often assumed in democratic theory (Dahl 1989) and theories of 
political support (Easton 1965), but mainly at the system level and con-
cerning states. Although political trust is a major political science inter-
est, empirical analyses of this specific relationship are few, especially 
those including all levels of a multi-level system. One contribution of 
this study is thus the theoretical elaboration of this expected relation-
ship in a full multi-level system, as well as empirical analysis of how the 
dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments may influence political 
trust at different levels.  
Developing existing theoretical reasoning, I have suggested that there 
are two different ways in which a multi-level system could challenge 
political trust. One would be if there were no relationship at all between 
territorial attachments and political trust. Another would be if the rela-
tionship existed, but the fact that individuals tended to feel attached to 
other territorial levels led to increased trust in political institutions and 
actors at other levels, and thus to decreased national political trust. 
Neither of these challenges was supported empirically by the analyses. 
Instead, the results indicate that people who are truly “multi-level 
Europeans”, i.e., attached to all levels, also tend to trust the political 
institutions and actors at all levels. These results also hold when con-
trolling for several other explanations of political trust, thus contribut-
ing to further knowledge. 
One can of course object to these results by referring to the uncertain 
direction of causality. Especially at the macro level, it is debatable 
whether aggregated feelings of attachment lead to trust in political insti-
tutions, or whether it is the construction of trustworthy institutions that 
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affects the attachments people have to them (cf. Putnam, et al. 1993; 
Rothstein 1996). My interpretation is that this is a reciprocal process 
over time, and I argue that it is theoretically reasonable to investigate 
the relationship as the influence of multi-level territorial attachments on 
political trust, at the individual level. This argument is also related to 
views expressed in other theories of political trust (Dalton 2004; Easton 
1975; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Mishler & Rose 2001). The reverse, 
that an individual’s trust in an institution would cause his or her territo-
rial attachment, is less intuitive, given that territorial attachments can 
be compared to a person’s beliefs, whereas political trust is closer to an 
attitude and is thus more easily subject to change (cf. Almond & Verba 
1963). The reverse order would also focus on trying to explain why an 
individual has certain attachments, rather than on exploring their pos-
sible impacts (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion). 
Regarding the three dimensions of attachment, I have argued that the 
territorial level dimension should influence trust in political institutions 
and actors at the corresponding level, in accordance with the horizontal 
principle, and this supposition was empirically supported. More inter-
estingly still, supra-national attachments tend to have the strongest 
impact on trust in institutions and political actors at all levels. This also 
corresponded to the fact that the nested form of attachment proved to 
be significantly connected with trust at all levels. Moreover, there is an 
evident difference between people with a dominantly European attach-
ment (i.e., supra-national etc.) and people who are equally strongly 
attached to all levels, including Europe (all levels equal). The former 
group did not trust sub-national institutions and actors, whereas the 
latter group trusted all levels’ institutions and actors. Hence, state le-
gitimacy (in the form of political trust) does not seem to be challenged 
by the European multi-level system. In light of current discussions of 
European integration and of the possible need for a European identity, 
these results indicate the importance of not focusing on the EU level to 
the exclusion of other. In a multi-level system, attachments to all levels 
might be equally important.  
To relate these results to a broader discussion of the future of Euro-
pean integration, these results, i.e. the rejection of the second challenge, 
could be seen as making it plausible that if more people had multi-level 
territorial attachments, the legitimacy of both the state and EU institu-
tions could be expected to strengthen. 
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Multi-level Europeans and Solidarity 
The third challenge to the state and to European integration is the chal-
lenge of welfare attitudes. I have argued that unlike the previous chal-
lenge, this challenge more clearly demands attention. The reason for 
this is connected both to the theoretical background and the results of 
the analyses. Theoretically, attitudes towards the welfare state can be 
seen as a harder case for gauging the impact of multi-level territorial 
attachment, because welfare policies usually contain redistributive fea-
tures and thus bear greater resemblance to a zero-sum game. This chal-
lenge also corresponds to the last of the system-building phases, mean-
ing it is the phase that presupposes the strongest structural bounding 
and the necessity of overriding subgroup interests (Ferrera 2005; Offe 
2000; Scharpf 1999). This can be compared to the fact that it is theo-
retically possible to have equally strong trust in institutions at several 
levels simultaneously. This third challenge can thus be seen as a chal-
lenge to the welfare state in particular.  
In this manner, theoretical expectations regarding the challenges 
posed by the European multi-level system are highlighted. My argu-
ments are elaborated from other normatively based theories concerning 
values and the “moral economy” (Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Mau 2003; 
Svallfors 2006). One key is the deservingness criterion of identity (van 
Oorschot 2006), since it provides a theoretical explanation of the 
mechanism of how territorial attachments can influence welfare atti-
tudes (people closer to “us” are seen as more deserving). Another key is 
the horizontal principle, which defines the boundaries of the relation-
ships, especially between the “nation” and welfare policies. 
The empirical results indicate that this is an area where it might be 
relevant to consider that the multi-level system could indeed pose a 
challenge to the welfare state. My analyses of the impact of the different 
dimensions of attachment indicate, for example, that people who are 
most strongly attached to domestic levels are more likely to hold public-
sector-friendly attitudes, whereas the group with a predominantly Euro-
pean attachment is the most unsupportive of the public sector. These 
results hold even when controlling for other explanations, such as ide-
ology, education, and class. The negative impact of predominantly 
European attachments can be understood, given the territorial limits of 
individual national public sectors.  
The willingness to share national welfare systems with other EU citi-
zens is, on the other hand, supported by people with predominantly 
European attachments, but not by people with national attachments. 
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The most immediate impact of a multi-level system concerns the pre-
ferred decision level for welfare policies, and as expected from theory, 
the relationship with national attachments is strongly negative, indicat-
ing a strong preference for national-level decision-making regarding 
welfare issues.  
As a general conclusion about territorial attachments and solidarity, it 
seems that some of the theoretical reasoning of Scharpf (1999), Ferrera 
(2005), and others is supported; even at the individual level, there is a 
connection between territorial attachments and attitudes towards wel-
fare, and the relationship is generally horizontal. The third challenge 
can thus not be rejected. Still, I argue that there is a need for further 
analysis of more territorial levels and other forms of welfare attitudes, 
in order to learn more about this relationship.  
The main difference between this challenge, of welfare attitudes, and 
the former challenge, of political trust, is that whereas the group of 
most proper “multi-level Europeans” (all levels equal) tended to trust 
all political levels, they displayed less solidarity with other EU citizens 
and were less in favour of making welfare decisions at the EU level. 
However, people with predominantly European attachments (supra-
national etc.), who did not trust all political levels, are the ones most 
favourable towards the idea of EU-level decision-making regarding 
welfare issues and towards sharing national social systems with other 
EU citizens, even when controlling for ideology or EU attitude.  
If the number of people with strong European attachments were to 
increase, the multi-level system could thus challenge the role of the wel-
fare state − a possibility that needs more detailed analysis in the future. 
From the perspective of someone who would favour deeper European 
integration, it may, on the one hand, be seen as positive that solidarity 
with other EU citizens, and the preference for the EU as the decision 
level for welfare issues, can be found among people who are predomi-
nantly European. This group is very small, however, and in general less 
supportive of a large public sector – and it is the larger group of “multi-
level Europeans” who are the most trusting of the whole multi-level 
system. Hence, the possible acceptance of the EU as a multi-level system 
could more easily be discussed in terms of trust than in terms of welfare 
issues, which is understandable given the position of welfare issues at 
the core of nation state functions, and the historical process of bounded 
structuring at the national level.  
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The institutional context 
Finally, the importance of the institutional context was included in 
Chapter 5. There are theoretical reasons to expect that the relationship 
between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, or pre-
ferred decision level for welfare issues, can vary according to type of 
institutional context. The three challenges were all brought down to the 
individual level, and analysed as the impacts of individuals’ territorial 
attachments. Including the institutional context thus implies a partial 
change of focus and further theoretical elaboration. Studying how insti-
tutional contexts can contribute to shaping individuals’ preferences and 
attitudes is by no means a new field. The special feature of my model is 
that, unlike the vast majority of literature in this field, my study does 
not emphasize the direct impact of institutional context, but rather the 
interaction effect of institutional contexts on the individual-level rela-
tionships. (Interaction effects are both theoretically and methodologi-
cally complicated; see Chapter 5 for more information). 
Despite the fact that I refer to the European multi-level system as a 
single phenomenon, the reality is that the features of this system vary 
considerably across countries. The theoretical contribution is thus an 
elaboration of what kinds of institutional contexts can be expected to 
influence the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments 
and political trust, or the preferred decision level for welfare issues.  
I have argued that the relevant institutional context factors must both 
take account of the multi-level system approach and be theoretically 
relevant to be thought to interact with multi-level territorial attach-
ments in influencing political trust and welfare attitudes. Citing macro 
theoretical explanations of political trust and welfare attitudes, I have 
suggested that three different kinds of institutional contexts were rele-
vant from the multi-level system perspective: institutional culture, insti-
tutional performance, and institutional procedures (or design). The 
specific selected institutional context factors for the analyses were: old 
or new member state (or phase of enlargement), welfare state regime, 
EU net contributor or recipient, and federal or unitary state. 
I have conducted several analyses to investigate whether there is any 
empirical support for the relevance of my theoretical reasoning. The 
analyses are limited to considering only the relationship between the 
state and the EU and only a few of the individual-level relationships. 
Some of the results highlight the relevance of considering the institu-
tional contexts; for example, the positive relationship between territo-
rial attachments and national trust is much stronger in older than newer 
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member states. These results are reasonable, given the period of transi-
tion to democracy affecting the national institutions in most new mem-
ber states. More surprisingly, there was no significant difference be-
tween old and new member states concerning the impact of individuals’ 
territorial attachments on trust in EU institutions. Such a difference 
could have been expected due to the longer EU exposure in older mem-
ber states. 
Resistance to EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues is 
much stronger among people with national attachments in older than in 
newer member states. There is a similar pattern of differences between 
net-contributing and net-recipient countries. Theoretically, this can be 
interpreted as indicating that when there is no economic gain, the affec-
tive impact becomes larger, thus amplifying both the negative effect of 
national attachments and the positive effect of supra-national attach-
ment. However, the institutional design (i.e., government structure) met 
the expectation that the relationship between territorial attachments 
and national trust would be stronger in federal states. My argument 
corresponds to Lijpharts’ (1999) suggestion that territorial conflict be-
tween different territorial levels can be seen as institutionalized in fed-
eral states. However, the suggestion that a supra-national level should 
thus fit more naturally into a federal system was not borne out, since 
trust in EU institutions was stronger in unitary states, at all attachment 
levels.  
These analyses only include a few of the possible institutional con-
texts, but I believe that I have, both theoretically and empirically, pro-
duced enough interesting results as to highlight the necessity of consid-
ering institutional contexts in future research. Moreover, I have sug-
gested the kinds of institutional contexts that could be theoretically 
relevant. The results of the empirical analyses imply the usefulness of 
further exploring this combined micro and macro approach, albeit us-
ing other data and methods. 
 
Implications and future research 
Several implications of this explorative study deserve highlighting. At 
the system level, I would argue that my results are significant for the 
system-building tradition, not least regarding the prospects for system 
building in Europe. Concerning the individual-level theories, I believe 
that my theoretical development of the concept of multi-level territorial 
attachments can be useful for ongoing research into (territorial) iden-
tity, especially in a multi-level setting. I have identified the necessity of 
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considering not only several levels, but how attachments to these vari-
ous levels are connected and combined. Emphasizing the three dimen-
sions of multi-level territorial attachments and their combination should 
lead to further theoretical elaborations of these aspects and their possi-
ble impact. 
After considering the challenges of multi-level territorial attachments 
to the state and to European integration, I concentrated on the possible 
impacts of these attachments on political trust and welfare attitudes. 
Hence, some contributions are also relevant to research into political 
trust and welfare attitudes. In both these areas, theoretical arguments 
and results have indicated that, although the impacts may not be very 
strong, there are still both theoretical and empirical reasons to consider 
the multi-level territorial attachment concept as advancing our under-
standing of why individuals trust political institutions and actors at 
different territorial levels, and why they have certain welfare attitudes. 
Especially in the field of welfare state research, I would claim that 
there are strong incentives to continue exploring the relevance of multi-
level territorial attachments. Though less empirically explored, these 
attachments may challenge the role of the welfare state. Taken to their 
extreme, such attachments could even affect not only the question of 
what level should be responsible for welfare issues, but whether gener-
ous public welfare policies can exist at all in a multi-level system. We 
must reserve judgement, however, since several of the relevant analyses 
were conducted using only Swedish data, and Sweden is a special case 
in terms of welfare attitudes, given its history as a generous welfare 
state. Further investigation of this relationship in a comparative Euro-
pean setting is thus needed, also including other aspects of welfare poli-
cies and of sub-national levels. 
A final theoretical implication concerns research into institutionalism 
and preference formation, or more specifically, the growing interest in 
combining macro and micro analyses. I have theoretically suggested 
what kinds of institutional contexts might be important to the individ-
ual-level relationships examined in this study. Despite the clear limita-
tions of the analyses presented, I would argue that there are reasons 
both to continue the theoretical discussion and conduct analyses that 
simultaneously combine the micro and macro levels. I especially believe 
a multi-level analysis approach could be useful for such empirical analy-
ses (Snijders & Bosker 1999). 
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Epilogue, or some final comments on possible social implications 
I would like to take the opportunity to make a few comments about the 
possibly much broader social implications of this study, leaving behind 
more strictly academic considerations. The fact that multi-level territo-
rial attachments by themselves turned out not to challenge either the 
role of the state or state legitimacy might be considered as a positive 
result for political representatives, especially national politicians. The 
number of people who can be defined as “multi-level Europeans”, and 
their overall tendency to trust all political institutions, may also please 
European integrationists and remind them not to focus solely on the 
question of whether or not there is a European identity. All levels are 
important in the European multi-level system. It can thus be argued that 
an increase in the number of “multi-level Europeans” could be expected 
to raise the degree of political trust in the multi-level system as a whole, 
including the EU level. However, the idea of a “social Europe” might 
not necessarily be supported by this group, since social sharing involves 
distributing scarce resources among people. Unlike trust, it is not an 
unlimited or easily expandable resource. On the other hand, these 
“multi-level Europeans” tend to be more supportive of general public 
welfare management than are people who are predominantly European, 
as long as there is no question of changing the governmental level re-
sponsible for these issues. A possible solution from both the state and 
European integration perspectives could thus be to let welfare issues 








Table A4.1 Effect of form of attachment on redistribution and pre-
ferred decision level for social policies, in Sweden 2004 
(unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates) 
 
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01  
Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study 2004. The solidarity with EU-citizens in 
Sweden index ranges from 1-4, where 4 equals most solidarity. The attachment variables are each coded 0-1, 1 for 
feeling attach to the level - but they are not dummy variables. For information on control variables, see table 4.5. No 
control variables are presented in this table due to the similar results to table 4.5. All estimates are under control for 
each other. 
Table A4.2 Effect of strength of attachment on redistribution and 
preferred decision level for social policies, in Sweden 
2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates) 
 
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01  
Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study 2004. The solidarity with EU-citizens in 
Sweden index ranges from 1-4, where 4 equals most solidarity. The attachment variables are each coded 0-1, 1 for 
feeling attach to the level - but they are not dummy variables. For information on control variables, see table 4.5. No 
control variables are presented in this table due to the similar results to table 4.5. All estimates are under control for 
each other. 
 Solidarity with EU-citizens 
in Sweden (index) 
EU preferred decision level 













Form (base = unattached) .50**    -.33    
Exclusive form  -.20* -.69*** .50 .47 -.21 .12 -.31 -.49 
Multiple form  -.26*** -.64*** .38 .35 -.59*** .02 -.46 -.64 
Nested form  .28*** -.35 .64 .48 .65*** .68** -.01 -.48 
         
Constant  2.54*** 1.39*** 1.36**  2.38*** 1.76*** 1.86** 
R2  .05 .16 .18  .07 .13 .19 
N  1203 781 775  1218 801 797 
 Solidarity with EU-citizens 
in Sweden (index) 
EU preferred decision level 











Strength (base = unattached) .50**    -.33    
Fairly attached .12* -.39 .57 .51 .22** .51 -.15 -.44 
Fairly and very attached .05 -.48* .47 .37 .20*** .40 -.26 -.59 
Very attached -.16 -.62** .39 .38 -.36*** .06 -.48 -.64 
         
Constant  2.54*** 1.39*** 1.36**  2.38*** 1.76*** 1.86** 
R2  .05 .16 .18  .07 .13 .19 
N  1203 781 775  1218 801 797 
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Table A4.3 Effect of strongest attachment on welfare attitudes in the 
Swedish national SOM-survey 2004 (unstandardised mul-
tivariate OLS estimates) 
 
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01  
Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM-study 2004. The three indices range from 1-5, where 5 is the most public 
sector friendly position. The attachment variables are coded 0-1, indicating attachment to the level, but they are not 
mutually independent since a person can be attached to more than one level. For each index, the left-most estimates 
in italics display the bivariate relationships, in the middle columns are the estimates of the basic model where the 
effect of the attachment variables is measured under control for each other, and the last column display the estimates 
of the full model, including the control variables. 
 
Table A5.1 Coding of interaction variables 
 
 General support 
















(base = unattached) -.13   .03   .02   
sub-national -.11 -.01 .36 -.07 .07 -.01 -.06 .09 -.10 
All domestic .28*** .33* .69*** .37*** .30** .19 .30*** .29*** .03 
Foremost national  .14** .21 .60*** -.02 .03 .03 -.07 .01 -.17 
Supra-national (et al)  -.47*** -.29 .29 -.44*** -.37*** -.25 -.36*** -.23*** -.26 
All levels equal -.30*** -.14 .48** -.21** -.15 -.07 -.04 .04 -.09 
       
Constant 3.11*** 4.91*** 3.17*** 4.94*** 3.94*** 4.51*** 
Adjusted R2 .00 .26 .02 .33 .03 .25 
N 1563 1123 1613 1179 1392 1033 











Austria 1995 Contributor federal state Corporatist 
Belgium 1958 Contributor federal state Corporatist 
Cyprus 2004 Recipient unitary state - 
The Czech republic 2004 Recipient unitary state East European 
Denmark 1973 Contributor unitary state Nordic 
Estonia 2004 Recipient unitary state East European 
Finland 1995 Contributor unitary state Nordic 
France 1958 Contributor unitary state Corporatist 
Germany 1958 Contributor federal state Corporatist 
Greece 1981 Recipient unitary state Mediterranean 
Hungary 2004 Recipient unitary state East European 
Ireland 1973 Recipient unitary state Liberal 
Italy 1958 Contributor unitary state Mediterranean 
Latvia 2004 Recipient unitary state East European 
Lithuania 2004 Recipient unitary state East European 
Luxembourg 1958 Contributor unitary state Corporatist 
Malta 2004 Recipient unitary state - 
The Netherlands 1958 Contributor unitary state Corporatist 
Poland 2004 Recipient unitary state East European 
Portugal 1986 Recipient unitary state Mediterranean 
Slovakia 2004 Recipient unitary state East European 
Slovenia 2004 Recipient unitary state East European 
Spain 1986 Recipient unitary state Mediterranean 
Sweden 1995 Contributor unitary state Nordic 
United Kingdom 1973 Contributor unitary state liberal 
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Table A5.2 Phase of joining the EU as interaction effect on the rela-
tionship between level of attachment and political trust, 
EU25 2004 (OLS regression coefficients) 
 
 
Table A5.4 Effect of welfare regimes on the relation between multi-
level territorial attachments and preferred decision level 
for social policy issues, EU25 2004 (unstandardized OLS 
regression coefficients) 
 
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01  
Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. The preferred decision-level index is constructed from six items 
(national level=0, EU=1), added to range from 0-6. The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 
(do not have such attachment). The Level items are not mutually independent, but the strongest attachment items 
are, with the group of ‘Foremost sub-national attachment’ as the base category. All the coefficients are computed 
under control for the control variables used in chapter 4, plus the multiplicative interaction terms, although they are 
suppressed in the table. The fat marked coefficients are significantly different from the base category.  
Phase of EU-admission 1958 1973 1980:ies 1995 2004 
National trust index 
     
Level of attachment:      
Sub-national  .20** .37** -.51** .53* .38* 
National .51*** .92*** 1.05*** .49 .25 
Supra-national .41*** .33*** .24*** .10 .09 
Supra-national trust index 
     
Level of attachment:      
Sub-national  .23*** .47** -.04 .24 .33 
National .16* .06 .64*** .34 -.09 
Supra-national .87*** 1.17*** .93*** .72*** .73*** 
National trust index 
     
Strongest attachment:      
Foremost sub-national .80*** 1.04** -.61 1.09 -.38 
All domestic 1.18*** 1.64*** -.04 .99 -.24 
Foremost national  .93*** 1.49*** -.20 1.00 -.17 
Supra-national (et al) 1.01*** .96** .03 .62 -.09 
All levels equal 1.31*** 1.40*** .09 .88 .03 
Supra-national trust index 
     
Strongest attachment:      
Foremost sub-national .20 1.47*** .12 .31 .51 
All domestic .48** 1.16*** .59 .02 .71* 
Foremost national  .09 .90** .55 .23 .71*  
Supra-national (et al) .37* 1.44*** 1.54*** .50 1.15*** 
All levels equal .86*** 1.97*** 1.51*** .51 1.12*** 
 Social policies should be decided at the EU-level 
Welfare regime Nordic Corporatist Liberal Latin East European 
Level of attachment:      
Sub-national  -.07 -.12 -.18 -.28* -.02 
National -.38 -.66*** -.75*** -.38*** -.07 
Supra-national .15 .44*** .80*** .30*** .28** 
      
Strongest attachment:      
Unattached -.50 .25 .47* .27 -.27 
All domestic -.44* -.39*** -.35*** -.28*** .04 
Foremost national  -.29 -.27*** -.10 -.16 -.10 
Supra-national (et al) -.00 .35*** .78*** .23** .25 
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